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Abstract 
 
The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has substantially 
progressed amongst countries around the world, particularly in the ASEAN region, which 
consists mainly of developing countries.  Numerous research studies on IFRS issues have 
been conducted in western countries, mainly those with developed economies.  Few studies 
have examined the impacts of IFRS adoption on developing economies, but mainly focused 
on partial convergence.  This thesis focused on the impact of full IFRS convergence on one 
of the developing economies in ASEAN region, Malaysia.  Specifically, this thesis focused 
on two IFRS issues. First, it explored the impact of IFRS on changes in financial statements 
and financial ratios.  This is followed by determining the IFRS impact on the quality of 
financial reporting, particularly the earnings management. 
This thesis applied two theories - agency and signalling theories - to determine how the full 
convergence with IFRS will affect the financial reporting of the companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia.  Agency theory suggests that full IFRS convergence acts as a bonding mechanism 
to restrict the listed companies from engaging in the manipulation of financial information.  
This restriction will reduce the information asymmetry between the managements of the 
listed companies and the users of financial statements, especially the shareholders and 
investors. This can be explained by the signalling theory.  Therefore, agency and signalling 
theories predict that the full convergence with IFRS will improve the quality of financial 
reporting.  The changes in the quality of financial reporting are evident when there are 
changes in financial statements and financial ratios. 
To determine the impact of full IFRS convergence, this thesis conducted a six-year 
observation which comprised three years before and three years after full IFRS convergence.  
 
 
xii 
 
The sample used for this study consisted of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  Data was 
manually collected from the annual reports of these listed companies.  To determine the 
quality of financial reporting, this study examined the changes in discretionary accruals – one 
of the earnings management proxies.  The discretionary accruals were calculated using the 
Jones (1991) model and two of the modified Jones (1991) models. 
The results of this thesis indicate that the IFRS convergence (both before and after full 
convergence) significantly influenced the financial statements and financial ratios.  A 
comparison of the discretionary accruals indicated that the managements of listed companies 
exercised less earnings management during the full convergence period than the close 
alignment period.  The findings of this study also suggest that full IFRS convergence may not 
be effective in reducing earnings management in the long term. The strengthening of 
monitoring or bonding mechanisms by, for example, using Big 4 auditors, is important to 
ensure compliance with IFRS. 
This thesis provides analytical information on the effectiveness of IFRS in improving the 
quality of financial reporting, which is important to the accounting standards-setting bodies, 
particularly the IASB and MASB.  The findings of this study also signal to the Malaysian 
accounting regulators the importance of strengthening the enforcement of IFRS compliance 
to ensure the long-term benefits of IFRS implementation.  Finally, this analytical information 
may also serve as guide for the neighbouring ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, Singapore 
and Thailand that are currently working towards full convergence.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
In 2002, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) introduced the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) globally and recommended that countries around the 
world adopt these accounting standards.  The European Union (EU) was one of the first to 
announce the adoption of IFRS in 2002 and had completely adopted IFRS by 2005 through 
the enactment of Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002.  The mandatory adoption of IFRS resulted 
in more than 7000 EU listed companies applying IFRS from 2005.  The mandatory adoption 
of IFRS was followed by other developed countries such as Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand.  Two leading economies, the United States and China, also worked together with 
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) to converge the national generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) with IFRS.  In the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) region, the significant growth of IFRS adoption can be observed with most of the 
countries (except Laos and Cambodia) having either mandatorily adopted or closely aligned 
with IFRS.  
The transition from local GAAP to IFRS is aimed to improve the quality of accounting 
standards which brings transparency, accountability and efficiency to the global financial 
markets (IFRS 2017).  However, the proposed benefits of IFRS adoption have been a subject 
of debate among academicians, practitioners, accounting regulators and other stakeholders.  
Academic researchers have agreed that IFRS adoption promotes higher quality financial 
reporting (Ball 2006; Damant 2006; Alali & Cao 2010).  Academic researchers (Ball 2006; 
Zeff 2007; Alali & Cao 2010; De George, Li & Shivakumar 2016) also identified possible 
challenges that hinder the effectiveness of IFRS implementation.  In particular, Ball (2006) 
argued that the effectiveness of IFRS implementation depends on the incentives of the 
preparers (i.e. managers) to be transparent and the enforcers (i.e. auditors, regulators, 
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politicians) to enforce the implementation of IFRS. The ineffectiveness of IFRS 
implementation in reducing information asymmetry will ultimately disadvantage the 
investors.  Studies such as Covrig, DeFond and Hung (2007), DeFond et al. (2011), Márquez-
Ramos (2011) and Gordon, Loeb and Zhu (2012) have found that countries which adopted 
IFRS have greater foreign direct investments (FDI) than do non-IFRS countries.  Particularly, 
Gordon, Loeb and Zhu (2012) reported that IFRS-adopted countries with developing 
economies (or emerging markets) have a greater increase in foreign direct investments (FDI) 
than IFRS-adopted developed economies.  Developing economies have weaker financial 
reporting regulations and less transparency in financial reporting than countries with 
developed economies (Ding et al. 2007; Gordon, Loeb & Zhu 2012).  Given the substantial 
IFRS adoptions across the globe, it is important to determine whether IFRS adoption has 
improved the quality of financial reporting.   
Previous IFRS studies have examined the impact of IFRS adoption on the quality of financial 
reporting such as comparability, earnings management and value relevance.  IFRS studies on 
earnings management have been conducted in various countries, primarily in developed 
western countries such as Australia (Jeanjean & Stolowy 2008; Chua, Cheong & Gould 
2012), Brazil (Pelucio-Greeco et al. 2014), France (Jeanjean & Stolowy 2008; Zéghal, 
Chtourou & Sellami 2011), Germany (Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen 2005), Greece (Iatridis & 
Rouvolis 2010), Italy (Paglietti 2009), New Zealand (Kabir, Laswad & Islam 2010), and U.K. 
(Jeanjean & Stolowy 2008; Iatridis 2010).  It is argued that research studies on developing 
economies are equally important because the IFRS adoption in developing economies will 
lead to significant growth in FDI (Gordon, Loeb & Zhu 2012) and corporations can benefit 
from joining the global IFRS movement, especially those in the ASEAN region.  This thesis 
has focused on one of the developing economies in the ASEAN region, namely Malaysia. 
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This chapter is organised as follows: 1.1 Research aims and questions, 1.2 Background of 
IFRS and accounting standards development in Malaysia, 1.3 Motivation and significance of 
IFRS research in Malaysia, 1.4 Contribution of this thesis, and chapter summary.  
 
1.1 Research aims and questions 
The main aim of this study was to determine the impacts of IFRS adoption in the emerging 
economy of Malaysia from different dimensions in order to understand the relevance of 
benefits of IFRS adoption suggested by the IASB.  Another aim of this study was to evaluate 
the impact of full IFRS convergence on the financial statements and financial ratios of the 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange).  
Full convergence hereby means that the financial reporting system is fully compliant with 
IFRS.  The examination of financial statements is important because the first direct effect of 
IFRS adoption is a change in financial statements.  This study investigated the impact of first 
year full IFRS convergence for the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia, followed by three 
years before and after full IFRS convergence in order to ascertain the impact scattered 
throughout the different convergence periods.  Based on the purposes of this research, 
research objectives 1.1 and 1.2 were developed. 
Research objective 1.1: To determine whether the full convergence with IFRS has had 
an impact on the financial statements and financial ratios for 
the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
Research objective 1.2: To determine the differences in the changes of financial 
statements and financial ratios between before and after full 
IFRS convergence for the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
 
 
4 
 
The second aim of this study was to evaluate whether the full convergence with IFRS in 
Malaysia has enhanced the quality of financial reporting of the Malaysian listed entities.  The 
changes in the quality of financial reporting are determined based on earnings management. 
Research objective 2.1: To determine whether the full convergence with IFRS has 
decreased the earnings management of the companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia. 
Research objective 2.2: To determine whether the impact of full IFRS convergence on 
earnings management is influenced by the size of audit firms 
(Big 4 versus non-Big 4).  
 
1.2 Background of IFRS and accounting standards development in Malaysia  
1.2.1 Introduction of IFRS  
The move to develop international accounting standards began to grow in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s.  This was due to the post World War II economic integration and the expansion 
of relevant cross-border capital flows (FASB 2014).  Many participants had urged the 
development of international auditing, accounting and reporting standards at the 8
th
 
International Congress of Accountants hosted by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) in 1962.  Following the event, the AICPA reactivated its Committee 
on International Relations.  This committee aimed to improve the collaboration and 
information exchange between accountants internationally and to encourage the movement 
towards the standardisation of accounting practices.  The committee published the 
Professional Accounting in 25 Countries (AICPA) in 1964 documenting the review of 
international accounting standards (FASB 2014).   
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During the Annual Conference of Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) in 
1966, Lord Henry Benson proposed the formation of the Accountants International Study 
Group (AISG).  This resulted in the establishment of the AISG in January 1967 (Bonham 
2008).  AISG was comprised of the AICPA, CICA and the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales, and lasted for ten years.  In September 1972, the 10
th
 World Congress 
of Accountants was held in Sydney.  Major accounting institutes represented at the congress 
had requested the establishment of an accounting body to develop and publish international 
accounting standards (Bonham 2008).  This led to the establishment of the International 
Accounting Standard Committee (IASC) in June 1973.  The IASC was comprised of 
accounting bodies from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, Ireland and United States (Bonham 2008).   
The IASC aimed to develop International Accounting Standards (IASs) that would be in the 
public interest and to promote worldwide recognition of these standards.  By 1987, the IASC 
had issued 25 accounting standards.  These standards contained several accounting treatments 
because they were developed from the accounting practices in different nations and IASC 
acknowledged the presence of acceptable alternative accounting treatment of specific 
accounting issues (FASB 2014; Bonham 2008).  These multiple accounting treatments were a 
concern for the IASC and the board conducted a comparability/improvements project in 1993 
to reduce the number of permissible alternative accounting methods.  The IASC also formed 
the Standing Interpretations Committee (SIC) in 1997 to consider accounting issues that 
required authoritative guidance in order to reduce unacceptable practices (ICAEW 2014; 
Bonham 2008).   This undertaking led to a reduction in the number of alternative accounting 
treatments.  
The increasing demand for a single set of internationalised accounting standards, together 
with the globalisation of capital markets and the increased complexity of business 
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transactions, encouraged the IASC to restructure its board (Bonham 2008).  The IASC 
appointed the Strategy Working Party in 1998 to examine the board’s structure and strategy. 
In December 1998, the working party proposed a Discussion Paper titled ‘Shaping IASC for 
the future’ and presented its final report, ‘Recommendations on Shaping IASC for the 
Future’, in November 1999.  The proposal was unanimously approved by the IASC which led 
to the restructure of IASC and its renaming as IASB on 1 April 2001.  The IASB formed 
IFRS foundation and the IFRS foundation had adopted all the 41 IASs developed and issued 
by the IASC (Pacter 2014).  The SIC was also reconstituted as the International Financial 
Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) in December 2001.   
1.2.2 IFRS adoption by countries 
In 2002, the EU announced that all EU companies listed on a regulated market were required 
to use IFRS in their consolidated financial statements for the period beginning on or after 1 
January 2005. The requirement to apply IFRS was enacted in Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 
of the European Parliament and the Council on 19 July 2002 (ICAEW 2014).   Following the 
enactment of this regulation, more than 7000 listed companies in the EU applied IFRS in 
their consolidated financial statements in 2005 (Jermakowicz & Gornik-Tomaszewski 2006; 
Pacter 2015).  In the same year, countries such as Australia, Hong Kong and South Africa 
adopted the IFRS.  Countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Korea and Nigeria also adopted 
IFRS in the following years.  Other leading economies such as U.S. and China also worked 
closely with the IASB to converge their national GAAP with IFRS.  Currently, approximately 
120 countries and reporting jurisdictions permit and require the use of IFRS for domestic 
listed companies (AICPA 2018). 
ASEAN countries have signalled their positive response to the global IFRS movement.  Most 
of the countries in this region have either fully adopted or closely aligned with IFRS, except 
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for Laos and Vietnam. Table 1.1 provides the details of the IFRS adoption process in the 
region.  
Table 1. 1: The progress of IFRS adoption/convergence in ASEAN region 
Countries Progress of Adoption 
  Brunei Darussalam Full adoption (1st January 2014) 
  Cambodia Full adoption (1st January 2012) 
  Indonesia Full convergence in progress 
  Lao No IFRS adoption 
  Malaysia Full convergence, except Transitioning Entities 
  Myanmar Adopted 2010 version of IFRS 
  Philippines Full adoption with limited modifications 
  Singapore Full convergence in progress 
  Thailand Full convergence in progress 
  Vietnam No IFRS adoption 
Source: IFRS (2017) 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand selected the path of convergence that will lead 
to IFRS adoption in the future.  Of these four countries, Malaysia was the first to achieve full 
convergence in 2012.  In Singapore, the Singapore Accounting Standards Council (ASC) 
aligned the national GAAP with substantial IFRS and announced that full IFRS convergence 
would be achieved for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2018 (ASC 2014, ISCA 
2017).  Indonesia has made the commitment to align the Indonesia Financial Accounting 
Standards (IFASs) with IFRS and to strive to maintain one-year differences with IFRS 
(Deloitte 2017).  To date, the nation has no plan for full IFRS convergence (IFRS 2017).  
Thailand has strived to ensure the Thai Financial Reporting Standards (TFRSs) are identical 
to IFRS with one-year delay from the equivalent IFRS effective date, with few accounting 
standards not adopted (IFRS 2017).  Thailand aims to have full convergence with IFRS by 
2019 (KPMG 2017).   
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1.2.3 ASEAN: Background and the relevance 
ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand with members from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  Countries such as Brunei 
Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia joined the group in later years.  
The main objective of the establishment of ASEAN was to promote intergovernmental 
cooperation and to facilitate the economic integration of the member nations, which would 
lead to economic growth and trade.  The ASEAN region is located at the heart of the Asia-
Pacific region and is situated across major trade routes with $US 5.3 trillion of global 
trade passes through its waterways each year (J.P. Morgan 2018).  This region is also the 
United States’ third-largest Asian trading partner and the largest Asian destination for U.S. 
investments, along with the incoming of the largest investment from the EU, at 24%.  
Majumdar (2016, pg. 25) stated, 'Currently, ASEAN is one of the most open economic 
regions in the world, whose merchandise exports account for nearly 54.0 percent of the total 
ASEAN GDP and 7.0 percent of global exports. Between 2007 and 2014, total trade 
increased by about US$ 1 trillion in the region, while the region’s total foreign direct 
investments (FDI) inflow as a share of the total global FDI inflows increased from 5.0 
percent to 11.0 percent.’   
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, known as the ASEAN-5 
countries, received $128.4 billion in foreign investment in 2013, an increase from the 
previous year, outperforming China’s FDI receipts of $117.6 billion (J.P. Morgan 2018).  Of 
these five countries, Singapore and Thailand were ranked the top 10
th
 and top 19
th
 on the 
2017 FDI Confidence Index, making these two countries the recipients of the highest FDI in 
this region (AT Kearney 2017).  The other three countries were also ranked among the top 10 
FDI hotspots in 2016 (Bernama 2016).  In particular, Malaysia has been reported as one of 
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the top FDI recipients in Asia with a 64% increase in foreign capital in 2016 compared to 
2015.   
With the significant growth in economies, trade and FDI in this region, a high quality of 
financial reporting is crucial to ensure the investors are well-informed about the financial 
situation (Gordon, Loeb & Zhu 2012).  The transition from national GAAP to full IFRS 
promotes higher quality financial reporting.  As indicated previously, Malaysia is the only 
country amongst the other convergent countries (i.e. Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand) that 
has achieved full convergence after a period of gradual IFRS transitioning.  Therefore, this 
study has selected Malaysia for the research. 
1.2.4 Malaysia – Background to the development of accounting standards 
British colonisation prior to 1957 has benefited the accounting system in Malaysia by 
infusing well-developed and refined accounting institutions and regulations into Malaysian 
accounting practices (Muniandy & Ali 2012).  During the period of British colonisation, the 
Companies Ordinances (and amendments) of 1940, 1946 and 1956 were regulated for the 
purpose of financial reporting.  There was no locally-established accounting body to govern 
the accountants. Moreover, the majority of accountants in Malaysia were members of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales, Ireland or Scotland and the 
Association of Certified and Chartered Accountants of the United Kingdom.  In 1958, the 
first professional accounting body named the Malayan Association of Certified Public 
Accountants (MACPA) was established.  MACPA was established under the Companies 
Ordinances (1940-1946) as a self-regulatory accounting body with the aim of providing 
technical guidance and training to its members (MICPA 2015).  This accounting body was 
also responsible for conducting professional examinations.  The MACPA was later renamed 
the Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA) in 2002. 
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Since its establishment, the MACPA had actively pursued its role to ensure a sound 
accounting profession and offer continuing professional development opportunities to its 
members.  The MACPA was strongly influenced by chartered accountants in the United 
Kingdom and Australia.  The MACPA was also supported by the Big Six (now changed to 
Big Four) accounting firms who encouraged their accountants to take the MACPA 
examinations (Susela 1999).  Members of other accounting bodies such as Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) and the Australian Society of Accountants (ASA) 
had found difficulties in receiving support from the Big Six (Susela 1999).  The graduates of 
ACCA and ASA also found it difficult to be accepted as members of the MACPA.  
Therefore, the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) was established in 1967 under 
Accountant Act 1967 to regulate the accountancy profession of the members who were 
members of accounting associations other than the MACPA.  The MIA was inactive for a 
period of 20 years until 1987 as the MACPA continued to control the development of the 
accountancy profession in Malaysia.  Currently, the MIA is the only accounting body that is 
empowered by the law to regulate the accounting profession in Malaysia.  Any person who 
wishes to be designated as accountant needs to be a member of the MIA (Muniandy &Ali 
2012).  This requirement is enforced under sections 22 and 23 of the Accountants Act 1967 
(CPA Australia 2017).  From 1968 to 1976, MACPA developed several accounting standards 
for its members.  These accounting standards are shown in Table 1.2 below. 
Table 1. 2: Accounting standards developed by MACPA 
Year Accounting Standards 
1968 Accounting guidance on specimen company account 
1972 MACPA Statement No.1 – Recommendation on the Presentation of Accounts 
1972 MACPA Statement No. 2 – Audit Reports and Qualification 
1976 MACPA Statement No. 3 – Accountants Report for Prospectus 
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Source: Mohamed (2002) 
In 1970, the Malaysian government introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) to increase 
the holdings of local ‘bumiputera’ in large corporations and to reduce the foreign ownerships.  
The ‘bumiputera’ are the Malays and other indigenous people in Malaysia.  This movement 
resulted in numerous corporate mergers and takeovers by the Malays.  These mergers and 
takeovers resulted in a huge amount of goodwill recorded in the financial reports of the 
corporations.  The concern regarding the lack of accounting rules and reporting guidelines, 
particularly in relation to the revaluation of assets and the creation of goodwill, led to 
MACPA establishing a technical committee.  MACPA had sought guidance from the IAS to 
develop and issue accounting standards in Malaysia after becoming a member of the IASC in 
1978 which resulted in the adoption of several international accounting standards in 
Malaysia.  However, the unique environment of Malaysia had raised the concerns of the 
MACPA in 1980 and onward, because either there were no international accounting 
standards to guide the specific accounting issues or these standards were contradicted by the 
local legislation (Susela 1999; Sood 2006).  This resulted in the development of local 
accounting standards – the MAS in Malaysia.   
The MIA was actively involved in the development of MAS after a period of silence.  In 
1987, MIA reactivated its function to develop the accounting profession for its members and 
adopted the accounting standards developed by MACPA.  This was followed by the 
commitment of MIA to develop the MAS together with the MACPA.  The joint commitment 
of the MACPA and MIA to developing accounting standards resulted in the establishment of 
the Common Working Technical Committee in 1989.  This committee either adopted more of 
the IAS or developed more of the MAS.  During the period of joint commitment, the 
accounting professions had successfully developed and issued eight accounting standards.  
These included accounting standards for: earnings per share, acquisitions and mergers, 
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general insurance business, life insurance business, aquaculture, goodwill, property 
development activities, and pre-cropping costs (Mohamed 2002; Sood 2006). 
The Common Working Technical Committee dissolved in 1992 due to a controversial 
decision on the issuance of MAS 6 – Accounting for Goodwill.  The MACPA opted to defer 
the adoption of MAS 6, but the MIA resolved to adopt it.  The two accounting bodies then 
went their separate ways in developing and issuing the accounting standards.  The adoption 
of MAS 6 by the MIA was later deferred due to public pressure.  The tension between the 
MICPA and the MIA led to the establishment of the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
(MASB).  Various affected parties realised the importance of having an independent 
accounting standards setting body taking responsibility for developing and issuing accounting 
standards (Sood 2006).  Hence, the MASB was established on 1 July 1997 under the 
Financial Reporting Act (FRA) 1997 to take the role of the MACPA and the MIA in 
developing and issuing the accounting standards in Malaysia.  Currently, the MACPA 
(hereafter MICPA) is still responsible for providing quality education and training for 
professional accountancy qualifications, and ensuring the high quality of professional 
conduct and technical competence of its members that protect public interest.  The MIA is 
also responsible for providing education to its members and quality assurance to the public.  
Unlike the MICPA, the MIA ensures enforcement and compliance by having a robust 
disciplinary system in place to penalise those members who fail to comply with the regulated 
accounting standards.  Such members could lose their qualification as an accountant.  For 
instance, the MIA began to implement a Practice Review program from 1 January 2003 as 
part of the enforcement strategy. The Practice Review applies to all Malaysian members who 
acquire a practising certificate and who are involved in public practice services, particularly 
the auditors.  It is designed to provide practising members with a framework of quality 
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assurance principles, to which they can refer to assess and develop their practice more 
effectively (MIA 2016).  
Unlike the MACPA and the MIA, the accounting standards issued by the MASB are legally 
enforceable under the amendment of Companies Act 1965 that requires compliance with the 
approved accounting standards issued by MASB (Susela 1999; Sood 2006).  Failure to 
comply with the MASB’s approved standards is a breach of two regulations – the amended 
Companies Act 1965 and the FRA. Similar to the formation of IASB, MASB is an 
independent accounting standard-setting body, represented by all relevant parties that are 
affected by the process of establishing accounting  standards in Malaysia, such as the report 
preparers, users, regulators, academics and members of the accounting profession.  It is 
governed by the Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF) that was enacted under FRA 1997 
which comprised 19 members appointed by the Ministry of Finance.  These members must 
not be directly responsible for the establishment of standards (Muniandy & Ali 2012).   
MASB first adopted 24 of the extant accounting standards that had been issued by the 
MICPA and MIA.  In 2005, the MASB began the alignment of its accounting standards with 
IFRS.  The first step was to rename the MAS as Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) and to 
renumber the FRS so the newly introduced numbers were identical to the IFRS.  The MASB 
then gradually aligned the local GAAP with IFRSs from 2005 to 2011.  Most of the IFRS 
adopted were effective in 2006.  In 2008, the MASB announced its decision to impose full 
convergence of national GAAP with IFRS by 1 January 2012, and renamed the standards as 
the Malaysian Financial Reporting Standards (MFRSs).  The MASB requires that all listed 
entities, except for private entities, comply with the IFRS.  However, listed companies that 
are considered to be Transitioning Entities (TE) can be exempted.  The TE group comprises 
those listed companies that meet the two criteria provided by the MASB (2014):   
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(a) An entity that would otherwise be subject to the application of MFRSs as its financial 
reporting framework and thereby be subject in particular to the application of MFRS 
141 Agriculture and/or IC Interpretation 15 (Agreements for the Construction of Real 
Estate) may in the alternative apply the Financial Reporting Standards (FRSs) as its 
financial reporting framework.  
(b)  An entity that consolidates or equity accounts another entity that has chosen to apply 
FRSs as its financial reporting framework may itself choose to apply FRSs as its 
financial reporting framework. 
1.2.5 Accounting regulation in Malaysia 
Four main accounting regulators govern the financial reporting practices of corporations in 
Malaysia (Muniandy & Ali 2012):  the Companies Act 1965, the Securities Commission Act 
1993, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (currently the Bursa Malaysia) Listing 
Requirements and the Companies Commission of Malaysia.    These regulators determine the 
regulations of the financial reporting requirements for the listed companies or companies that 
wish to be listed.  The following figure presents the financial reporting regulatory bodies in 
Malaysia. 
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Figure 1. 1: Regulatory framework in Malaysia 
 
1) Companies Act 1965 
The Companies Act 1965 was based upon the U.K.’s Companies Act 1948 and modelled on 
the Australian Uniform Companies Act 1961 (Muniandy & Ali 2012).  Section 166A of this 
act requires companies to comply with the approved MASB accounting standards.  The Ninth 
Schedule [Section 169, 326] of the Companies Act 1965 also entails the disclosure 
requirements in annual reports that must be complied with by the listed companies or the 
companies that wish to be listed on Bursa Malaysia.  The Ninth Schedule [Section 169, 326] 
includes only minimal disclosure requirements regarding the profit and loss accounts, balance 
Companies Act 1965 
- Enforce the complaince 
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Bursa Malaysia (KLSE) 
Listing Requirements 
- Provides the listing 
requirements and failure to 
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Securities Commission Act 
1993 
- Licences the capital 
market players 
- Oversees the activities of 
the stock exchanges and 
corporations in Bursa 
Malaysia 
Companies Commission of 
Malaysia 
- Incorporates companies and 
registers businesses 
- Provides company and 
business information to the 
public 
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sheets and the directors’ company reports (Muniandy & Ali 2012).  Muniandy and Ali (2012) 
criticised that although the published accounts must be presented as a true and fair view of 
the financial operations of the company, there is no statutory definition of the term ‘true and 
fair view’. 
2) Bursa Malaysia (KLSE) Listing Requirements 
Bursa Malaysia, previously known as the KLSE, has issued a number of requirements that 
need to be complied with prior to a company being listed.  Failure to comply with the listing 
requirements will result in enforcement proceedings and legal actions (Bursa Malaysia 2014).   
The Bursa Malaysia consists of two trading boards: the Main Board and the Second Board 
(ACE).  Generally, the listing requirements set by the Main Board are stricter than those of 
the Second Board.  Companies that are not large enough to satisfy the listing requirements of 
the Main Board but have shown substantial growth can be listed on the Second Board 
(Muniandy & Ali 2012).  
3) Securities Commission Act 1993 
The Securities Commission Act 1993 enacted the establishment of the Securities Commission 
on 1 March 1993.  The Securities Commission is a self-funding statutory body that has the 
power of investigation and enforcement. The regulatory functions of the Securities 
Commission (2014) are:  
 Supervising exchanges, clearing houses and central depositories; 
 Registering authority for prospectuses of corporations other than unlisted 
recreational clubs; 
 Approving authority for corporate bond issues; 
 Regulating all matters relating to securities and derivatives contracts; 
 Regulating the take-over and mergers of companies 
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 Regulating all matters relating to unit trust schemes; 
 Licensing and supervising all licensed persons; 
 Encouraging self-regulation; and 
 Ensuring proper conduct of market institutions and licensed persons.   
The primary role of the Securities Commission is to protect the investors by licensing the 
capital market players and overseeing the activities of the stock exchanges and corporations 
within the Bursa Malaysia (Muniandy & Ali 2012).  
4) Companies Commission of Malaysia 
The Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) started its operation on 16 April 2002 under 
the Companies Commission Act 2001 due to the merger of the two offices: the Registrar of 
Companies and the Registrar of Business (Companies Commission of Malaysia 2016).  CCM 
is a statutory body that is authorised to regulate companies and businesses in Malaysia. The 
main function of CCM is stated in CCM (2014): ‘to serve as an agency to incorporate 
companies and register businesses as well as to provide company and business information to 
the public’.  CCM (2016) is responsible for administering the following legislations:  
- Companies Act 1965 (Act 125); 
- Registration of Businesses Act 1956 (Act 197); 
- Trust Companies Act 1949 (Act 100); 
- Kootu Funds (Prohibition) Act 1971 (Act 28); 
- Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2012 (Act 743); 
- any subsidiary legislation made under the Acts specified above such as: 
1. Companies Regulations 1966; and  
2. Registration of Businesses Rules 1957. 
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1.2.6 Background of IFRS and development of Malaysian accounting standards  
The accounting regulations and accounting standards in Malaysia are arguably similar to 
those of the U.K. accounting system.  This can be explained by the colonisation of the British 
before 1957 and the influence of the U.K. and Australian chartered accountants on the 
MICPA during the earlier years.  MICPA had developed few accounting standards since 1968 
for its members.  In 1978, the MICPA used IAS to develop the local accounting standards.  
Hence, the local GAAP and IAS had certain accounting standards in common before the start 
of the IFRS convergence process in 2005.  The similarity between local GAAP and IFRS 
implies that IFRS convergence may have minimal impact on financial statements and 
financial ratios.   
There are four accounting regulations that govern the implementation of accounting standards 
in Malaysia.  The MIA is responsible for regulating the accounting profession.  For example, 
the MIA introduced the Practice Review program in 2003 that aims to ensure the credibility 
of audit services.  In order to remain in the profession, auditors are more inclined to ensure 
that their clients have followed the accounting standards. Despite the establishment of these 
accounting regulators, compliance with accounting regulations is still low and the 
enforcement is weak (Muniandy & Ali 2012), thereby possibly hindering the effectiveness of 
IFRS implementation in Malaysia. 
 
1.3 Motivation and significance of IFRS research on Malaysia 
The transition from national GAAP to IFRS implies a change in the quality of accounting 
standards, which subsequently leads to changes in financial statements.  The changes in 
financial statements have implication for the financial and capital markets.  Previous studies 
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have tended to focus on the adoption of IFRS in developed countries, with minimal research 
being conducted in developing economies.  This leads to the first rationale for examining the 
impact of IFRS adoption in developing economies, particularly the ASEAN region, because 
most of the countries in this region have mandatorily adopted IFRS as shown in Table 1.1.   
From the list of ASEAN countries, this study has focused on the impact of IFRS adoption in 
Malaysia.  Malaysia is a unique IFRS transitioning country when compared to other countries 
examined in previous IFRS studies.  For instance, EU mandatorily adopted full IFRS in 2005.  
Malaysia began the alignment of national accounting standards with IFRS in 2005 but the full 
convergence with IFRS was achieved only in 2012.  It is also the first amongst other 
converging countries such as Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand to reach full convergence.  
The gradual convergence with IFRS may have distributed the impact on financial statements 
into different periods between 2005 and 2012.   
Ball (2006) identified the incentives of preparers and enforcers as one of the challenges that 
hinder the effectiveness of IFRS implementation.  Moreover, Malaysia is a country with low 
enforcement and low compliance with accounting regulations (Ball, Robin & Wu 2003; 
Muniandy & Ali 2012).  It has been evidenced that Malaysia has a lower quality of financial 
reporting compared to Singapore and Hong Kong and the low quality of financial reporting 
can be explained by the incentives of preparers (Ball, Robin & Wu 2003).  The full IFRS 
convergence is intended to enhance the quality of financial reporting but the low enforcement 
and low compliance with accounting regulations may reduce the effectiveness of IFRS in 
improving the quality of financial reporting.  Therefore, Malaysia is an appropriate country to 
test whether the full IFRS convergence reduces the incentive of managers to manipulate 
financial figures. 
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The study is also motivated by the fact that the IFRS have changed significantly from the 
voluntary or early adoption periods in 2005 (Byard, Li & Yu 2011) to the periods of full 
convergence or full adoption by various jurisdictions until 2014. This implies that the 
findings of earlier western studies during the period of voluntary or early adoption of IFRS 
may no longer be generalisable, particularly in the context of small or developing economies 
such as Malaysia.  Further to this, existing literature indicates that there is virtually a dearth 
of empirical evidence on the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings quality in the context of 
developing economies even though there have been some studies those provided a useful 
theoretical perspective on the costs and benefits of IFRS adoption (Joshi et al. 2008), 
challenges of IFRS adoption (Joshi et al. 2016; Sharma et al. 2016) and institutional 
perspectives for the adoption of IFRS in similar economies.  
 
1.4 Contribution of the thesis 
This thesis makes several contributions as this research has been conducted on the emerging 
economy of Malaysia, whose accounting standard-setting body has been working on the 
international harmonisation of accounting standards from the beginning of the development 
of international accounting standards by the IASB. Secondly, Malaysia has been a leading 
economy in the ASEAN region that had a smooth transition regarding the convergence of 
local accounting standards to the IFRS. 
The first contribution of this thesis is the new knowledge that it adds to the existing IFRS 
literature by determining the impact of full IFRS convergence in a developing country in the 
ASEAN region, Malaysia.  IFRS studies have focused the research mainly on developed 
countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and those in the EU.  With the significant 
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growth of IFRS adoption in the ASEAN region, it is important to study the impact of IFRS 
adoption, particularly on the quality of financial reporting in the region.   
Second, it is anticipated that the information analysed in this study will provide valuable 
insights to the IASB and MASB on the usefulness of IFRS in improving the quality of 
financial reporting.  In particular, Malaysia has been found to have a lower quality of 
financial reporting that is explained by the tendency of preparers to manipulate the financial 
information (Ball, Robin & Wu 2003).  The findings will also serve to guide neighbouring 
countries in the ASEAN region such as Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand to either accept 
the full IFRS convergence or continue the close alignment between national GAAP and 
IFRS.  The findings in this study may also guide the regulators in these developing 
economies to pay particular attention to the implications of any changes in the technical 
methods used to change local accounting standards to international accounting standards. 
Third, the thesis contributes to theoretical implications by testing the signal implications of 
the IFRS adoption in the context of a developing country. The study tested signalling 
relevance of IFRS adoption in Malaysia by analysing the impact of IFRS adoption on the 
financial statements, financial ratios and earning management. Hence, this thesis extends the 
previous research by analysing the impact of IFRS on the quality of earnings after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2012 in the Malaysian context, and provides information to 
financial analysts, regulators and other users of financial information regarding the causes 
and consequences of IFRS adoption for the purpose of earnings management. 
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1.5 Chapter summary  
This chapter discusses the importance of IFRS research in the ASEAN region and provides 
the aim of this thesis.  The sections provided in this chapter include research aims and 
questions, background of IFRS and accounting standards development in Malaysia, 
motivation and significance of IFRS research on Malaysia, and contribution of the thesis.  
The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides the review of IFRS literature, with the 
focus on the financial statements and financial ratios effect and the changes in earnings 
management.  Chapter 3 explains the signalling theory and agency theory, and discusses the 
application of these two theories in predicting the outcomes of the research.  Chapter 4 
develops the research hypotheses based on the findings in the literature review and the 
theoretical framework.  Chapter 5 explains the selection of the final sample of companies 
listed on Bursa Malaysia, the process of data collection from annual reports, and the research 
methodology used to obtain the results for the differences in financial statements and 
financial ratios reported under Malaysian GAAP and under IFRS, the changes in earnings 
management, and the relationship between discretionary accruals and the size of audit firms 
(Big 4 versus non-Big 4) when full IFRS is implemented.  Chapter 6 presents the results of 
analysis and discusses the findings for each of the research objectives.  Chapter 7 concludes 
the thesis, with discussion on the research limitation and future research directions. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The introduction of IFRS and its widespread adoption has attracted the attention of academic 
scholars with numerous research studies conducted on the IFRS topic.  The IFRS issues that 
have been explored in prior research studies include the pros and cons of IFRS adoption, the 
challenges of IFRS implementation, the impact of IFRS adoption on investors’ investment 
options (i.e. foreign direct investments, home bias and market reaction), the economic 
consequences of IFRS adoption, the impact of IFRS on financial statements and financial 
ratios, as well as the impact of IFRS adoption on the quality of the financial reporting.  Given 
the extensive research on IFRS and its evident significance, the research focus of this thesis is 
on the full IFRS convergence in a developing, emerging economies country – Malaysia in the 
ASEAN region. 
Several IFRS research studies such as Carlin, Finch and Hidayah Laili (2009), Halim Kadri, 
Abdul Aziz and Kamil Ibrahim (2009), Hanefah and Singh (2012), Yaacob and Che-Ahmad 
(2012), Yaacob and Che-Ahmad (2012), Muniandy and Ali (2012), Adibah Wan Ismail et al. 
(2013), Phang and Mahzan (2013), Rad and Embong (2014), Abdullah et al. (2015), and 
Joshi, Yapa and Kraal (2016) have been conducted in the Malaysian context.  Table 2.1 
provides a list of IFRS studies conducted in Malaysia and the nature of each research. 
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Table 2.1: The IFRS literature on Malaysia and the nature of the study  
IFRS literature on Malaysia 
Context 
Nature of the study 
Carlin, Finch and Hidayah Laili 
(2009) 
Compliance and disclosure of  FRS 136 – Impairment of 
Assets by Malaysian listed entities 
Halim Kadri, Abdul Aziz and Kamil 
Ibrahim (2009) 
The impact of pre- (2002-2005) and post-IFRS 
convergence (2006-2007) on value relevance of book value 
and earnings, as well as the relationship between earnings 
and operating cash flow 
Hanefah and Singh (2012) The problems of converging to IFRS and the future 
challenges of IFRS convergence 
Muniandy and Ali (2012) The financial reporting development in Malaysia; includes 
the IFRS convergence in Malaysia 
Yaacob and Che-Ahmad (2012) Impact of FRS 138 – Intangible Assets on the timeliness of 
the audit report issuance (period of examination: 2005 to 
2008) 
Yaacob and Che-Ahmad (2012) Impact of IFRS convergence (during the period of 2004 to 
2008) on the audit pricing 
Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013) The effect between pre- (i.e. 2002-2005) and post-IFRS 
partial convergence (i.e. 2006-2009) on earnings 
management 
Phang and Mahzan (2013) External factors influencing the preparedness of listed 
companies for IFRS convergence and internal obstacles 
that hinder the implementation of IFRS   
Rad and Embong (2014) The effect of IFRS adoption based on sample from 2003 to 
2009 on information quality  
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Abdullah et al. (2015) The effect of family control on IFRS mandatory disclosure 
levels based on 31 December 2008, companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia. 
Joshi, Yapa and Kraal (2016) The perceptions of professional accountants on IFRS 
adoption from the three countries in ASEAN, i.e. 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. 
Based on the studies listed in the table above, IFRS issues in the Malaysian context that have 
been explored include: the level of IFRS compliance by listed companies, the benefits and 
challenges of IFRS convergence, the impact of IFRS convergence on the timeliness of the 
audit report issued and the audit pricing, and the quality of financial reporting based on value 
relevance and earnings quality.  These studies have predominantly concentrated on the period 
of alignment between FRS and IFRS.  In this thesis, the IFRS research has been expanded to 
scrutinise the impact of full IFRS convergence in Malaysia on the quality of financial 
reporting.  
The literature review is divided into sections: 2.2 provides an overview of IFRS literature; 2.3 
reviews the IFRS literature on financial statements and financial ratios; 2.4 reviews the 
literature pertaining to the earnings management; 2.5 reviews the literature on the association 
between Big 4 versus non-Big 4 and earnings management, and 2.6 presents a summary of 
the literature review.  
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2.2 Overview of IFRS literature  
IFRS studies such as Ball (2006), Damant (2006), Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewki 
(2006), Alali and Cao (2010), Brown (2011), and Sidik and Rahim (2012) have examined the 
advantages and disadvantages of IFRS adoption.  These studies have documented that the 
IFRS adoption improves the quality of financial reporting in terms of, for example, its 
transparency and comparability.  Ball (2006, pg. 11) stated that ‘IFRS promise more accurate, 
comprehensive and timely financial statement information’.  Ball (2006) also argued that 
IFRS adoption reduces international differences in accounting standards practice, thereby 
improving the comparability of financial statements from different nations.  The 
improvement of the quality of financial reporting is beneficial to investors who make 
financial investment decisions because it can minimise the financial risk caused by the 
opportunistic behaviour of the management of listed companies.   
These perceived benefits have also been supported by the accounting practitioners in 
Malaysia (Sidik & Rahim 2012).  Based on 159 respondents, Sidik and Rahim (2012) 
reported that most of these accounting practitioners agreed that the adoption of FRS can 
improve the transparency of financial reporting and the comparability of financial statements 
between businesses.  Most of these respondents were also optimistic that the IFRS adoption 
could provide other benefits, particularly the enhancement of foreign capital. Yapa, Kraal and 
Joshi (2015) also reported that full IFRS convergence would enhance foreign investments 
based on 11 respondents comprising Malaysian academics, accounting professionals and 
accounting bodies.  The study also documented the ambiguity regarding greater transparency 
of financial reporting under IFRS in Malaysia. 
While studies have reported the positive impact of IFRS adoption, Ball (2006) argued that the 
effectiveness of IFRS implementation may be hindered by the preparer and enforcers.  This is 
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because the preparers are responsible for reporting according to the accounting standards and 
the level of enforcement on IFRS implementation depends upon the national regulators.  Zeff 
(2007) identified four main cultural differences that may be obstacles to achieving greater 
comparability under IFRS compliance.  These obstacles are business and financial culture, 
accounting culture, auditing culture and regulatory culture.  Zeff (2007) has also identified 
political influence as one of the obstacles to IFRS adoption, supported by Alali and Cao 
(2010).  Powerful companies may place pressure on the IASB and the national regulators to 
ensure that favourable accounting standards are issued and enforced.  This may obstruct the 
purpose of IFRS which is to serve as a set of high quality accounting standards that improve 
the usefulness of financial statements. 
IFRS studies such as Ashbaugh (2001), Hope, Jin and Kang (2006), Renders and 
Gaeremynck (2007), and Bova and Pereira (2012) have explored the motives of companies 
and countries regarding the adoption of IFRS.  Ashbaugh (2001) found that non-U.S. 
companies which voluntarily comply with IFRS in financial reporting are those listed in more 
foreign equity markets.  The study also found that companies are more willing to disclose 
IFRS or US GAAP when the financial information generated under IFRS or US GAAP is 
more standardised compared to financial information prepared under the local GAAP.   
Based on research conducted in 38 countries, Hope, Jin and Kang (2006) have found that 
countries with weaker investor protection mechanisms and countries that are perceived as 
providing better access to their domestic capital markets are more likely to adopt IFRS.  
Renders and Gaeremynck (2007) investigated the factors that influence the IFRS adoption in 
1,563 listed companies from seven EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.  The results of their analysis indicated that listed 
companies with strong laws or extensive corporate governance codes are more likely to adopt 
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IFRS.  Renders and Gaeremynck (2007) explained that the management of those listed 
companies that chose not to voluntarily adopt IFRS wanted to protect the private benefits of 
the company insiders, thereby indicating opportunistic behaviour.   
Bova and Pereira (2012) who focused on a developing country – Kenya found that public 
companies exhibit higher IFRS compliance than do the private companies.  The study also 
reported that greater foreign ownership and greater share turnover are positively associated 
with higher IFRS compliance.  The findings of these three studies revealed that companies’ 
and countries’ adoption of IFRS can be attributed to factors related to the need of companies 
to raise capital from a greater number of foreign investors, less loss on private benefits, and 
greater share turnover. 
Since the main reason for IFRS adoption is to increase capital investments, it is important to 
examine whether capital investments improved after the IFRS adoption.  Prior IFRS studies 
examined this issue based on the changes in foreign investments, home bias and the market 
reaction to IFRS adoption.  Studies such as Covrig, Defond and Hung (2007), DeFond et al. 
(2011), Márquez-Ramos (2011), and Gordon, Loeb and Zhu (2012) have found that IFRS 
adoption does increase foreign investments.  This finding suggests that investors believe the 
implementation of IFRS will improve the quality of financial reporting.   
Some of these studies have further investigated the factors that contributed to the increase in 
foreign investments.  Covrig, Defond and Hung (2007) who examined companies from 29 
countries from 1999 to 2002, conducted a comparative analysis of IFRS adopters in poorer 
information or lower visibility environments and IFRS adopters in higher information 
environments with higher investor visibility.   Poorer information environments are related to 
smaller companies with fewer analysts; companies with low investor visibility are those that 
are excluded from major local or international indexes.  Covrig, Defond and Hung (2007) 
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have found that the foreign mutual fund ownership is higher for IFRS adopters in poorer 
information environments or lower investor visibility compared to IFRS adopters in higher 
information environments and higher investor visibility.  The study also found that regional 
mutual fund managers who specialised in geographical regions have more investments 
compared to country and global fund managers.  Covrig, Defond and Hung (2007) explained 
that regional fund managers have greater reliance on the financial statements than country 
and global fund managers because they are likely to be less informed about local companies.   
Gordon, Loeb and Zhu (2012), who analysed the impact of IFRS on FDI based on a panel 
data set of more than 1300 observations from 124 countries between 1996 and 2009, 
compared the countries with developing economies and those with developed economies.  
The study reported that the increase in FDI is greater in countries with developing economies 
than in those with developed economies.  This result supported the argument of Covrig, 
Defond and Hung (2007) that developing economies have greater FDI compared to 
developed economies because the adoption of IFRS has led to greater improvement in the 
quality of financial reporting in developing economies.  
IFRS studies that investigated the impact of home bias include Beneish and Yohn (2008), 
Hamberg et al. (2009), Khurana and Michas (2011), Shima and Gordon (2011), and Hamberg 
et al. (2013).  The adoption of IFRS has led to a decrease in home bias according to the 
findings of Khurana and Michas (2011) and Hamberg et al. (2013).  The decrease in home 
bias implies the willingness of investors to diversify their investment to foreign companies 
that comply with IFRS.  Beneish and Yohn (2008) argued that IFRS adoption does not affect 
home bias.  This argument is supported by the findings from Hamberg et al. (2009) and 
Shima and Gordon (2011).   
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Hamberg et al. (2009) further explored the factors that influence investments in foreign 
companies.  The study found that foreign investors prefer to invest in companies that are 
listed on one or more foreign stock markets, or are still growing, or have lower risk.  Shima 
and Gordon (2011) also found that investors are more willing to invest in IFRS-compliant 
foreign countries with strong regulatory environments based on their legal standards system 
and enforcement regime.  The findings of these studies have shown that IFRS adoption has 
both positive and negative impacts on home bias.  In particular, the positive impact is greater 
when foreign countries have greater investor protection, better returns, and strong regulatory 
environments. 
Studies conducted by Christensen, Lee and Walker (2007), Daske et al. (2008), Armstrong et 
al. (2010), and Horton and Serafeim (2010) reported that IFRS adoption affects the market 
reaction, but not by Klimczak (2011).  Horton and Serafeim (2010) found negative market 
reaction when listed companies reported lower earnings under the IFRS compared to 
companies under the UK GAAP.  Armstrong et al. (2010) found greater positive market 
reaction for firms that provide lower quality of financial information and disclosed financial 
information that had higher information asymmetry before IFRS adoption.  The study also 
found that the market reacted negatively to IFRS adoption by companies in code law 
countries, which suggests that investors are concerned about the enforcement of IFRS in 
these countries.  The accounting standards in code law countries are predominantly originate 
in governments whereas accounting standards in common law countries are mainly driven in 
governance (Ball, Robin & Wu 2003).    
Overall, the findings from the studies on foreign investments, home bias and market reaction 
indicate that IFRS adoption does increase the confidence level of investors regarding the 
quality of financial reporting.  The findings of these studies also indicated the importance of 
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the level of investor protection and legal enforcement of countries to investors when 
determining their investment. 
IFRS studies such as Dargenidou, Mcleay and Raonic (2006), Daske (2006), Daske et al. 
(2008), Li (2010), Daske et al. (2013), and Neel (2017) examined the economic consequences 
of IFRS adoption.  All of the aforementioned studies, except Daske (2006), have reported 
positive economic consequences based on the decrease in cost of capital and increase in 
market liquidity.  Daske et al. (2008) who conducted research on countries in different parts 
of the world partitioned the sample based on reporting incentives and legal enforcement.  The 
study found that capital market benefits occur only in countries with listed companies that 
have an incentive to be transparent and have strong legal enforcement.  Li (2010) also 
reported that the decrease in the cost of equity prevails in countries with strong legal 
enforcement.  Daske et al. (2013) extended their research to compare the serious adopters and 
label adopters.  The study defined the serious adopters as those companies that are serious 
about the reporting strategy and defined label adopters as those companies that adopted IFRS 
merely for the name.  The results of their analysis indicate that the serious adopters have 
higher market liquidity and lower capital costs than the label adopters. Futhermore, Neel 
(2017) found that the economic benefits of IFRS adoption are highly associated with cross-
country accounting comparability. 
Numerous IFRS researchers have examined the impact of IFRS adoption on the quality of 
financial reporting.  These studies include Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), 
Jermakowicz, Prather-Kinsey and Wulf (2007), Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008), Jeanjean 
and Stolowy (2008), Paglietti (2009), Zhou, Xiong and Ganguli (2009), Aharony, Barniv and 
Falk (2010), Callao and Jarne (2010), Chen et al. (2010), Devalle, Onali and Magarini (2010), 
Iatridis (2010), Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010), Kabir, Laswad and Islam (2010), Kwong 
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(2010), Leventis, Dimitropoulos and Anandarajan (2010), Atwood et al. (2011), Byard, Li 
and Yu (2011), Clarkson et al. (2011), Liu et al. (2011), Tan, Wang and Welker (2011), 
Zéghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011), Chua, Cheong and Gould (2012), Cotter, Tarca & Wee 
2012, Yip and Young (2012), Ahmed, Neel and Wang (2013), Brochet, Jagolinzer and Riedl 
(2013), Horton, Serafeim and Serafeim (2013), and Paulo et al. (2013).   
IFRS studies such as Barth, Landsman & Lang (2008), Chen et al. (2010), Chua, Cheong and 
Gould (2012), and Ahmed, Neel and Wang (2013) examined the impact on the quality of 
financial reporting based on different accounting quality indicators.  These studies, except for 
those of Ahmed, Neel and Wang (2013), found that IFRS adoption improved the quality of 
financial reporting.  Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) investigated whether IFRS adoption 
increased the accounting quality using 327 listed companies from 21 countries during the 
period from 1994 to 2003.  The study found that the adoption of IFRS improved the quality 
of financial information based on earnings smoothing and managing earnings towards a 
target, timelier loss recognition, and more value relevance than the companies that applied 
non-U.S. accounting standards.   
Chen et al. (2010) selected listed companies from 15 EU member states to examine the 
differences in accounting quality between the pre-adoption (2000-2004) and post-adoption 
(2005-2007) periods. This study found that most of accounting quality indicators, except 
earnings smoothing and timeliness of loss recognition had improved during the post-IFRS 
adoption period, evident in less of managing earnings toward a target, a lower magnitude of 
absolute discretionary accruals and higher accruals quality.  Based on the Australian entities, 
Chua, Cheong and Gould (2012) also reported lesser earnings smoothing, greater timeliness 
of loss recognition and higher value relevance.   
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The adoption of IFRS did not improve the quality of financial reporting according to the 
findings in Ahmed, Neel and Wang (2013) who examined listed companies from 20 
countries.  The study benchmarked a group of companies in IFRS countries against non-IFRS 
countries and found an increase in income smoothing, increase in aggressive reporting of 
accruals, reduction in timeliness of loss recognition, and no consistent evidence of meeting 
earnings targets for the IFRS group compared to the non-IFRS group.  These results are not 
consistent with those of Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008), Chen et al. (2010), and Chua, 
Cheong and Gould (2012).  Ahmed, Neel and Wang (2013) further reported that a lower 
quality of financial reporting is observed in mainly strong enforcement countries.  When 
examining the sample selection of Ahmed, Neel and Wang (2013), it is observed that the 
listed companies classified as strong legal enforcement countries are such as those in the EU, 
in Australia and in Hong Kong.  Specifically, the sample was dominated mainly by 
companies in the U.K. and France.  This finding suggests that the adoption of IFRS has 
reduced the quality of financial reporting in listed companies from the U.K. and France.   
Several IFRS research studies have focused on one specific accounting quality, such as 
comparability (Tan, Wang & Welker 2011; Byard, Li & Yu 2011; Cotter, Tarca & Wee 2012; 
Yip & Young 2012; Brochet, Jagolinzer & Riedl 2013; Horton, Serafeim & Serafeim 2013), 
value relevance (Jermakowicz, Prather-Kinsey & Wulf 2007; Aharony, Barniv & Falk 2010; 
Devalle, Onali & Magarini 2010; Kwong 2010; Clarkson et al. 2011), and earnings 
management (Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen 2005; Jeanjean & Stolowy 2008; Callao & Jarne 
2010).   
The majority of these IFRS studies that evaluate the comparability, such as Tan, Wang and 
Welker (2011), Byard, Li and Yu (2011), Cotter, Tarca and Wee (2012), and Horton, 
Serafeim and Serafeim (2013), reported that financial analysts are able to provide more 
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accurate financial forecasts when financial statements are prepared under the IFRS.  Horton, 
Serafeim and Serafeim (2013) also found that the forecast accuracy of mandatory adopters is 
higher than that of non-adopters and voluntary adopters.  This finding suggests that 
mandatory adopters rather than voluntary adopters are more likely to follow IFRS.  Byard, Li 
and Yu (2011) documented that the forecast accuracy is greater for mandatory adopters in 
countries with strong legal enforcement and with local accounting standards that differ 
significantly from IFRS.  When examining the sample of countries with weak legal 
enforcement and with local accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS, the 
study found that forecast errors and dispersion decrease for companies with greater incentive 
to be transparent.  Moreover, Yip and Young (2012) reported that the institutional 
environment affects the cross-country comparability.  The improvement on comparability is 
most likely to occur in companies that have similar institutional environments. 
IFRS studies such as Jermakowicz, Prather-Kinsey and Wulf (2007), Aharony, Barnix and 
Falk (2010), and Clarkson et al. (2011) have also documented the increase in value relevance.  
Devalle, Onali and Margarini (2010), who examined the value relevance for listed companies 
from five European stock exchanges, found mixed results.  The study reported that earnings 
on share price increased for listed companies in Germany, France and the U.K., but the book 
value of equity had decreased (except in the U.K.).   
Based on the IFRS studies mentioned above, it is arguable that IFRS adoption does affect the 
investment decision of investors, the quality of financial reporting and the economic 
consequences.  Overall, the findings from the IFRS studies indicate that IFRS adoption has 
improved investors’ confidence in the quality of financial statements prepared under IFRS 
based on the increase in foreign investments and the market reaction.  The IFRS studies have 
also found an improvement in the quality of financial reporting based on the decrease in 
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earnings smoothing, decrease in managing earnings towards a target, timelier loss 
recognition, and more value relevance.  The majority of studies on economic consequences 
have also reported a decrease in cost of capital and increase in market liquidity.  IFRS studies 
have also indicated that the IFRS impact is associated with the level of legal enforcement, the 
level of investor protection, the incentive to be transparent, and the similarity of the 
institutional environments in different nations.  Table 2.2 provides a brief summary of the 
IFRS issues researched and the studies associated with each issue. 
Table 2.2: The IFRS literature on different issues 
Issues IFRS literature 
Advantages and disadvantages of 
IFRS adoption 
Ball (2006), Damant (2006), Jermakowicz and Gornik-
Tomaszewki (2006), Zeff (2007), Alali and Cao (2010), 
Brown (2011), and Sidik and Rahim (2012) 
Reasons for companies or countries 
to adopt IFRS  
Ashbaugh (2001), Hope, Jin and Kang (2006), Renders and 
Gaeremynck (2007), and Bova and Pereira (2012) 
Impact on foreign investments, 
home bias and the market reaction  
Christensen, Lee and Walker (2007), Covrig, Defond & 
Hung (2007), Beneish and Yohn (2008), Daske et al. 
(2008), Hamberg et al. (2009), Armstrong et al. (2010), 
Horton and Serafeim (2010), DeFond et al. (2011), 
Márquez-Ramos (2011), Khurana and Michas (2011), 
Shima and Gordon (2011), Gordon, Loeb and Zhu (2012), 
Hamberg et al. (2013)  
Impact on the economic 
consequences 
Dargenidou, Mcleay and Raonic (2006), Daske (2006), 
Daske et al. (2008), Li (2010), and Daske et al. (2013) 
Impact on the quality of financial 
reporting 
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), Jermakowicz, 
Prather-Kinsey and Wulf (2007), Barth, Landsman and 
Lang (2008), Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008), Paglietti 
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(2009), Zhou, Xiong and Ganguli (2009), Aharony, Barniv 
and Falk (2010), Callao and Jarne (2010), Chen et al. 
(2010), Devalle, Onali and Magarini (2010), Iatridis 
(2010), Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010), Kabir, Laswad and 
Islam (2010), Kwong (2010), Leventis, Dimitropoulos and 
Anandarajan (2010), Atwood et al. (2011), Byard, Li and 
Yu (2011), Clarkson et al. (2011), Liu et al. (2011), Tan, 
Wang and Welker (2011), Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami 
(2011), Chua, Cheong and Gould (2012), Cotter, Tarca & 
Wee 2012, Yip and Young (2012), Ahmed, Neel and Wang 
(2013), Brochet, Jagolinzer and Riedl (2013), Horton, 
Serafeim and Serafeim (2013), and Paulo et al. (2013).   
 
2.3 Literature review on IFRS impact on financial statements and financial ratios 
The adoption of IFRS may have an impact on the financial statements and financial ratios 
because of the change in accounting standards from local to international.  The changes in 
financial statements and financial ratios depend upon the similarity between the national 
accounting standards and IFRS.  Since the introduction of IFRS, research studies have been 
conducted to examine the differences between the financial statements and financial ratios 
reported under IFRS and those prepared according to local accounting standards.  These 
studies include Jermakowicz (2004), Goodwin and Ahmed (2006), Callao, Jarne, and Lainez 
(2007), Hung and Subramanyam (2007), Goodwin, Ahmed, and Heaney (2008), Callao et al. 
(2009), Lantto and Sahlstrom (2009), Callao et al. (2010), Stent, Bradbury and Hooks (2010), 
Tsalavoutas and Evans (2010), Blanchette, Racicot, and Girard (2011), Ahmed and Alam 
(2012), Trewavas, Redmayne, and Laswad (2012), Blanchette, Racicot, and Sedzro (2013), 
Terzi, Oktem, and Sen (2013), and Lueg, Punda and Burkert (2014). 
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2.3.1 Impact of IFRS on financial statements and financial ratios 
Hung and Subramanyam (2007) investigated the impact of IFRS adoption on financial 
statements and financial ratios for 80 German listed industrial companies during the period 
from 1998 to 2002.  The results of this study showed a significant increase in mean total 
assets, mean book value, median total assets, median total liabilities, median book value and 
median net income.  These results imply that IFRS adoption did affect the financial 
statements and financial ratios of these German companies and the adoption of IFRS had a 
positive impact on the financial statements (except for the increase in total liabilities).   
Callao, Jarne and Lainez (2007) focused their research on the IFRS effects on the 
comparability and relevance of financial reporting in Spain.  The study reported lower 
comparability and no improvement on relevance of financial reporting for the 26 companies 
listed on IBEX 35.  In addition to determining these accounting qualities, the study 
investigated the changes in interim and annual financial statements and financial ratios.  The 
results suggested that, based on the interim financial statements, the Spanish listed companies 
had reported higher cash and cash equivalents, long-term and total liabilities, cash ratio, 
indebtedness and return on equity.  The interim financial statements also showed that these 
companies reported fewer debtors and less equity, operating income, solvency ratio and 
return on assets (measured based on operating income).  The analysis of annual financial 
statements indicated changes similar to those found in the interim statements, with an 
additional significant decrease in current assets and acid test ratio. 
Callao et al. (2010) examined the quantitative impact of mandatory IFRS adoption in Spain 
and the U.K.  This study extended the research of Callao, Jarne and Lainez (2007) by 
selecting 100 German companies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange General Index and 74 
U.K. companies listed on the Financial Times Stock Exchange Index (FTSE).  An analysis of 
 
 
38 
 
the differences between the 2004 financial statements reported under IFRS and those under 
local accounting standards found that the Spanish listed companies reported greater fixed and 
total assets, long-term liabilities, short-term liabilities and indebtedness.  These companies 
had also reported lower current assets, current ratio and solvency under IFRS.  It is 
observable that there are differences between Callao, Jarne and Lainez (2007) and Callao et 
al. (2010) in terms of the results on financial statements and financial ratios.  In particular, 
Callao et al. (2010) documented significant increases in fixed assets, total assets, and short-
term liabilities and a significant decrease in current ratio, but these significant changes were 
not reported in Callao, Jarne and Lainez (2007).  The differences of the changes in financial 
statements and financial ratios can be explained by the significant difference in the size of the 
study samples.   
Callao et al. (2010) also found that U.K. listed companies reported higher fixed and total 
assets, long-term liabilities, short-term liabilities, operating income, net income, indebtedness 
and return on equity under IFRS.  These listed companies also reported lower current assets, 
equity, and solvency under IFRS.  When comparing the results for the U.K. and Spain, it is 
evident that the impact of IFRS adoption on financial statements and financial ratios on 
Spanish companies is different from that on U.K. companies. In particular, U.K. listed 
companies reported significant higher profitability based on operating income, net income 
and return on equity (measured with net income); conversely, all profitability measurements 
of Spain listed companies showed insignificant changes. 
Lueg, Punda and Burkert (2014) examined how the transition from local accounting 
standards to IFRS affects the key financial ratios in U.K., which falls under the shareholder-
oriented common law regime.  Based on the final sample of 101 FTSE listed companies, the 
study found significant increases in operating profit margin, return on equity, return on 
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invested capital, and current ratio, and a significant decrease in price to earnings ratio.  
Comparing these results with Callao et al. (2010), it can be determined that U.K. listed 
companies have experienced better profitability under IFRS but there is inconsistency in the 
changes of current ratio.  The inconsistency of the findings in current ratios suggests the 
possibility that other factors influence the impact of IFRS on financial statements and 
financial ratios.   
Lueg, Punda and Burkert (2014) compared their results to those of Lantto and Sahlstrom 
(2009) who observed the changes in accounting figures and financial ratios for listed 
companies in Finland, which is a country in the group of creditor-oriented code law regimes.  
Basing their study on 91 Finnish listed companies, Lantto and Sahlstrom (2009) found 
significant increases in operating profit margin, return on equity, return on invested capital 
and gearing ratio.  The study also reported significant decreases in equity ratio, quick ratio 
and price to earnings ratio.  The findings of Lantto and Sahlstrom (2009) and Lueg, Punda 
and Burkert (2014) are similar for the profitability ratios, but not for the current ratio.  This 
difference in results suggests that the impact of IFRS adoption on current assets and current 
liabilities is due to the difference between a creditor-oriented code law regime and a 
shareholder-oriented common law regime. 
IFRS research on financial statements and financial ratios has also been conducted in 
Australia by Goodwin and Ahmed (2006), Goodwin, Ahmed and Heaney (2008), and Ahmed 
and Alam (2012).  Goodwin, Ahmed and Heaney (2008) reported that listed companies in 
Australia have significant increases in total liabilities based on mean and median.  The 
increase in debt level reported under IFRS is also shown in the increase of total liabilities 
over total assets.  The study also reported that the total equity and retained profits have 
significantly decreased, while total assets did not show significant change.  Ahmed and Alam 
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(2012) investigated the impact of IFRS on Australian local government entities, which are 
divided into city council, shire council and district council.  The study reported increases in 
total assets, total liabilities and total equity for the local councils, while surplus had 
decreased.  The study also found that only the change in total liabilities was significant.   
Blanchette, Racicot and Girard (2011) examined the financial ratios of nine Canadian 
companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.  Results of their analysis indicated that the 
changes in financial ratios are not significant except for cash flow coverage.  Blanchette, 
Racicot and Sedzro (2013) examined a larger sample size of 150 Canadian listed companies 
and found insignificant results for the financial statements.  The study further examined the 
number of companies with a positive impact on financial statements following IFRS adoption 
and the numbers of companies with a negative impact.  The study reported that 77 companies 
had an increase in total assets and 62 companies had a decrease.  Most of the companies (87) 
reported higher total liabilities, while 50 companies experienced a decrease. 83 companies 
had decreased in total equity and 53 companies had increased.  These results indicate that 
financial statements reported under IFRS are more volatile than those of Canadian GAAP.  
The increase of volatility in financial statements was also reported by Stent, Bradbury and 
Hooks (2010) and Tsalavoutas and Evans (2010), which are discussed in 2.3.2.   
Another recent IFRS study on financial ratios was conducted by Black and Maggina (2016).  
This study examined the Greece context, similar to Tsalavoutas and Evans (2010), but 
observed a longer period from 2000 to 2010 to determine the differences between pre- and 
post-IFRS adoption.  The study reported that several financial ratios had been significantly 
influenced by IFRS adoption.  In particular, the median of total debt to total assets, total debt 
to net worth, and long-term debt to equity had shown significant increase, indicating a higher 
debt level reported under IFRS.  The median net income to total assets, net profit to sales and 
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return on equity showed a significant decrease, indicating lower profitability reported under 
IFRS.  Table 2.3 lists the main IFRS studies on financial statements and financial ratios and 
the findings of these studies. 
Table 2.3: Main IFRS studies on financial statements and financial ratios 
IFRS studies Findings 
Hung and Subramanyam (2007) IFRS adoption affects the financial statements of the 
German listed companies and has led to more positive 
impact on the financial statements.   
Callao et al. (2010) IFRS adoption affects the financial statements and 
financial ratios of the Spain and U.K. listed companies.  
The impacts differ between the two countries, 
particularly the profitability measurements. 
Lueg, Punda and Burkert (2014) This study confirmed the results of Callao et al. (2010) 
that IFRS adoption significantly affected the 
profitability indicators in U.K. context.  
Goodwin, Ahmed and Heaney 
(2008) 
The study reported significant increase in debts 
indicators and significant decrease in total equity and 
retained profits for Australian listed companies 
Blanchette, Racicot and Sedzro 
(2013) 
This study found insignificant differences between the 
financial statements and financial ratios reported under 
IFRS and those under the Canadian GAAP.  The study 
also found a greater volatility in the change of financial 
statements and financial ratios. 
Black and Maggina (2016) Based on a sample from 2000 to 2010, the study 
reported the Greek listed companies had significant 
increase in debt ratios and significant decrease in 
profitability ratios. 
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2.3.2 Factors that affect the changes in financial statements and financial ratios 
Goodwin and Ahmed (2006) examined the impact of IFRS adoption on small, medium and 
large listed companies in Australia.  Based on the percentage of no change in net income and 
equity, small listed companies are less affected by IFRS adoption, while large companies are 
the most affected.  The study also reported that 51.2% of the large listed companies (exclude 
companies without changes in net income) reported a decrease in net income but only 36.8% 
of the small companies reported a similar decrease.  77.8% of the large companies (exclude 
companies without changes in total equity) reported an increase in total equity, but only 
22.2% of the small companies reported a decrease.  80% of the small listed companies 
(exclude companies without changes in total assets) reported an increase in total assets but 
only 53.3% of the large companies reported a similar increase.  More than 90% of the small, 
medium and large companies (excluding those companies without changes in total liabilities) 
reported an increase in total liabilities. 
Stent, Bradbury and Hooks (2010) examined the impact of IFRS adoption on financial 
statements and financial ratios of the early New Zealand (NZ) adopters (2005-2006) and the 
late NZ adopters (2007-2008).  The study reported that 87% of the NZ listed companies had 
been affected by the IFRS adoption based on the percentage of companies with no changes in 
net profit and total equity, similar to the Goodwin and Ahmed (2006) measurement.  Overall, 
most of the sample companies reported significantly higher total assets (55%>25%), total 
liabilities (75%>4%) and net profit (55%>32%), but significantly lower total equity 
(57%>30%).  When partitioning the sample into early and late adopters, the study found that 
IFRS adoption had less impact on the early adopters than on the late adopters.  The IFRS 
adoption had a significant impact on the total assets, total liabilities and net profit of the late 
adopters, but for the early adopters, only the total liabilities and total equity were significantly 
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affected.  In particular, most of the early (81%>6%) and late adopters (73%>3%) had 
reported higher total liabilities under IFRS. 
When examining the impact on financial ratios, Stent, Bradbury and Hooks (2010) found 
significant differences in all the selected financial ratios based on all observation.  The study 
reported that the majority of listed companies had increased their return on equity 
(64%>25%), return on assets (55%>33%), leverage ratio (64%>24%) and return on sales 
(66%>25%), but most had decreased in asset turnover (57%>30%).  Similar to the changes in 
financial statements, the financial ratios of the early adopters were less influenced by IFRS 
adoption than were the late adopters.  The results showed significant changes in return on 
equity, leverage ratio and return on assets for the late adopters, but only return on equity and 
return on sales were significantly changed for early adopters.  In particular, the majority of 
early adopters and late adopters reported greater return on equity and return on sales.   
Stent, Bradbury and Hooks (2010) also examined the IFRS impact on small and large 
companies.  Consistent with Goodwin and Ahmed (2006), Stent, Bradbury and Hooks (2010) 
found large companies to be more affected by IFRS adoption than were the small companies.  
Callao et al. (2010) grouped the listed companies in Spain and U.K. into quartile 1 (smallest), 
quartile 2 (medium), quartile 3 (medium), and quartile 4 (largest).  The study found that the 
medium-sized listed companies (quartile 2 and quartile 3) were more affected than the 
smallest and largest companies in Spain and the U.K.  These results are not consistent with 
those of Callao et al. (2010) and Stent, Bradbury and Hooks (2010).  When comparing the 
results for Spain and U.K., the U.K. listed companies of all sizes had experienced greater 
financial impact than did those in Spain. 
Tsalavoutas and Evans (2010) studied the impact of IFRS adoption on the financial 
statements and financial ratios of 238 companies in Greece.   The research focused on total 
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equity, net profit, gearing and liquidity ratios.  From the analysis it was concluded that the 
adoption of IFRS had a significant impact on all the selected figures and ratios.  More than 
half of the companies reported higher total equity (119>93), net profit (94>55), gearing ratio 
(191>38), and lower liquidity ratio (128>83).  These results were supported by Black and 
Maggina (2016) who found an increase in debt indicators and decrease in profit indicators for 
Greek listed companies.  When the sample was partitioned into companies audited by Big 4 
versus non-Big 4, the study found that companies audited by the Big 4 are less affected by 
IFRS adoption than those audited by non-Big 4 companies.  The analysis results showed that 
IFRS adoption had a significant impact on the net profit, gearing ratio and liquidity ratio of 
the listed companies audited by non-Big 4 but only the gearing ratio was found to be 
significantly affected by companies audited by the Big 4. 
Type of industry may also determine the impact of IFRS, and is another factor that has been 
examined in previous studies such as Callao et al. (2010), Trewavas, Redmayne and Laswad 
(2012), Blanchette, Racicot and Sedzro (2013) and Terzi, Oktem and Sen (2013).  Callao et 
al. (2010) who found differences between Spain and U.K. in terms of financial impact also 
analysed and compared the financial impact on the industrial sector and on the commercial 
and service sectors in the two countries.  While differences between the two sectors were 
found in terms of the financial impact, the study also found that the financial impact of the 
two sectors differed between Spain and U.K.  In Spain, the industrial sector experienced 
greater financial impact after IFRS implementation than did the commercial and service 
sectors.  In the U.K., the commercial and service sectors experienced greater financial impact 
than did the industrial sector.  Blanchette, Racicot and Sedzro (2013) also analysed the data 
and compared the results for different industries.  The results indicated that the impact of 
IFRS adoption on financial statements and financial ratios differed between industries.  For 
instance, companies within a management and finance sector had significantly higher total 
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assets but the transport industry had significantly lower total assets.  Only the management 
sector has been found to significantly increase on total liabilities.  Transport and professional 
services sectors were found to have significant decreases in total equity but finance and real 
estate had significant increases in total equity. Table 2.4 lists the main IFRS studies on the 
factors affecting the IFRS impact on financial statements and financial ratios. 
Table 2.4: Main IFRS studies on the factors affecting the IFRS impact on financial 
statements and financial ratios 
IFRS studies Main Findings 
Goodwin and Ahmed (2006) The effects of IFRS adoption on financial statements 
and financial ratios differ for different sized 
companies, based on an Australian study. 
Callao et al. (2010) The impact of IFRS adoption on financial statements 
and financial ratios varies between different industries.  
The study also found that the IFRS impact is different 
for similar industries in different countries. 
Stent, Bradbury and Hooks (2010) IFRS adoption has less impact on financial statements 
and financial ratios for early adopters than the late 
adopters, based on a NZ study. 
Tsalavoutas and Evans (2010) The Greece listed companies audited by Big 4 
companies are less influenced by IFRS adoption 
compared to those audited by non-Big 4. 
 
IFRS studies have documented that the adoption of IFRS does affect the financial statements 
and financial ratios for listed companies from different countries such as Australia, Canada, 
Germany, Greece, New Zealand, Spain, and the U.K.  In particular, these studies found that, 
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on average, listed companies reported significantly higher debts (such as total liabilities, total 
liabilities to total assets ratio) under IFRS or the majority of companies reported higher total 
liabilities.  This finding suggests that the full convergence with IFRS in Malaysia will 
increase the debt level of listed companies.   
Several studies such as Hung and Subramanyam (2007), Lantto and Sahlstrom (2009), Callao 
et al. (2010), Stent, Bradbury and Hooks (2010), Tsalavoutas and Evans (2010), Lueg, Punda 
and Burkert (2014) and Black and Maggina (2016) also reported that the adoption of IFRS 
influences the profitability figures and ratios, although there have been mixed results.  Listed 
companies from German (Lantto & Sahlstrom 2009), Greece (Tsalavoutas & Evans 2010), 
New Zealand (Stent, Bradbury & Hooks 2010), and the U.K. (Callao et al 2010; Lueg, Punda 
& Burkert 2014) reported higher profitability under IFRS, while listed companies from Spain 
(Callao et al. 2010) reported lower profitability.  In the Greek context, Tsalavoutas and Evans 
(2010) reported that the majority of listed companies have higher net profit, although Black 
and Maggina (2016) found that listed companies in Greece reported lower profitability ratios 
such as net profit to sales and return on equity.  The findings from these studies suggest that 
the increase in net profit may not mean an improvement on profitability ratios and it is 
important to evaluate the changes in financial ratios.   
These studies also found that the impact of IFRS adoption on financial statements differs 
according to the different sizes of companies, early adopters versus late adopters, Big 4 
versus non-Big 4 auditors, and different sectors.  In particular, Callao et al. (2010) reported 
that medium-sized listed companies experience greater impact following IFRS adoption, 
which differs from the findings of Goodwin and Ahmed (2006) and Stent, Bradbury and 
Hooks (2010).  Callao et al. (2010) also found that the commercial and service sectors in the 
U.K. experienced greater financial impact than did the industrial sector.  This study 
 
 
47 
 
anticipates similar results of IFRS adoption for U.K. listed companies and Malaysian listed 
companies.   
 
2.4 Literature review on IFRS impact on earnings management 
This section reviews and discusses the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings management in 
order to address the second research objective:  to evaluate whether the full convergence with 
IFRS has an effect on the earnings management of the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  
Earnings management is a proxy for the quality of earnings reported.  As Healy and Wahlen 
(1999, pg. 368) explained, ‘Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead 
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.’  The increase 
in earnings management indicates the decrease in the quality of earnings reported, vice versa.  
In Malaysia, research studies have been conducted on earnings management, including those 
of  Aini et al. (2006), Abdul Rahman and Haneem Mohamed Ali (2006), Johl, Jubb, and 
Houghton (2007), Mohd Saleh, Mohd Iskandar, and Mohid Rahman (2007), Ahmad-Zaluki, 
Campbell and Goodacre (2010), Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013), and Onalo, Lizam and 
Kaseri (2014).   
 
2.4.1 Earnings management research: Malaysian context 
Aini et al. (2006) examined the factors that caused the occurrence of earnings management in 
Malaysia by using companies that had been listed for 10 years (1990-1999) on the KLSE and 
observing them over a five-year period (1995-1999).  The researchers selected several 
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variables such as size of the companies, debt covenants, political costs, tax rate, internal 
financing, and four ownership variables – individual ownership, managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership, and nominee ownership for their study purposes.  Results of analysis 
indicated significant differences in natural log of total assets (measurement of size of 
companies) and nominee’s ownership.  The study also observed the change in discretionary 
accruals during the financial crisis (1997-1998) and found no explanatory variable on 
earnings management.  According to the results, Malaysian entities are more likely to apply 
earnings management (income decreasing accounting accruals) to avoid political costs and 
tax rate, and to apply income-increasing accounting accruals to attract nominee ownership 
consisting of security brokers and investment trusts.  Previous academic studies in Malaysian 
context (i.e. Abdul Rahman & Haneem Mohamed Ali 2006; Johl, Jubb, & Houghton 2007; 
Mohd Saleh, Mohd Iskandar, & Mohid Rahman 2007) investigated whether factors such as 
Big 4 versus non-Big 4, characteristics of the board of directors, audit committee and ethics 
have an impact on the change in earnings management.   
Abdul Rahman and Haneem Mohamed Ali (2006) examined the effectiveness of the board of 
directors, audit committee and concentrated ownership in monitoring and restricting the 
earnings management for the 97 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2002 to 2003.  The 
proxies of the characteristics of board of directors are: the proportion of independent 
directors, competency of independent directors, separation of the roles of CEO and chairman, 
and the size of the boards.  The proxies of audit committee characteristics include the 
proportion of independent directors on audit committee, competency of audit committee 
members, and the frequency of meetings.   The proxies of cultural characteristics are the 
proportion of Malay directors on the board and on the audit committee.  The results indicated 
that there is a significant positive relationship between discretionary accruals and size of the 
boards, but no significant relationship with other independent variables.  The study also 
 
 
49 
 
found that two control variables – size of the companies and the book to market value ratio – 
have a significant relationship with discretionary accruals.  Based on the results, the study 
concluded that the greater the number of directors on the board, the less effective is the 
monitoring of earnings management.   
The effectiveness of audit committee characteristics in monitoring the practice of earnings 
management in Malaysia was also examined by Mohd Saleh, Mohd Iskandar, and Mohid 
Rahman (2007).  The audit committee characteristics are the frequency of audit committee, 
the size of audit committee, the audit committee members with accounting knowledge, and 
the independent members on audit committee.  Based on final sample of 548 companies 
listed on Bursa Malaysia in 2001 (the year of the implementation of Code), the study found 
no significant relationship between the three proxies of audit committee characteristics (i.e. 
the frequency of audit committee, the size of audit committee, the audit committee members 
with accounting knowledge) and discretionary accruals.  The study found a significant 
negative relationship between the independence of the audit committee and discretionary 
accruals as well as the number of meetings attended by audit committee with accounting 
knowledge and discretionary accruals.  This finding suggests that the greater the 
independence of the audit committee and the number of meeting attended by knowledgeable 
audit committee members, the less likely it will be that management manage the earnings.  
Johl, Jubb, and Houghton (2007) focused on the association between the size of external 
auditors (Big 5 versus non-Big 5) and earnings management based on discretionary accruals 
(Jones 1991 model).  Specifically, the study observed the likelihood of qualified audit 
opinion expressed by Big 5 versus non-Big 5 when a high level of discretionary accruals is 
detected.  Based on the sample of companies listed on KLSE from 1994 to 1999, Johl, Jubb, 
and Houghton (2007) found that the size of external auditors and frequency of qualified audit 
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opinion are positive and significant.  This result indicates that the Big 5 external auditors 
report qualified opinions more frequently than do the other external auditors.   The results 
showed a significant positive relationship between the frequencies of the audit opinion and 
the size of the external auditors when discretionary accruals occurred.  This result indicates 
that Big 5 auditors reported qualified opinions more frequently than did other external 
auditors when earnings management occurred.  Based on this study, it is arguable that Big 5 
auditors in Malaysia provide higher quality audit reports than do the non-Big 5 auditors. 
Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell and Goodacre (2010) examined the impact of IPO on earnings 
management based on discretionary current accruals for 250 IPO companies listed on KLSE 
from 1990 to 2000.  In addition, the study investigated the association between IPO and 
economic crisis in terms of earnings management.  Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell and Goodacre 
(2010) found evidence of income-increasing earnings management in Malaysian IPOs, which 
occurred mainly during the economic crisis of 1997 and 1998.  The study also found that IPO 
companies engaged in aggressive income-increasing earnings management had significantly 
worse market-based performance compared to the others.  The findings of this study suggest 
the occurrence of opportunistic managerial behaviour. 
Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013) and Onalo, Lizam and Kaseri (2014) are the two research 
studies that focused on IFRS impact on earnings management.  Adibah Wan Ismail et al. 
(2013) selected listed companies from the Thompson One Banker database with 4010 firm-
year observations from 2002 to 2009, which included three years of pre- (2002-2005) and 
post-IFRS adoption (2006-2009) data to determine the absolute value of abnormal accruals 
using the modified Jones (1991) model of Dechow et al. (1995) and Kasznik (1999) and 
value relevance of earnings and book value.  The results showed a significant negative 
relationship between IFRS-based accounting standards and the absolute discretionary 
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accruals measured with the two modified Jones (1991) models.  The significant negative 
relationship indicates that Malaysian entities applied less earnings management under IFRS.  
Onalo, Lizam and Kaseri (2014) focused on the banking sector in Malaysia and Nigeria for 
the period between 2009 and 2012.  Using 8 Malaysian banks and 15 Nigerian banks, the 
study reported that the earnings management based on discretionary accruals had decreased 
by 12.6% and 41% respectively.  The results of this study also indicated the effectiveness of 
IFRS in reducing earnings management.  Table 2.5 lists the earnings management studies in 
Malaysian context. 
Table 2.5: Malaysian studies on earnings management 
Literature on Earnings 
Management in Malaysia 
Nature of the study 
Aini et al. (2006) Association between earnings management and 
factors such as size of the companies, debt 
covenants, political costs, tax rate, internal 
financing, and four ownership variables (i.e. 
individual ownership, managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership, and nominee ownership) 
Abdul Rahman and Haneem 
Mohamed Ali (2006) 
The effectiveness of the board of directors, audit 
committee and concentrated ownership in 
monitoring and restricting the earnings management 
Mohd Saleh, Mohd Iskandar, and 
Mohid Rahman (2007) 
The association between different audit committee 
characteristics (such as the frequency of audit 
committee, the size of audit committee, the audit 
committee members with accounting knowledge, 
and the independent members on audit committee) 
and earnings management 
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Johl, Jubb, and Houghton (2007) Examined the association between discretionary 
accruals and the frequency of qualified opinions for 
Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms  
Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell and 
Goodacre (2010) 
Examined the impact of IPO on earnings 
management based on discretionary current accruals 
Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013) Compared the earnings management between pre- 
(2002-2005) and post-IFRS convergence  (2006-
2009) 
Onalo, Lizam and Kaseri (2014) The impact of IFRS convergence on earnings 
management within banking industry (2009-2012) 
 
2.4.2 Impact of IFRS adoption on earnings management 
IFRS studies that examined the IFRS effect on earnings management include Van Tendeloo 
and Vanstraelen (2005), Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008), Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008), 
Paglietti (2009), Zhou, Xiong and Ganguli (2009), Callao and Jarne (2010), Chen et al. 
(2010), Iatridis (2010), Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010), Kabir, Laswad and Islam (2010), 
Leventis, Dimitropoulos and Anandarajan (2011), Atwood et al. (2011), Gebhardt and 
Novotny-Farkas (2011), Liu et al. (2011), Marra, Mazzola and Prencipe (2011), Sun, Cahan 
and Emanuel (2011), Zéghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011), Chua, Cheong and Gould (2012), 
Houqe et al. (2012), Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013), Ahmed, Neel and Wang (2013), 
Lourenco, Branco and Curto (2013), Paulo et al. (2013), Onalo, Lizam and Kaseri (2014), 
Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014), Dayanandan et al. (2016), Ebaid (2016), and Kouki (2018).  The 
findings of these studies are discussed below. 
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Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008), Chen et al. (2010), Houqe et al. (2010), Gebhardt and 
Novotny-Farkas (2011), and Dayanandan et al. (2016) examined the impact of IFRS adoption 
on earnings management using a sample of listed companies from different countries and 
found favourable results regarding changes in earnings management.  Barth, Landsman and 
Lang (2008) who observed 1896 firm-years for 326 firms from 21 countries that adopted 
IFRS from the period of 1994 to 2003 reported less earnings management based on two 
earnings management indicators – earnings smoothing and managing earnings towards a 
target.  The study measured the earnings smoothing based on three measurements, the 
variability of the change in net income scaled by total assets, mean ratio of the variability of 
the change in net income, and Spearman correlation between accruals and cash flows, and 
measured managing earnings towards a target based on the coefficient of small positive net 
income.   
The earnings management based on earnings smoothing and managing earnings towards 
target were also examined by Chen et al. (2010).  In addition, the study examined the cross-
sectional absolute discretionary accruals and accruals quality as measurements.  Based on the 
listed companies from 15 EU countries during 2000 to 2007, Chen et al. (2010) reported that 
majority of the earnings management indicators had improved in terms of less earnings 
management towards target, less absolute discretionary accruals and higher accruals quality; 
however, the earnings smoothing had increased and the recognition of large losses was less 
timely.  The study also found that the improvement in accounting quality was attributed to 
IFRS adoption, rather than to the managerial incentives and other business environmental 
factors.  
Houqe et al. (2010) examined the IFRS adoption impact on the changes in earnings 
management based on signed discretionary accruals for companies in different industries 
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from 46 countries.  While the study found no improvement on the earnings quality for the 
overall sample, the listed companies from countries with strong investor protection were 
found to have higher earnings quality in terms of less earnings management, greater value 
relevance, and greater earnings conservatism.  The indicators of strong investor protection are 
board independence, enforcement of securities laws, protection of minority shareholders’ 
interest, enforcement of accounting and auditing standards, judicial independence, and 
freedom of the press. 
Ahmed, Neel and Wang (2013) selected 3262 companies from 20 countries to examine the 
earnings management between pre- (2002-2004) and post- (2006-2007) IFRS.  This study 
reported an increase in income smoothing based on the significant decrease in the volatility of 
net income, the volatility of net income relative to the volatility of cash flows, and the 
association between cash flow and accruals, as well as a significant increase in the 
aggressiveness of accruals.  The study also reported that the increase in earnings management 
was observed mainly in listed companies from countries with strong legal enforcement.  
Moreover, in the sample, the IFRS countries with strong legal enforcement were EU 
countries, Australia and Hong Kong and the majority of the IFRS listed companies were from 
the U.K. (24.4%) and France (14.2%).  Both of these countries have strong legal 
enforcement.  Based on the sample and the findings, it can be concluded that the adoption of 
IFRS in U.K. and France has had a negative impact on the quality of financial reporting based 
on earnings management.   
Dayanandan et al. (2016) examined listed companies from 35 countries over a seven-year 
period (2002-2008), which is divided into pre- (2002-2004) and post-IFRS period (2006-
2008) to examine the impact on earnings management using earnings smoothing and 
discretionary accruals proxies.  The study grouped the listed companies under code law and 
 
 
55 
 
common law countries.  The code law countries were further grouped under French-origin, 
German-origin, and Scandinavian-origin.  The findings showed a significant increase in the 
variability of net income and a significant decrease in average discretionary accruals.  These 
results indicated that overall, the IFRS adoption had effectively reduced the earnings 
management.  Moreover, the study found that code law countries had less discretionary 
accruals but common law countries remained unchanged.  Dayanandan et al. (2016) divided 
the companies according to their high and low disclosure based on the degree to which 
investors are protected by the disclosure of ownership and financial information.  The study 
found that the discretionary accruals for countries with high disclosure levels are lower than 
those of countries with low disclosure levels.  Similarly, Kouki (2018) has also reported that 
mandatory IFRS adoption associated with investor protection significantly reduce the 
discretionary accruals in code law countries such as Germany, France and Belgium. 
Studies such as Iatridis (2010), Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010), Leventis, Dimitropoulos and 
Anandarajan (2010), Liu et al. (2011), Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011), Chua, Cheong 
and Gould (2012), Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013), and Onalo, Lizam and Kaseri (2014), 
and Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) focused on a specific country or jurisdiction to examine the 
impact of IFRS adoption on earnings management.  These studies found a mainly positive 
impact on earnings management based on different proxies of earnings management.  Iatridis 
(2010) examined the earnings management of the 241 U.K. companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange for the period before (2004) and after (2005) IFRS adoption and reported 
that the two proxies of earnings management, i.e. earnings smoothing and managing earnings 
toward a target, had decreased.  The study found a higher volatility of change in net profit 
and a higher volatility of change in net profit to the change in operating cash flows; the 
association between discretionary accruals and cash flows was significantly positive.  These 
results are similar to those of Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) and Chen et al. (2010).   
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Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010) investigated the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings 
management in 254 companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange from 2004 to 2006.  The 
study selected measurements of earnings management similar to those of Iatridis (2010): 
volatility of the change in net profit scaled by total assets, and association between 
discretionary accruals and cash flow.  According to the results, the change in net profit and 
the change in net profit to the change in operating cash flow have shown higher volatility.  
The correlation between accruals and cash flows showed greater negative value in the year of 
adoption (2005), but lower negative value in the second year of adoption (2006).  The study 
also found that the report of small profits rather than losses by listed companies had 
decreased after the IFRS adoption.  These results indicated that the IFRS adoption had 
reduced the earnings management in Greece, despite the increase in earnings management in 
the first year of IFRS adoption.   
Chua, Cheong and Gould (2012) focused their research on the companies listed on Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX).  Using the final sample of 172, the study analysed the earnings 
management based on earnings smoothing and managing earnings toward a positive target 
similar to Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008).  The analysis results showed that the IFRS 
adoption had significantly increased the variability of the change in net income and the ratio 
of the variance of the change in net income to the variance of the change in operating cash 
flows.  The findings indicated a less negative correlation between accruals and cash flows.  
However, the study found that the financial firms had engaged in managing earnings toward a 
small positive target.  These results indicated that the mandatory adoption of IFRS had 
improved the quality of financial reporting in Australia, except for the financial sector.   
Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013) and Onalo, Lizam and Kaseri (2014), as mentioned in 2.4.1, 
found that the implementation of IFRS had reduced the earnings management using the 
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discretionary accruals in Malaysia.  These findings suggest that full convergence with IFRS 
will increase the quality of reported earnings in Malaysia.  The impact of full IFRS 
convergence on the quality of reported earnings in Brazil was evaluated by Pelucio-Grecco et 
al. (2014).  The study selected 317 non-financial listed companies in Brazil and conducted the 
research on the pre- (2006-2008) and post-IFRS convergence (2009-2011) periods.  The 
study concluded that full-IFRS convergence had led to decreased earnings management 
(lower discretionary accruals). 
There are also studies such as Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), Jeanjean and Stolowy 
(2008), Paglietti (2009), Zhou, Xiong and Ganguli (2009), Callao and Jarne (2010), Kabir, 
Laswad and Islam (2010), Atwood et al. (2011), Paulo et al. (2013), and Ebaid (2016) that 
reported greater earnings management when IFRS was adopted.  Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005) selected listed companies in Germany – a code law country – from 1999 
to 2001 to examine the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings management.  The earnings 
management was examined using absolute discretionary accruals based on Jones (1991) 
model and earnings smoothing based on the correlation between accruals and operating cash 
flow.  The results indicated that the IFRS listed companies had significantly higher absolute 
discretionary accruals and earnings smoothing based on the significant negative correlation 
between operating cash flow and accruals than did the non-IFRS listed companies.  These 
findings suggest that the German listed companies had applied greater earnings management 
under IFRS.   
Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) selected listed companies from two common law countries such 
as Australia and U.K. and one code law country, France for the period 2002-2006.  The study 
analysed the distribution of earnings to discover whether the companies engaged in more 
earnings management to avoid losses when IFRS was implemented.  Based on the analysis 
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results, the small profits/small losses ratio had increased for each country.  A robustness test 
was conducted using small profits/small losses with IBEX scaled by lagged sales, and the 
results remained unchanged.  These results indicated that the earnings management had not 
decreased after the implementation of IFRS in the three countries regardless of whether they 
were under code law or common law.  The increase of earnings management in France 
(Jeanjean & Stolowy 2008) and in Germany (Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen 2005) has 
strengthened the argument that IFRS adoption has a negative effect in code law countries. 
Paglietti (2009) selected 92 non-financial companies listed on Italian Stock Exchange 
between 2002 and 2007 to examine the change in earnings management when mandatory 
IFRS adoption is implemented.  The study also used the earnings smoothing and managing 
earnings towards a target as the proxies of earnings management.  Similar to Barth et al. 
(2008), the metrics for earnings smoothing and earnings towards a target are the variability of 
annual changes in net income, the variability of annual changes in net income relative to the 
variability of annual changes in cash flows, and the correlation between accruals and cash 
flows.  The study found that variability of net income measured by net profit and the 
variability of net income relative to cash flow had decreased.  The results showed an increase 
in the correlation between accruals and cash flow when IFRS is implemented.  The study, 
however, does not provide sufficient evidence to support the change in managing earnings 
towards a target.  Based on these results, the listed companies in Italy had engaged in more 
earnings management when IFRS was implemented.  
The adoption of IFRS had a negative impact on earnings management for the majority of 
countries in the EU as reported by Callao and Jarne (2010).  The study investigated the 
change in earnings management based on the magnitude of change in discretionary accruals 
for the 1408 non-financial listed companies from 11 EU countries during the pre- (2003-
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2004) and post-IFRS adoption periods (2005-2006).  The results showed a significant change 
in total discretionary accruals for Belgium, France, Greece, and U.K., but not for Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.  More than half of the companies 
from the four countries had higher total discretionary accruals.  The study also analysed the 
changes in current discretionary accruals and long-term discretionary accruals.   
The study found that France, Spain and U.K. had significant changes in current discretionary 
accruals and most of the companies from these countries had significant higher current 
discretionary accruals.  Moreover, all countries (except Italy) had significant changes in long-
term discretionary accruals and the majority of companies from each country had higher 
long-term discretionary accruals.  When comparing the results of different countries and 
variables, France was the only country where the majority of listed companies experienced a 
significant increase in total discretionary accruals, current discretionary accruals and long-
term discretionary accruals, while Italy was the only country that experienced insignificant 
changes in all total discretionary accruals, current discretionary accruals and long-term 
discretionary accruals. 
The increase in earnings management was also found in another common law country – New 
Zealand (Kabir, Laswad & Islam 2010).  The study’s final sample consisted of 100 
companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange from 2002-2009.  The researchers 
examined the accruals quality and ability of earnings to predict one-year-ahead cash flow 
from operating activities, which is used to determine the change in earnings management.  
Kabir, Laswad and Islam (2010) found significantly higher absolute discretionary accruals 
during the years of IFRS implementation, but the change in signed discretionary accruals and 
the ability of earnings to predict one-year-ahead CFO are insignificant. 
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Similar to Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008), Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011) selected 
French listed companies to determine the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings management.  
Using a different earnings management matrix, the study investigated the changes in 
discretionary accruals for the final sample of 353 French listed companies from six industries 
during pre- (2003-2004) and post-mandatory IFRS (2005-2006) periods. The study found that 
the discretionary accruals and absolute discretionary accruals had significantly decreased 
during the post-mandatory IFRS period when compared with the pre-mandatory IFRS period.  
These results indicated that the French listed companies had exercised less earnings 
management when IFRS was implemented.   
The finding of the change in earnings management in France by Zeghal, Chtourou and 
Sellami (2011) is different from that of Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) and Callao and Jarne 
(2010).  The differences in the findings using the same country can be explained by the 
differences in the earnings management proxies used to determine the change in earnings 
management, suggesting that the listed companies may be using different means to manage 
the earnings.  This explanation is strengthened by the different findings on the changes in 
earnings management based on different measurements in Australia (Jeanjean & Stolowy 
2008; Chua, Cheong & Gould 2012) and U.K. (Jeanjean & Stolowy 2008; Iatridis 2010).  
Callao and Jarne (2010) and Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011) examined discretionary 
accruals based on a different model, which may explain the difference in findings. 
Ebaid (2016) investigated the impact of IFRS adoption on the quality of financial reporting in 
Egypt – a code law country.  The study compared the two proxies of earnings management – 
earnings smoothing and managing earnings toward earnings target for pre- (2000-2006) and 
post-IFRS (2007-2009) periods. The results have shown a significant decrease in the 
variability of change in net income relative to the change in cash flow from operations and a 
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significant increase in negative correlation between accruals and cash flow from operations in 
the post-IFRS adoption period.  The results also indicated that these companies were likely to 
engage in small positive earnings more frequently during the post-IFRS adoption rather than 
the pre-IFRS adoption period.  These results suggest that the IFRS adoption increased the 
earnings management in Egypt.  Table 2.6 lists the main IFRS studies on earnings 
management. 
Table 2.6: Main IFRS studies on Earnings Management 
IFRS Literature on Earnings 
Management 
Findings 
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
(2005) 
Discretionary accruals have increased after IFRS 
adoption in Germany.  Companies audited by Big 4 
have lesser discretionary accruals than non-Big 4. 
Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) The IFRS adoption did not lead to a decrease in 
earnings management for Australia, France and 
U.K.   
Paglietti (2009) On average, the listed companies in Italy engaged in 
more earnings smoothing when IFRS was adopted. 
Callao and Jarne (2010) Based on the sample from the EU, the study found 
that the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings 
management differs between countries.  In 
particular, the majority of listed companies from all 
countries except Italy experienced significant higher 
long-term discretionary accruals. 
Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010) The IFRS adoption reduced the earnings 
management in Greece. 
Kabir, Laswad and Islam (2010) The NZ listed companies reported significant higher 
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absolute discretionary accruals when IFRS was 
implemented. 
Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami 
(2011) 
The French listed companies have less discretionary 
accruals and absolute discretionary accruals after 
IFRS adoption. 
Chua, Cheong and Gould (2012) On average, the companies listed on ASX have 
applied less earnings smoothing under IFRS 
compare to the Australian GAAP. 
Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) The full convergence in Brazil has led to lower 
discretionary accruals.  
Dayanandan et al. (2016) Code law countries have less discretionary accruals, 
while common law countries remain unchanged.  
Countries with high level of financial disclosure 
have lower earnings management than countries 
with low level of financial disclosure. 
Ebaid (2016) The IFRS adoption has led to a decrease in earnings 
management in Egypt. 
 
From the findings of the studies in section 2.4.1, it can be determined that the listed 
companies in Malaysia do engage in earnings management based on discretionary accruals 
measurement.  These studies have also shown that the size of the board of directors (Abdul 
Rahman & Haneem Mohamed Ali 2006), the size of external auditors (Johl, Jubb & 
Houghton 2007), the independence of audit committee and frequency of the meeting attended 
by knowledgeable audit committee (Mohd Saleh, Mohd Iskandar, & Mohid Rahman 2007), 
and the close alignment with IFRS (Adibah Wan Ismail et al. 2013; Onalo, Lizam & Kaseri 
2014) do influence the management of the companies to engage in earnings management.   
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Based on the findings in section 2.4.2, it can be determined that IFRS adoption does have an 
impact on earnings management.  The changes in earnings management can be positive or 
negative depending on the country and the measurements of earnings management.  In 
particular, this thesis has focused on studies that examined IFRS impact on earnings 
management in U.K. because U.K. and Malaysia have similar institutional settings.  The U.K. 
and Malaysia are common law countries and the U.K. has influenced the accounting 
standards and regulations development in Malaysia due to the colonisation and the presence 
of U.K. chartered accountants.   
The majority of U.K. studies (Jeanjean & Stolowy 2009; Callao & Jarne 2010; Ahmed, Neel 
& Wang 2013) reported significant increase in earnings management.  Based on this finding, 
the full convergence with IFRS in Malaysia is more likely to increase the earnings 
management.  However, there are also studies such as those of Adibah Wan Ismail et al. 
(2013), Onalo, Lizam and Kaseri (2014) and Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) that suggest the full 
IFRS convergence in Malaysia can enhance the quality of reported earnings.  Adibah Wan 
Ismail et al. (2013) and Onalo, Lizam and Kaseri (2014) who examined Malaysian listed 
entities reported a significant decrease in earnings management during the close alignment of 
Malaysian accounting standards with IFRS as well as the transition from close alignment to 
full convergence (2009-2012) for the banking industry.  Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) who 
examined the impact of full IFRS convergence in Brazil also reported a decline in earnings 
management.   
This thesis has focused on the impact of full IFRS convergence on earnings management for 
the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  In particular, the study observed the change in 
discretionary accruals during the pre (2009-2011 or 2010-2012) and post full IFRS 
convergence (2012-2014 or 2013-2015).   This study is an extension of the studies by Adibah 
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Wan Ismail et al. (2013) who investigated the close alignment period (2002-2009) and Onalo, 
Lizam and Kaseri (2014) who observed the short period of transition from close alignment to 
full convergence (2009-2012) in finance sector.  It is anticipated that this thesis will provide 
significant information determining whether the full convergence of IFRS has enhanced the 
quality of financial reporting, which is important to various accounting standards setting 
bodies, accounting bodies and regulators, particularly the MASB. 
 
2.5 Literature on Big 4 versus non-Big 4 and earnings management 
The effectiveness of IFRS adoption in reducing earnings management may depend on various 
factors such as the size of the external auditors based on Big 4 versus non-Big 4 (Van 
Tendeloo & Vanstraelen 2005; Liu et al. 2011; Zéghal, Chtourou & Sellami 2011; Pelucio-
Grecco et al. 2014), cross-listing on developed economies (Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen 
2005; Sun, Cahan & Emanuel 2011; Zéghal, Chtourou & Sellami 2011), characteristics of 
board of directors (Marra, Mazzola & Prencipe 2011; Zeghal, Chtourou & Sellami 2011), and 
investor protection (Houqe et al. 2012).  Subsection 2.5.1 below reviews the studies that have 
examined the association between the size of external auditors and audit quality. Subsection 
2.5.2 reviews the studies that have evaluated whether the changes in earnings management 
differ between Big 4 versus non-Big 4 between pre- and post- full IFRS convergence. 
2.5.1 Variables influencing the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings 
management 
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), who found more earnings management when IFRS 
was adopted, reported that German listed companies audited by Big 4 firms have significant 
lower earnings smoothing compared to non-Big 4.  This result suggests that Big 4 audit firms 
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do play an important role in restricting the practice of earnings management by the 
management of listed companies.  The study also found that companies cross-listed on 
developed economies i.e. NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) have lower earnings smoothing, although the result is insignificant.  
Another study of cross-listed companies conducted by Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2011) found 
that the cross-listed companies on U.S. stock exchanges engaged in less earnings 
management than their counterparts who had adopted IFRS. The study selected 1698 foreign 
companies that had mandatorily adopted IFRS and examined several proxies of earnings 
quality such as discretionary accruals, target beating, earnings persistence, timely loss 
recognition, and the ERC.   
Liu et al. (2011) studied the impact of IFRS adoption on the accounting qualities of 870 
Chinese listed companies with A-shares between pre- (2005-2006) and post- (2007-2008) 
IFRS adoption.  The study found significant greater net income variability and significant 
change in the ratio of earnings variability over cash flow variability during 2007-2008, 
indicating less earnings smoothing when IFRS is implemented.  When examining the 
association between the size of audit firms and earnings management, Liu et al. (2011) found 
the improvement in the quality of financial reporting for listed companies with non-Big 4 
audit firms was greater than the Big 4 audit firms.  This finding suggests that the 
implementation of IFRS in China had itself effectively improved the quality of financial 
reporting. 
Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011) who found that IFRS adoption reduced the earnings 
management for French listed companies also reported that factors such as the board of 
directors, audit committee, existence of block shareholders, the quality of external audit and 
the cross-listing influence the enforcement of IFRS adoption.  In particular, the existence of 
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block shareholders and the size of auditors showed a significantly positive relationship with 
absolute discretionary accruals based on two analysed regressions.  This finding suggests that 
listed companies with block shareholders engaged in lesser discretionary accruals than 
companies without block shareholders.  Big 4 audit firms do restrict the listed companies in 
France from engaging in earnings management to a greater extent than non-Big 4. 
Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) found insufficient evidence to conclude that Big 4 audit firms 
had a more restrictive effect on earnings management on Brazilian listed companies than 
non-Big 4.   The study found sufficient evidence to affirm that the Brazilian listed companies 
with higher corporate governance were more likely to have more earnings management.  The 
study concluded that based on the results for Big 4 versus non-Big 4 firms, corporate 
governance and regulatory environment, the regulatory environment is the most effective 
mechanism for improving the quality of financial reporting.  This finding is similar to Liu et 
al. (2011) who found that IFRS implementation effectively reduced earnings management in 
China.  
Marra, Mazzola and Prencipe (2011) focused their research on examining whether the board 
of directors have a restrictive effect on the earnings management of the Italian listed 
companies when the country has mandatory adoption of IFRS.  Using the final sample of 222 
non-financial companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, the study has found that the 
board’s independence and the presence of an audit committee have a greater monitoring 
function in reducing earnings management after IFRS adoption.   
Based on the findings of the studies in 2.4.3, it can be determined that the monitoring 
mechanisms such as Big 4 versus non-Big 4 audit firms, board of directors, cross-listing 
companies, and level of investor protection (discussed in 2.4.2) have a restrictive effect on 
earnings management after IFRS adoption.    However, the effectiveness of the Big 4 and 
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non-Big 4 audit firms in reducing the earnings management depends on the jurisdictions.  
While German (Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen 2005) and French listed companies (Zeghal, 
Chtourou & Sellami 2011) audited by Big 4 have lower earnings management, the Brazilian 
(Pelucio-Grecco et al. 2014) and Chinese listed companies (Liu et al. 2011) audited by Big 4 
firms have not shown less earnings management than non-Big 4.  The comparison of studies 
by Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) and Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011) revealed 
that German listed companies increased their earnings management after IFRS adoption but 
Italian listed companies have decreased it.  These findings have led to ambiguity regarding 
the effectiveness of Big 4 auditors in restricting earnings management. 
2.5.2 Literature review on external auditors: Big 4 versus non-Big 4  
The separation of ownership and control creates the possibility of an agency problem – 
managerial opportunistic behaviour (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  The agency problem can be 
reduced when the listed companies impose effective monitoring and bonding mechanisms on 
the managers.  One of the monitoring mechanisms is the appointment of external auditors 
who perform audit services to ensure the reliability of financial information for capital 
holders.  The quality of the audit services is important to ensure the effectiveness of the 
external auditors as a monitoring mechanism.  Audit quality is defined (Palmrose 1988, pg. 
56) as, ‘the level of assurances – the probability financial statements contain no material 
omissions or misstatements’.   
Prior studies have questioned and examined the quality of audit services based on the 
different characteristics of the external auditors.  These characteristics include the size of 
audit firms – Big 4 versus non-Big 4 (DeAngelo 1981; Francis & Wilson 1988; Palmrose 
1988; Becker et al. 1998; Francis, Maydew & Sparks 1999; Nelson, Elliot & Tarpley 2002; 
Geiger & Rama 2006; Piot & Janin 2007; Wang et al. 2016), auditors or audit partner rotation 
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(Dye 1991; DeFond 1992; DeFond & Subramanyam 1998; Catanach & Walker 1999; 
Johnson, Khurana & Reynolds 2002; Jackson, Moldrich & Roebuck 2008; Ruiz-Barbadillo, 
Gomez-Aguilar & Carrera 2009; Firth, Rui & Wu 2012; Salleh & Jasmani 2014), external 
audit fees (Gul, Chen & Tsui 2003; Larcker & Richardson 2004; Hoitash, Markelevich & 
Barragato 2007; Venkataraman, Weber & Willenborg 2008; Choi, Kim & Zang 2010; 
Asthana & Boone 2012), and non-audit fee (Lennox 1999; DeFond, Raghunandan & 
Subramanyam 2002; Antle et al. 2006; Lim & Tan 2008).  In particular, a thorough review 
and discussion will be conducted on studies that focused on the size of audit firms.  
DeAngelo (1981) argued that the size of external auditors affects the audit quality because the 
independence of the external auditors can be influenced by the quasi-rents from the clients.  
DeAngelo (1981, pg. 197) stated, ‘ceteris paribus, the larger the auditor as measured by the 
number of current clients and the smaller the client as a fraction of the auditor’s total quasi-
rents, the less incentive the auditor has to behave opportunistically, and the higher the 
perceived quality of the audit.’  Based on this argument, Big 4 audit firms are more likely to 
provide a higher quality of audit service than non-Big 4 because Big 4 have more clients and 
a smaller fraction of the total quasi rents received from each client.  The association between 
the size of audit firms and audit quality can also be explained by the quality differentiation 
(Francis & Wilson 1988).  Francis and Wilson (1988) found that Big 8 audit firms (now Big 
4) that are considered as high quality suppliers provided better audit quality. 
Palmrose (1988) examined the audit quality of the Big 8 versus non-Big 8 based on the 
number of litigations between 1960 and 1985.  The study found that non-Big 8 audit firms 
have higher litigation occurrence rates than Big 8, which indicates that the latter provide 
higher quality audit services.  This result has supported the argument of Francis and Wilson 
(1988) that Big 8 audit firms are branded as higher quality auditors.  Lennox (1999) also 
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examined the association between the size of audit firms and the litigations.  Their study of 
U.K. listed companies between 1987 and 1994 found a highly significant positive association 
between auditor size (Big 8 versus non-Big 8) and the measurements of litigation, which 
indicates that Big 8 audit firms are more likely to incur litigation.  This finding is consistent 
with the deep pocket hypothesis used by Lennox (1999).  Deep pocket hypothesis predicts 
that large auditors have a greater chance of litigation and litigation against audit firms is not a 
strong indication of the audit accuracy.  This is because auditors are sued for insufficient 
conservatism in audit reports but are never sued for being too conservative.  Nonetheless, 
studies that examined the quality of financial reporting, particularly the reported earnings, 
will provide strong evidence and support of the audit quality. 
Teoh and Wong (1993) investigated whether the earnings response coefficient differs 
between Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms to determine the audit quality, particularly the 
perceived audit quality by investors.  The study found that Big 4 audit firms have 
significantly greater earnings response coefficients than non-Big 4, which suggest Big 4 audit 
firms are more likely to ensure the accuracy of reported earnings.  Becker et al. (1998) 
examined the relationship between the size of audit firms (Big 4 versus non-Big 4) and 
discretionary accruals.  Based on a sample from 1989 to 1992, the study found that the 
companies audited by non-Big 6 have greater discretionary accruals and absolute 
discretionary accruals than companies audited by the Big 6.  These results indicate that Big 6 
audit firms provide higher quality of audit services than non-Big 6 audit firms.   
Francis, Maydew and Sparks (1999) selected the companies listed on NASDAQ between 
1975 and 1994 to examine whether the companies audited by Big 6 engaged in greater 
accruals than non-Big 6.  The study found an increase of total accruals in listed companies 
audited by Big 6.  The study also reported that these companies have lower amounts of 
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estimated discretionary accruals than the non-Big 6, which indicates that Big 6 auditors are 
more effective in monitoring the earnings management than are the non-Big 6.  
Based on the findings of Becker et al. (1998) and Francis, Maydew and Sparks (1999), 
Bauwhede, Willekens and Gaeremynck (2003) questioned the determinants of earnings 
management in other institutional settings such as Belgium.  The study examined whether the 
earnings management differs between public and private ownership, Big 4 and non-Big 4 
audit firms for the industrial and commercial companies listed on the Brussels Stock 
Exchange from 1991 to 1997.  The study found that Belgian private and public listed 
companies had engaged in income smoothing and managed the earnings to meet the 
benchmark target of prior-year earnings.  Moreover, the study found that listed companies 
audited by Big 4 firms and public ownership have constrained earnings management in 
above-target firms, but found no evidence of auditor size and ownership effects on earnings 
management in below-target firms.  The Big 4 auditors had significantly greater constraints 
on income-decreasing earnings management for above-target companies than did the non-Big 
4 auditors.  The public ownership of above-target companies tended to manage earnings 
upward. 
Another study by Piot and Janin (2007) reported no significant differences between Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 on restraining earnings management activities in France.  This study examined 
various indicators of audit quality such as Big 4 versus non-Big 4, auditor tenure and audit 
committee on discretionary accruals measured with the Jones (1991) model and the modified 
version by Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) for the sample of 102 non-financial companies listed 
on the French stock market during 1998-2002.  The results showed that the size of audit firms 
made little difference to both discretionary accruals and absolute discretionary accruals 
measured using the Jones (1991) model and the modified model by Jeter and Shivakumar 
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(1999).  When comparing their findings to those of U.S. studies, Piot and Janin (2007) 
suggested that the differences can be explained by the fact that France has lower litigation 
risk compared to U.S.  
Geiger and Rama (2006) examined the differences in the quality of audit services between 
Big 4 and non-Big 4 based on the accuracy of audit reports, such as going-concern modified 
reports issued to clients who did not subsequently fail, and prior audit reports without a 
going-concern modification for bankrupt clients.  The study observed 1,042 companies that 
received first-time going-concern modified reports from 1990-2000 and 710 bankrupt 
companies from 1991-2001, and reported that Big 4 audit firms have significantly fewer type 
1 and type 2 errors than non-Big 4 audit firms.  The study also reported no significant 
differences of type 1 and type 2 errors between national second-tier and regional or local 
third-tier audit firms.  These results suggest that Big 4 audit firms are more accurate in audit 
reporting compared to non-Big 4 audit firms. 
Nelson, Elliot and Tarpley (2002) conducted qualitative research based on questionnaires to 
determine the approach of the Big 4 auditors on earnings management of the listed 
companies.  The results indicated that the managers are more likely to engage in earnings 
management and the auditors are less likely to adjust earnings management that are 
structured (not structured) with respect to precise (imprecise) accounting standards.  The 
study also found that the managers tend to report an increase of current-year income, but the 
auditors are more likely to adjust these attempts.  In addition, the auditors are more likely to 
adjust the earnings management attempts that are material and attempts made by small 
clients.  These findings suggest the importance of the quality of the regulated accounting 
standards and the possible dependent relationship between Big 4 auditors and large 
companies. 
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From the review of literature on Big 4 versus non-Big 4 in 2.5.2, majority of the studies have 
argued or documented that Big 4 audit firms provide better quality of audit services compared 
to non-Big 4 audit firms (DeAngelo 1981; Francis & Wilson 1988; Palmrose 1988; Becker et 
al. 1998; Francis, Maydew & Sparks 1999; Nelson, Elliot & Tarpley 2002; Geiger & Rama 
2006; Wang et al. 2016).  In particular, the findings of Nelson, Elliot and Tarpley (2002) 
indicated that Big 4 audit firms are unlikely to adjust earnings management if the attempts are 
structured (not structured) with respect to precise (imprecise) standards.  These findings 
suggest that the quality of accounting standards is an important means of reducing earnings 
management attempts.  However, Piot and Janin (2007) reported that listed companies 
audited by Big 4 audit firms do not necessarily exhibit lower earnings management than non-
Big 4 audit firms in France, which is explained by its lower litigation rate compared to the 
U.S.   
IFRS studies (Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen 2005; Zéghal, Chtourou & Sellami 2011) also 
found that listed companies audited by Big 4 have lower earnings management than non-Big 
4.  The findings of these studies suggest that Big 4 auditors are more effective in restricting 
the management of listed companies from engaging in earnings management than non-Big 4.  
In particular, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) found that IFRS adoption in German had 
increased the earnings management and the Big 4 auditors provide a more effective 
monitoring mechanism in restricting excessive earnings management than do the non-Big 4 
auditors.  Liu et al. (2011) who found the convergence with IFRS in China reduced the 
earnings management have documented that listed companies audited by non-Big 4 auditors 
have greater reduction in earnings management than Big 4 auditors.  This result suggests that 
the implementation of IFRS is the main reason for the improved quality of financial 
reporting.  However, Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) reported that the listed companies audited 
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by Big 4 auditors did not exhibit lower earnings management than non-Big 4 auditors when 
Brazil had full convergence with IFRS.   
Based on these findings, it can be concluded that Big 4 auditors are more likely to provide 
better audit services compared to non-Big 4 auditors based on the quasi-rent and brand 
differentiation.  However, the differences in audit quality between Big 4 and non-Big 4 
auditors may depend on countries or jurisdictions.  In particular, it is questionable whether 
the Big 4 is more effective than non-Big 4 in restricting earnings manipulation in a country 
that gives preparers’ an incentive to manipulate financial information (Ball, Robin & Wu 
2003) or the incentives of preparers prevail.  Furthermore, the external auditors are able to 
deliver better audit services when higher quality accounting standards are implemented.   
Therefore, one aim of this study is to determine whether Big 4 auditors are more effective in 
constraining earnings management than non-Big 4 during the three years before and after full 
convergence in Malaysia. 
 
2.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter reviewed the literature on IFRS issues, particulary the impact on financial 
statement and financial ratios, the impact on earnings management, and the effectiveness of 
Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors in restricting earnings management.   
The IFRS studies on financial statements and financial ratios have focused mainly on western 
developed countries, such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Greece, New Zealand, Spain, and 
the U.K.    These studies have documented that IFRS adoption does affect the financial 
statements and financial ratios.  In particular, these studies have found that 
 
 
74 
 
- The financial statements prepared under IFRS are more likely to report greater debts 
than those under the local GAAP;  
- The implementation of IFRS has impacts on profitability figures and ratios, but the 
changes may be different for each country.  Specifically, the U.K. studies (Callao et al 
2010; Lueg, Punda & Burkert 2014) found the profitability reported under IFRS is 
higher compared to that under local GAAP.  
- The impact of IFRS on financial statements and financial ratios is associated with 
variables such as the sizes of the companies, industries effect, early adopter versus 
late adopters, Big 4 versus non-Big 4. Studies have documented different impacts of 
IFRS adoption on the changes in financial statements and financial ratios influenced 
by these factors.  Callao et al. (2010) have reported that U.K. medium-sized listed 
companies are those most affected by IFRS adoption.  This study has also reported 
that the commercial and services sector is more affected than the industrial sector.   
The study on Malaysia is important because it is an emerging (developing) economy that is 
different from the western developed countries.  Malaysia has also experienced a period of 
gradual alignment before it reached the full convergence.  This process of IFRS convergence 
is different from the IFRS adoption process in countries examined in prior studies.  Based on 
the literature review, the transition from local GAAP to IFRS in Malaysia will lead to higher 
debts and higher profitability.  It is unclear whether the changes in financial statements and 
financial ratios occurred during the period of close alignment with IFRS or full convergence 
with IFRS.  For the purposes of this study, we examined the period before and after full IFRS 
convergence to capture how this unique IFRS convergence changed the financial statements 
and financial ratios.   
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The studies that examined the IFRS adoption effect on earnings management have reported 
either an increase or a decrease in earnings management.  In particular: 
- The majority of U.K. studies (Jeanjean & Stolowy 2009; Callao & Jarne 2010; 
Ahmed, Neel & Wang 2013) reported a significant increase in earnings management.  
These findings suggest that the full convergence with IFRS in Malaysia is more likely 
to increase the earnings management based on the similarity in the development of 
accounting standards and regulations between Malaysia and U.K. 
- Studies by Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013), Onalo, Lizam and Kaseri (2014) and 
Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) found less earnings management in IFRS convergence 
countries (i.e. Malaysia and Brazil).  The findings of these studies imply that the full 
convergence in Malaysia will lead to less earnings management. 
Studies on Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors (DeAngelo 1981; Francis & Wilson 1988; 
Palmrose 1988; Becker et al. 1998; Francis, Maydew & Sparks 1999; Nelson, Elliot & 
Tarpley 2002; Geiger & Rama 2006; Wang et al. 2016) have argued or empirically supported 
that Big 4 auditors provide better audit services than the non-Big 4 auditors.  Nelson, Elliot 
and Tarpley (2002) found that the effectiveness of Big 4 auditors in restricting earnings 
management depends on the quality of accounting standards and the size of companies.  Few 
IFRS studies (Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen 2005; Liu et al. 2011; Zeghal, Chtourou & 
Sellami 2011; Pelucio-Grecco et al. 2014) have examined the effect of IFRS adoption on the 
earnings management of companies audited by Big 4 and those audited by non-Big 4 firms.  
Following are the findings of these studies. 
- Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) who found that German listed companies have 
applied greater discretionary accruals under IFRS, reported that listed companies 
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audited by Big 4 have lower discretionary accruals than those audited by non-Big 4 
firms; 
- Liu et al. (2011) who found IFRS adoption leads to decrease in earnings management 
in China reported that companies audited by non-Big 4 firms have greater reduction in 
earnings management than those audited by Big 4; 
- Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011) reported that IFRS adoption has led to less 
earnings management in France.  This study also found that companies audited by Big 
4 firms have lower earnings management than those of non-Big 4; and 
- Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) found that Big 4 had no greater restricting impact than 
non-Big 4 when the IFRS convergence in Brazil reduced the earnings management.  
Given the different results reported in these studies, it is important to determine whether the 
Big 4 auditors had greater restricting effects on earnings management than did the non-Big 4 
in Malaysia during before and after full IFRS convergence.  In particular, there is a strong 
presence of the Big 4 in Malaysia’s audit market as approximately 50% of the listed 
companies on Bursa Malaysia are audited by them.  The findings on discretionary accruals 
also enable us to determine whether the decrease in discretionary accruals during the full 
convergence is influenced by the size of audit firms and to determine whether the companies 
audited by Big 4 have less earnings management when the discretionary accruals increased 
during the period before full convergence and during the third year of full convergence.  
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores and establishes the foundation of the theoretical framework for this 
research, and includes the justifications for the use of selected theories in the Malaysian 
context. This research fulfils the dual aim of addressing important issues related to 
understanding the impacts of the global accounting harmonisation in the Malaysian context 
and in providing recommendations for other similar economies in the process of IFRS 
convergence.  It is anticipated that this research may be able to contribute to the theoretical 
framework from the perspective of IFRS research in an emerging economy.  To develop the 
theoretical framework, this study applied the assumptions from two well-developed theories: 
agency and signalling theories.  These two theories hold a prominent position in accounting, 
economic and finance literature (i.e. Ross 1973; Spence 1973; Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Spence 1976; Ross 1977; Riley 1979; Fama 1980; Fama & Jensen 1983; Morris 1987; 
Eisenhardt 1989; Shapiro 2005; Filbeck 2009; and Connelly et al. 2011) and have been 
applied in different studies (i.e. Kim & Verrecchia 1991; DeFond 1992; Adams 1994; Jain & 
Kini 1994; Roth & O’Donnell 1996; Miller 2002; Watson, Shrives & Marston 2002; 
Palmrose, Richardson & Scholz 2004; Zhang & Wiersema 2009; Tsalavoutas 2011; Elzahar 
& Hussainey 2012). 
Agency theory is concerned with the agency problem arising from the principal-agent 
relationship.  A principal-agent relationship exists when there is a separation of ownership 
and control within a company.  Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 167) defined the principal-
agent relationship as a ‘contract under which one or more persons, the principal(s), engage 
another person, the agent, to perform some service on their behalf that involves delegating 
some decision-making authority to the agent’.  The principal-agent relationship in this study 
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is represented by the management of the listed companies to whom the shareholders have 
delegated the responsibility for making decisions about business activities.  The agency 
problem is likely to arise when there is conflict of interests between the management of listed 
companies and their shareholders.  For instance, the management may manipulate the 
financial information by removing unfavourable financial data to secure their remuneration or 
position in the company. The manipulation of financial information transfers the financial 
risk to the shareholders as they are unable to make judicious investment decisions.  The 
agency problem can be reduced when monitoring or bonding mechanisms are employed 
within the company (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  One of the bonding mechanisms is the 
regulation of higher quality accounting standards such as IFRS (Stiglitz 2000).  The detailed 
explanation of how agency theory is applicable in predicting the impact of full IFRS 
convergence is provided in the sections below. 
Signalling theory is concerned with the problem that arises from information asymmetry 
(Morris 1987).  This theory is useful for explaining how information asymmetry can be 
reduced when one party is willing to release more information to the other parties (Spence 
2002).  To apply signalling theory, the three primary elements of this theory – signallers, 
receivers and the signal – must exist.  In this study, the three primary elements did exist and 
are represented by the MASB (signaller), stock market participants on Bursa Malaysia 
(receivers), and the full IFRS convergence (signal).  The application of signalling theory in 
predicting the impact of full IFRS convergence is explained in the following sections. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the key concepts in agency theory and signalling theory. 
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Figure 3. 1: The principal-agent and signaller-receiver in this study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: 3.2 explains and discusses the imperfect capital market, 
information asymmetry and the costs of information asymmetry; 3.3 explains the agency 
theory; 3.4 explains the signalling theory; 3.5 discusses the application of both agency theory 
and signalling theory; and 3.6 provides the summary of the theoretical background in this 
study. 
 
3.2 Imperfect capital market, information asymmetry and the costs of information 
asymmetry 
One of the classic assumptions of traditional economies is the existence of the perfect capital 
market.  Miller and Modigliani (1961, p. 412) defined the perfect capital market as one where 
‘no buyer or seller (or issuer) of securities is large enough for his transactions to have an 
appreciable impact on the then ruling price.  All traders have equal and costless access to 
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information about the ruling price and about all other relevant characteristics of shares.  No 
brokerage fees, transfer taxes, or other transaction costs are incurred when securities are 
bought, sold, or issued, and there are no tax differentials either between distributed and 
undistributed profits or between dividends and capital gains’.  One important factor identified 
by Miller and Modigliani (1961) in the perfect capital market environment is the accessibility 
of complete information to all the participants.  For instance, the perfect capital market occurs 
when all customers have complete knowledge of the items and prices offered by all sellers 
and all sellers have full knowledge of the quality of products desired by, and the acceptable 
prices range for, all the buyers; all job applicants have complete knowledge of the wages 
offered by all employers and all employers have complete knowledge of the productivity of 
all job applicants.  Another feature of the perfect capital market is that all relevant financial 
information of a company is publicly available. 
The assumption of a perfect capital market is impractical in the real world.  Hence, the notion 
of a perfect capital market has been abandoned and information asymmetry has been 
identified by economists or academic researchers such as Hayek (1945), Miller and 
Modigliani (1961), Stigler (1961, 1966 and 1967), Leland and Pyle (1977), Wilson (1980), 
Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984), Miller and Rock (1985), Merton (1987), Balakrishnan 
and Koza (1993), and Stiglitz (2000) based on their proposed model, theoretical arguments 
and empirical findings.  In an earlier study, Hayek (1945, p. 520) has stated that, ‘The 
peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the 
fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exist in 
concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently 
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess’.  Stigler (1962, p. 94) 
also affirmed that, ‘Complete knowledge, however, is seldom possessed, simply because it 
costs more to learn of alternative prices than (at the margin) this information yields.’ 
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The incomplete or contradicting knowledge held by individuals is known as information 
asymmetry.  Information asymmetry begins at the stage where an individual has more 
information than another.  Leland and Pyle (1977) and Miller and Rock (1985) identified or 
argued the existence of information asymmetry between two different parties.  For instance, 
Leland and Pyle (1977) explained that entrepreneurs who need to borrow funds from the bank 
have better knowledge of the quality of their projects than the bank manager.  Miller and 
Rock (1985) proposed that the managers have full exposure to the firm’s current earnings 
than the investors.  Individuals who hold more information can decide whether to disclose or 
not disclose the information.  They are more likely to disclose the information if it is 
beneficial.  For instance, the entrepreneurs may disclose the quality of their projects, i.e. the 
future projected profit to the lenders when they need to borrow funds for their projects 
(Leland & Pyle 1977).  The managers may disclose the current earnings to the outside 
investors when the companies need more capital in order to operate (Miller & Rock 1985).   
In this study, information asymmetry occurs between the management of the listed 
companies and the financial statement users.  Fundamentally, it is assumed that the 
management of the listed companies have more knowledge of or full access to the financial 
information of their companies than do the financial statement users.  To eliminate this 
information asymmetry, the management of listed companies have to communicate the 
financial position of the companies to the public by releasing the financial statements.  The 
financial statement users can then read the financial statements in order to understand the 
financial position of the companies.  However, the reliability of financial statements is 
another concern of information asymmetry when the management of the companies chooses 
to not disclose all relevant financial information to the shareholders.  As they have the 
privilege of privately holding all the financial information about their companies, 
managements are able to determine the amount of financial information to be disclosed in the 
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financial statements (Miller & Rock 1985).  Since management might not disclose the true 
financial position of the companies in the financial statements, the shareholders and investors 
are exposed to substantial financial risk.  The motive for concealing certain financial 
information can be explained through the agency theory presented in the next section.  
The investors’ exposure to greater financial risk as a result of improper action by the 
management of companies is identified as a moral hazard.  The definition of moral hazard 
was provided by Faulkner (1960, p. 327) in his medical research: ‘the hazard that arises from 
the failure of individuals who are or have been affected by insurance to uphold the accepted 
moral qualities’.  Another definition was offered by Buchanan (1964, p. 33), ‘moral hazard is 
every deviation from correct human behaviour that may pose a problem for an insurer’.  
Similarly, in the accounting and finance literature, Hölmstrom (1979, p. 74) explained that, ‘a 
problem of moral hazard may arise when individual engage in risk sharing under conditions 
such that their privately taken actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome’.  
Hölmstrom (1982, p. 324) also stated that, ‘Moral hazard refers to the problem of inducing 
agents to supply proper amounts of productive inputs when their actions cannot be observed 
and contracted for directly’.  Hölmstrom (1979) also ascertained that, ‘the source of this 
moral hazard or incentive problem is an asymmetry of information among individuals that 
results because individual actions cannot be observed and hence contracted upon’.  Therefore, 
it is arguable that the information asymmetry between two related parties may create a moral 
hazard. 
Information asymmetry may also cause the problem of inverse selection (Akerlof 1970).  
Inverse selection is concerned with the risk of the genuine suppliers losing their business 
because the market is unaware of the quality of the products and services offered or the 
potential growth of the business.  Akerlof (1970, p. 182) in his study identified the problem 
of inverse selection, stating that ‘the cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the amount 
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by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include the loss incurred from driving 
legitimate business out of existence’.  Akerlof (1970) has explained the inverse selection 
based on the sale of automobiles with different attributes, i.e. new or used cars and good or 
bad (or ‘lemon’) cars.  Initially, when purchasing a new car, the buyers are assumed to have 
no knowledge of the quality of the car.  After a certain period of consumption, these buyers 
who are now the owners will know whether it is a good or bad quality car.  The condition of 
the car is known only by the owners but not the potential buyers of the used car, thereby 
leading to information asymmetry.  Assume that these owners have decided to sell their used 
cars and these cars are the same price.  Without information about the quality of the used 
cars, the buyers may buy those that are ‘lemons’ rather than good quality.  This situation 
creates inverse selection whereby the sellers of good cars are driven out of the market by 
those with ‘lemons’.  Similarly, listed companies that have been managed competently may 
be driven out by the companies that are not because they have produced fraudulent financial 
statements with good numbers because investors are unable to identify which companies have 
provided reliable financial information. 
The risk of financial losses is of great concern to investors based on the assumption of 
rational behaviour in an ideal economic.  ‘Rational behaviour’ is explained in Miller and 
Modigliani (1961, p. 412) as: ‘investors always prefer more wealth to less and are indifferent 
as to whether a given increment to their wealth takes the form of cash payments or an 
increase in the market value of their holdings of shares’.  Investors will be more willing to 
invest if the investment is at lower risk and the rate of return is higher.  The missing financial 
information is the key to producing better financial investments and lower financial risk.  
However, in order to obtain more information, an individual may need to incur certain costs.  
Stigler (1967, p. 291) stated that ‘There is no "imperfection" in a market possessing 
incomplete knowledge if it would not be remunerative to acquire (produce) complete 
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knowledge’.  The process of acquiring complete knowledge can be costly and requires 
substantial efforts, which reduces the number of participants receiving sufficient information 
for decision making.  One of the costs of obtaining more information is time (Stigler 1961; 
1962).  Stigler (1961, p. 216) stated that ‘The cost of search, for a consumer, may be taken as 
approximately proportional to the number of (identified) sellers approached, for the chief cost 
is time’.  It is an onerous task for customers to completely search for the best price given the 
scarcity of time and it may be wiser to use that time for leisure activities or to generate 
income. Similarly, it may be too costly for the individual investors to validate the reliability 
of the financial statements of all companies.  The cost of validating the financial information 
may exceed the profit derived from investments.  However, the information asymmetry 
between the management of listed companies and the users of the financial statements still 
has to be reduced to minimise the potential for moral hazard and inverse selection. 
The problem of information asymmetry between the management of listed companies and the 
users of financial statements can be reduced when the management group are restricted from 
managing the financial information.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed the induction of 
monitoring or bonding devices, such as the appointment of independent auditors.  The 
government intervention to legalise the national accounting standards, financial reporting 
regulations, and the fraud laws can be the bonding mechanisms used to restrict the managers 
from engaging in the manipulation of financial figures (Stiglitz 2000).  This is because the 
management of the listed companies who choose not to comply with the legalised accounting 
standards will be penalised under the enacted law.   
The introduction of IFRS by the IASB is one means of achieving better quality financial 
reporting.  These internationally developed accounting standards promote transparency and 
accountability in financial reporting which lead to the improvement of capital or financial 
markets.  The acceptance and mandatory adoption of IFRS by nations has forced the listed 
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companies to comply with these standards.  Therefore, the transition from local GAAP to 
IFRS within a country is one way of reducing the information asymmetry between the 
management of listed companies and the users of financial statement.  It also signals to the 
financial and capital markets that the IFRS country is determined to ensure the practice of 
higher quality financial reporting (Hope, Jin & Kang 2006).  In the following section, agency 
theory is used to explain how full IFRS convergence restricts the management of the listed 
companies from engaging more earnings management.  Signalling theory is then used to 
explain how the full convergence with IFRS signals to the financial and capital market the 
quality of financial reporting.  
 
3.3 Agency theory 
Noreen (1988, p. 359) stated that ‘agency theory is primarily concerned with describing the 
contracts and relationship between individuals under information asymmetry’.  The contracts 
between two individuals create the principal-agent relationship.  Adam (1994, p. 8) stated 
that, ‘agency theory is based on the premises that agents have more information than 
principals and that this information asymmetry adversely affects the principals’ ability to 
monitor effectively whether their interests are being properly served by agents.  It also 
assumes that principals and agents act rationally and that they will use the contracting process 
to maximise their wealth’.  Accordingly, this theory requires: (1) the existence of principal-
agent relationship (or agency relationship), (2) both principal and agent to be wealth 
maximisers, and (3) the agency problem or information asymmetry to occur as a result of the 
opportunistic behaviour of the agents. 
Principal-agent relationship 
Ross (1973), in his study explained that ‘agency relationship has arisen between two (or 
more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative 
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for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems’.  The 
agency relationship is also defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) as ‘a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making 
authority to the agent’.  Based on these two definitions, the three necessary criteria for the 
agency relationship are the principal, agent and the authority given by the principals to agents 
under contract to act on their behalf.  Examples of agency relationships are:  employers and 
employees, clients and lawyers, investors and fund managers, the bondholders and 
management of companies, as well as the shareholders and management of companies (Ross 
1973; Smith & Warner 1979; Eisenhardt 1989; Donaldson & Davis 1991; Shapiro 2005).   
This study focuses on the relationship between the management of companies and the users 
of financial statements, such as bondholders, creditors, employees, investors, and 
shareholders.  In particular, the main focus is on the persons who are financially affected, i.e. 
shareholders and investors.  The management of listed companies are contracted to operate 
the business and are authorised to decide the strategy for companies, either to grow or to 
sustain them.  A firm, in particular a private corporation, is defined by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976, p. 311) as ‘one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting 
relationships and which is also characterised by the existence of divisible residual claims on 
the assets and cash flows of the organisation which can generally be sold without permission 
of the other contracting individuals’.  The shareholders or investors, on the other hand, are the 
persons who together own the company through their investment in shares.  This group does 
not have the authority to engage in business operations unless they are part of the 
management team.  The shareholders, however, can choose whether to retain the current 
management team and to continue investing in the company.  The management team 
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members may lose their jobs if they do not perform well financially or if the company loses 
the invested money. 
Assumptions of the Agency Theory 
Morris (1987, p.50) established a set of conditions for agency theory.  These conditions are: “ 
a) All market participants are rational wealth maximisers. 
b) All firms operate in two periods.  Managers make production/investment decisions 
in the first period which affect firms’ expected values and variances in the second 
period. 
c) Firms have external equity and debt financing. 
d) There are separation of equity and debt capital suppliers and managerial control in 
the firm. 
e) Each manager owns a fraction of his firm’s outstanding equity. 
f) Each manager is remunerated by salary, perquisite consumption, and returns on his 
equity in the firm 
g) Monitoring and bonding are available at a cost proportional to the value of the firm; 
and they reduce activities dysfunctional to capital suppliers at a reducing rate.” 
From the list above, the two necessary conditions in agency theory are individual rational 
wealth maximisers and the separation of the equity or debt capital suppliers from the 
managerial control (Morris 1987).  When these two conditions are met, a conflict of interests 
is more likely to arise between the management of the companies and the shareholders (or 
investors, bondholders).  The importance of the assumption about rational wealth maximisers 
is also highlighted in the study by Norreen (1988).  Norreen (1988, p. 359) explained that the 
foundation of agency theory is, ‘the assumption that people act unreservedly in their own 
narrowly defined self-interest with, if necessary, guile and deceit’.   
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The conflict of interests may lead to an agency problem when the agent does not act in the 
best interests of the principal.  Eisenhardt (1989, p. 58) identified two reasons for an agency 
problem to occur: ‘(a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict; and (b) it is 
difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing’. 
The conflict of interests between principal and agent may arise because both parties have the 
incentive to increase their wealth.  The conflict of interests between two parties may also 
arise when the principal and agents have different risk preferences (Eisenhardt 1989).  For 
instance, the principal may be risk-averse but the agents may desire to engage in business 
with greater risk that offers a greater return.  When conflict of interests arises between the 
principal and agent, the management group may be driven to conceal financial information 
that may prevent them from receiving remuneration or continuing their position in the next 
tenure.  This action may cause the problems of moral hazard and inverse selection as 
described in the previous section.  The agency problem has to be reduced in order to 
minimise the possibility of the moral hazard and inverse selection occurring.  
To minimise the agency problem, listed companies have to be prevented from managing the 
financial information.  Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 304) stated that ‘agency problems arise 
because contracts are not costlessly written and enforced’.  For instance, the management of a 
company might not incur losses as a result of poor business decisions because the risk of 
financial losses is borne by the shareholders.  However, the management of the companies 
may operate the business more diligently if they have substantial shares in the firm or have a 
monetary incentive such as bonuses. The implementation of monitoring and bonding 
mechanisms may also reduce the agency problem (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  These 
monitoring and bonding devices require the outflow of capital which is part of the agency 
costs.  As Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) explained, the agency costs comprise ‘(1) the 
monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, and (3) 
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residual loss’.  Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 304) offered a similar explanation of agency costs, 
stating that ‘agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of 
contracts among agents with conflicting interests.  Agency costs also include the value of 
output lost because the costs of full enforcement of contracts exceed the benefits’.  Based on 
these two explanations of agency costs, it is arguable that the monitoring and bonding 
expenditures may reduce, but will not eliminate, the agency problems. Nonetheless, it is still 
worthwhile incurring the monitoring or bonding expenditures if these systems can effectively 
reduce substantial agency problems.   
Some monitoring or bonding expenditures include: the appointment of independent directors, 
the engagement of independent auditors, the allocation of reasonable salaries or remunerative 
package to the top management.  Government intervention may be another solution to reduce 
the agency problem.  For instance, the government can legalise the financial reporting 
requirements and introduce stricter laws regarding corporations, minority shareholder 
protection, fraud etc. (Stiglitz 2000).   
Table 3.1 below lists several studies that applied agency theory and explains how this theory 
was applied in the studies. 
Table 3. 1: Application of agency theory in previous literature  
Authors The Application of Agency Theory 
Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) The study applied the agency theory to predict that the 
managers who are the agents will prefer fewer monitoring 
devices and lower risks in the reward system. Based on this 
prediction, the study developed hypotheses for the 
monitoring and incentive alignment, as well as the 
difference in compensation risk between the owner-
controlled and management-controlled firms. 
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DeFond (1992) The study used agency theory to hypothesise that client 
firms tend to switch to higher quality audit firms in 
anticipation of the decrease in the percentage of 
management ownership, increase in leverage, and the 
increase in the relative size of short-term accruals.  The 
lower percentage of management ownership, higher 
leverage and the greater size of short-term accruals may 
imply greater agency problems. 
Adam (1994) This study explored how the agency theory can be used to 
explain the role and responsibilities of internal audit 
function in maintaining the cost-efficient contracting 
between owners and managers. 
Menon and Williams (1994) This study examined whether the board of directors rely on 
the audit committee based on the frequency of audit 
committee meeting and its composition.  The study has 
relied upon the agency theory to develop the hypotheses.  
For instance, the decrease in manager ownership may lead 
to a greater agency problem and this requires a stronger 
monitoring system, i.e. regular audit committee meetings 
and more independent audit committee members. 
Warfield, Wild and Wild 
(1995) 
Based upon the assumptions in agency theory, the study 
developed the hypotheses that the level of managerial 
ownership has an impact on the accuracy of earnings 
reported and the magnitude of discretionary accounting 
accrual adjustments.  The assumptions are separation of 
ownership and control, the constraints of accounting-based 
contracts, and the manager-owner incentive problems. 
Bushman, Indjejikian and 
Smith (1996) 
The agency theory was used in this study to predict that a 
particular performance measure will be included in a 
portfolio of performance measures if and only if it has 
information content about a manager’s actions over and 
above other measures in the portfolio.  Based on this 
prediction, the study argued that the individual performance 
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evaluation increases with the importance of growth 
opportunities relative to assets in place, length of product 
development and product life cycles, and noise in 
traditional financial measures. 
Roth and O’Donnell (1996) This study applied the agency theory to explain how the 
agency problem influences the compensation strategy based 
on the subsidiary’s cultural distance from its headquarters 
market, lateral centralisation, and senior management’s 
commitment to the parent.  The greater the possibility of 
inappropriate managerial behaviours, the greater the 
proportion of compensation through incentives. 
Abbott, Park and Parker 
(2000) 
This study explained how a stronger monitoring system 
reduces the information asymmetry between principal and 
agent.  The study hypothesised that the greater the 
independence of the audit committees within firms, the 
lower is the incidence of SEC sanctions for fraud and 
aggressive accounting. 
Miller (2002) The study explained how agency theory can be applied in 
non-profit organisations.  In particular, the study examined 
the effectiveness of the board of directors in monitoring the 
operation of non-profit organisations and the chief 
executive officers (CEOs).  
Zhang (2008) This study applied agency theory to propose that the 
dismissal of a newly-appointed CEO is related to the degree 
of information asymmetry at the time of succession.  This 
hypothesis is based on the Holmstrom (1982) model which 
suggests that the principals will acquire more knowledge 
about the ability of the agents over time, and the updating of 
estimated ability can be more informative in each 
successive period. 
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In this study, the agency theory is used to explain how the full convergence with IFRS 
prevents the management of listed companies from manipulating financial figures.  Agency 
theory assumes that both the management of companies and the shareholders are rational 
wealth maximisers.  The separation of ownership and control within a firm enables the 
management group to act opportunistically when a conflict of interests arises.  The 
opportunistic behaviour of the management team can be reduced by implementing a 
monitoring or bonding device.  Based on these assumptions, agency theory predicts that full 
IFRS convergence can act as a bonding device to prevent the management of companies from 
behaving opportunistically by manipulating the financial information.  
 
3.4 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory is associated with the problem of information asymmetry.  This theory 
explains how information asymmetry can be reduced when the party with more knowledge 
signals the information to others (Morris 1987; Spence 2002).  Connelly et al. (2011, p. 39) 
stated that ‘Signalling theory is useful for describing behaviour when two parties (individuals 
or organisations) have access to different information.  Typically, one party, the sender, must 
choose whether and how to communicate (or signal) that information, and the other party, the 
receiver, must choose how to interpret the signal.’  Hence, this theory has three requirements: 
(1) the existence of signaller and receiver, (2) the existence of information asymmetry, and 
(3) the process of signalling more information to minimise the information asymmetry. 
Figure 3. 2: The signalling process 
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The signaller, receiver and signalling process  
Connelly et al. (2011) highlighted the key concepts of signalling theory: the signaller, 
receiver and the signal.  Signallers are the insiders who have access to information that is not 
available to the outsiders.  The information may be related to an individual (Spence 1973), a 
product (Kirmani & Rao 2000), or the organisation (Ross 1977).  On the other hand, the 
receivers are the outsiders who have limited or no information about the individual, product, 
or the organisation that concerns them, but have the desire to obtain this information.  The 
information required by the receivers is crucial to their decision making and may affect the 
outcome of their selection of candidates, purchases, and the investment options.  Prior studies 
have identified different group as receivers, such as employers (Spence 1973), lenders 
(Leland & Pyle 1977), and investors (Welch 1996; Palmrose, Richardson & Scholz 2004; 
Zhang & Wiersema 2009).  The process of signalling is the communication of useful 
information, either positive or negative, by the signallers to the receivers.  Signalling theory 
is more commonly used to describe the signallers deliberately communicating positive 
information to the receivers (Connelly et al. 2011).  The occurrence of signalling requires the 
following set of conditions established by Morris (1987, p. 50):“ 
a) All market participants are rational wealth maximisers.   
b) All firms operate in two periods. Managers make production/investment decisions in 
the first period which affect the quality of firms in the second period. 
c) The quality of firms competing for equity and debt funds in the capital market 
varies. 
d) The actual quality of firms is objectively observable, ex post, in period 2. 
e) Ex ante, in period 1, information asymmetry exists between the manager of each 
firm and capital suppliers. The manager’s information about the firm is superior to 
that of capital suppliers. 
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f) Signalling costs are inversely related to quality.” 
Morris (1987) argued that the most important condition in the list is the existence of 
information asymmetry.  Without information asymmetry, there is no need for signalling.   
Signalling Mechanism and Effective Signalling 
There are two types of signalling mechanisms: contingent contracts and the cost of signalling 
the activity and reporting quality (Spence 1976).  A contingent contract is defined by Spence 
(1976, p. 593) as ‘a menu of options for seller that are created by virtue of the buyer’s 
subsequent ability to observe the product quality directly, and, to transact with the seller at 
that point’.  The two functions of a contingent contract are: (1) to transmit information, and 
(2) to transfer the risk from an individual to another.  For instance, the sellers list the 
ingredients in a product and this list is the information transmitted to the buyers via the 
product’s label.  The effectiveness of contingent contracts in transmitting information may 
improve when: (1) the buyers and sellers are in contact for a sufficient period, and (2) the 
buyers take note of the product quality. 
The cost of signalling activity and quality, hereafter referred to as ‘signalling cost’ is 
important in the process of signalling. In the earlier study, Spence (1973) explained that the 
signalling cost is the cost of differentiating one individual from others.  For instance, job 
applicants with education send a signal to employers about their education level to 
differentiate themselves from those without education.  To obtain higher education 
qualifications, potential employees need to incur substantial cost and time.  Spence (1976) 
also stated that, ‘For a signal to be effective, it must be unprofitable for sellers of low quality 
products to imitate it. That is, high quality sellers must have lower costs for signalling 
activities’.  The signalling costs do not necessarily mean costs in dollars (Spence 1976).  
They can be differences in quality created by, for example, work experience.  The signalling 
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costs have also been identified by Connelly et al. (2011) as one of the primary characteristics 
of effective signals.  Another characteristic is signal observability.  The signal observability is 
the extent to which the signal is noticeable by outsiders.  This characteristic is necessary but 
not sufficient on its own; it requires the presence of signal cost.   
The companies listed on Bursa Malaysia are legally required to provide financial information 
based on the accounting standards issued by the MASB. By providing the financial 
information, the management of the listed companies have subsequently transferred the risk 
of financial investment to the financial statement users.  The problem arises when the 
financial information provided under local GAAP does not truthfully represent the 
company’s financial performance, thereby imposing a greater financial risk on the users of 
the financial statements.  In particular, the managers may have the incentive to manipulate the 
financial figures according to the accounting standards when their personal interests such as 
remuneration and work are at stake.  Outsiders find it difficult to ascertain the quality of 
financial statements because they are not authorised to be involved in business operations.  
The contingent contract can be more effective in transmitting information when there are 
monitoring or bonding devices.  The transition from local GAAP to full IFRS can be one 
means of improving the effectiveness of transmitting more useful financial information to the 
users of financial statement. 
The full implementation of IFRS in Malaysia is noticeable by the users of the financial 
statements of the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia, as MASB in 2008 announced the full 
convergence by 2012.  The signalling cost is arguably the cost of transitioning from the local 
GAAP to full IFRS as IFRS is perceived to have higher quality accounting standards than the 
local GAAP.  The widespread adoption of IFRS in different countries has also increased the 
importance of full IFRS convergence in Malaysia as it implies greater comparability of 
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financial reporting between companies in different countries, thereby increasing the value of 
this signal. 
Table 3. 2: Application of signalling theory in previous literature  
Authors The Application of Signalling Theory 
Spence (1973) Signalling theory is applied in this study to demonstrate 
how the job applicant sends signal to the employers about 
their productivity to obtain better wages, i.e. by providing 
their education qualifications.  The signallers are the job 
applicants and the receivers are the employers. 
Spence (1976) Signalling theory is applied to explain that sellers 
(signallers) signal the quality of their products to the buyers 
(receivers). 
Leland and Pyle (1977) The study developed a model of capital structure and 
financial equilibrium based on signalling theory to explain 
how entrepreneurs obtain financial assistance when the true 
qualities of the projects are known only to them.  The study 
identified the commitment of the entrepreneurs (signallers) 
in their projects as the signal to the shareholders (receivers).  
Kim and Verrecchia (1991) The study used signalling theory to evaluate how the public 
announcements made by firms affect the market reaction.  
The signallers in this study are the managers, the receivers 
are the investors, and the signal sent is the public 
announcement. 
John and Lang (1991) This study applied the signalling framework to explain that 
both the interaction of insider trading and the dividend 
announcements can be used together as signals.  The study 
explained that increases in dividends accompanied by 
unusual insider buying may signal good news to the market, 
but increases in dividend accompanied by unusual insider 
selling may signal bad news. 
Welch (1996) The study applied signalling theory to develop the Initial 
 
 
97 
 
Public Offering (IPO) model that hypothesised the longer a 
firm waits to sell remaining shares in a seasoned equity 
offering (SEO), the higher the probability that the quality of 
the firm will be revealed.  This is based on the assumption 
from the Aleend and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989) 
studies that the quality of the issuer is revealed after the IPO 
and before the SEO. 
Palmrose, Richardson and 
Scholz (2004) 
This study examined how the restatements of annual and 
quarterly financial statements affect the market reaction.  
The study explained that the restated financial statements 
published by the managers (signallers) act as a signal to the 
investors (receivers) that firms may be acting fraudulently. 
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
(2005) 
The study evaluated whether the voluntary adoption of 
IFRS in Germany was associated with lower earnings 
management.  Using signalling theory, the study assumed 
that companies that are committed to providing investors 
with transparent information will adopt IFRS.  The study 
also argued that the signal may be false if there is a lack of 
enforcement and low risk of litigation.  Based on this 
argument, the study hypothesised companies that adopt 
IFRS engage less in earnings management compared to 
companies that used German GAAP. 
Hope, Jin and Kang (2006) This study explained based on the signalling theory, that the 
adoption of IFRS serves as a signal to the market 
participants that a firm is willing to disclose more 
information to investors.  This explanation is then used to 
develop the hypothesis regarding the decision of a country 
to adopt or not to adopt IFRS. 
Zhang and Wiersema (2009) Based on market signalling theory, this study examined 
how the characteristics of the director and top management 
(i.e. the CEO certification and the credibility of the 
certification based on CEO background) send a signal to the 
investors. 
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Bergh and Gibbons (2011) Based on the signalling theory approach, this study 
developed the hypothesis that clients with better financial 
performance have positive stock market reactions when 
they announce the hiring of management consultants, 
compared to clients with poorer financial performance. The 
financial performance of a company provided by its 
management (signallers) acts as a signal to the investors 
(receivers). 
Gordon, Loeb and Zhu (2012) This study examined the impact of IFRS on foreign direct 
investments.  Using the signalling theory, the study 
explained that the countries with developing economies 
may adopt IFRS to signal to the world’s financial market 
that the companies operating within these countries are 
following the generally accepted global accounting 
standards. 
 
3.5 The application of both agency theory and signalling theory   
Morris (1987) argued that the signalling theory and agency theory are complementary 
theories, which indicates that the two theories can be applied together in a study.  These two 
theories are consistent when the necessary conditions of signalling theory and agency theory 
coincide.  The necessary condition of signalling theory is information asymmetry, while the 
individual rational wealth maximisation and separation of resource ownership and control are 
the necessary conditions of agency theory.  Morris (1987) argued that the necessary 
conditions of these two theories do not conflict with each other because positive monitoring 
costs and separation of ownership and control imply information asymmetry between 
managers, investors and creditors.  The separation of ownership and control and the 
assumption of individual rational wealth maximisation may lead to possible conflict of 
interests between two parties. This increases the chance of opportunistic behaviour by the 
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party who controls the entity and may hide unfavourable information or misuse the capital 
funds.  The principal (resource ownership) will require the entity to incur positive monitoring 
costs in order to prevent the opportunistic behaviour of the agent (party who has control).  
Table 3.3 shows how the agency and signalling theories have been used in previous studies. 
Table 3. 3: Application of agency and signalling theories in previous literature 
Authors The Application of Agency and Signalling Theories 
Arrow (1986) This study used agency and signalling theories to explain 
that when principals are competing against each other for 
the agents, the principals should visibly signal their unique 
differences.  For instance, clients with lower health risk 
(signallers and principals) have to signal their differences to 
obtain lower premiums from the insurance company 
(receivers and agents).   
Jain and Kini (1994) This study examined the change in the operating 
performance of companies when they make the transition 
from private to public ownership.  This study found a 
decline in post-issue operating performance for the IPO 
firms.  The agency and signalling theories were used to 
explain the lower operating performance in post-IPO 
period.  Post-IPO implies a reduction in management 
ownership which in turn may lead to greater agency 
problems (Jensen & Meckling 1976) and may signal that 
the quality of the project is lower (Leland & Pyle 1977).  
Menon and Williams (1994) This study applied agency and signalling theories to 
hypothesise that audit committee activity are more likely to 
increase and companies are more likely to exclude 
managers from audit committees when there is a greater 
proportion of independent directors on the board.  This is 
based on the assumption that having a greater proportion of 
insiders on the board sends a strong signal that the company 
will be dominated by managers.  The incentives offered to 
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managers may conflict with the shareholders, and 
independent directors are important for the board’s 
effectiveness.     
Watson, Shrives and Marston 
(2002) 
The study examined whether the agency and signalling 
theories can be used to explain the voluntary disclosure of 
financial ratios in the corporate annual reports.  Signalling 
theory predicts that companies with good performance will 
signal their quality to investors, while agency theory 
predicts that companies with good performance will 
disclose detailed information to ensure the continuance of 
their position in the next period.   
Tsalavoutas (2011) This study examined the level of IFRS compliance by the 
listed companies in Greece.  From the signalling theory 
perspective, the study assumed that companies will have 
higher level of compliance with IFRS if the adjustment is 
positive.   Agency theory assumes that companies will have 
a lower level of IFRS compliance if the adjustment is 
negative.   
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) This study investigated the determinants of narrative risk 
information disclosed in interim reports based on a sample 
of non-financial U.K. companies.  The study applied both 
agency and signalling theories to hypothesise the 
association between firm size and corporate risk disclosure.  
Agency theory assumes that larger companies will disclose 
more information than smaller companies in order to reduce 
agency cost or information asymmetry because they need 
capital from external sources.  The disclosure of a greater 
amount of risk information will signal to investors and 
creditors the company’s ability to manage risk. 
 
The studies listed in Table 3.3 show how the agency and signalling theories can work 
together to explain the connection between two variables in different ways.  For instance, Jain 
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and Kini (1994) used agency and signalling theories to explain why there is a decline after the 
post-issue operating performance for the IPO firms, but Tsalavoutas (2011) used signalling 
theory to explain that companies will have a higher level of IFRS compliance if the 
adjustment is positive and used agency theory to explain that companies will have a lower 
level of IFRS compliance if the adjustment in negative.  The signallers and receivers can be 
either the agents or principals.  For instance, the clients with lower health risks (signallers and 
principals) signal their health issues to the insurance companies (receivers and agents) 
(Arrow 1986).  In the Tsalavoutas (2011) study, the managers are both agents and signallers, 
and the shareholders are the principals and receivers.   
Agency and Signalling in this Thesis 
The first research aim of this study is to evaluate the impact of full IFRS convergence on the 
financial statements and financial ratios of the listed companies on Bursa Malaysia.  
Signalling theory is used to explain how IFRS convergence will lead to the changes in 
financial statements and financial ratios for these listed companies.  The transition from local 
GAAP to IFRS is meant to improve the quality of financial reporting.  To achieve this, the 
financial statements prepared under IFRS must be different from those prepared under the 
local GAAP.  The full IFRS convergence in Malaysia signals to the stock market participants 
that there is a change in financial reporting.  Using the signalling theory, it is predicted that 
the full IFRS convergence in Malaysia will have an impact on financial statements and 
financial ratios.  Figure 3.3 illustrates the application of signalling theory associated with the 
first research aim. 
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Figure 3. 3: Application of signalling theory  
 
 
 
 
The second research aim of this thesis is to evaluate whether the full convergence with IFRS 
in Malaysia has improved the quality of financial reporting for the companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia.  Agency theory predicts that the full IFRS convergence acts as a bonding device to 
prevent the management of listed companies from engaging in earnings manipulation.  On the 
other hand, signalling theory predicts that the full IFRS convergence signals a higher quality 
of financial reporting to the stock market stakeholders.  Based on both agency and signalling 
theory, the full convergence with IFRS should lead to less earnings management.  If the 
earnings management does not decrease, this indicates that full IFRS convergence is not 
effective in restricting managers from manipulating earnings and the signal sent to the stock 
market is false.   Figure 3.4 illustrates the application of agency and signalling theory 
associated with the second research aim. 
Figure 3. 4: Application of agency and signalling theories 
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This thesis also determines whether the size of audit firms influences the impact of full IFRS 
convergence on earnings management.  The appointment of external auditors acts as a 
monitoring mechanism that restricts the management of listed companies from manipulating 
the financial information.  In the principal-agent relationship, the external auditors are the 
agents hired by the principal (i.e. financial statement users) to provide an audit service to 
ensure that material financial information is reported.  Prior studies have argued that Big 4 
auditors are more likely to provide higher audit quality than non-Big 4 auditors because Big 4 
auditors have a greater number of clients with a smaller fraction of quasi-rent and have a 
stronger brand name than non-Big 4 audit firms.  Based on agency theory, it is predicted that 
the listed companies audited by Big 4 have less earnings management than non-Big 4 clients 
when financial statements are prepared under IFRS.   
 
3.6 Chapter summary  
Agency theory is concerned with the agency problem that arises from the principal-agent 
relationship.  Principal-agent relationship exists when there is a separation of ownership and 
control within a company (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  Agency theory assumes that both 
principals and agents are rational wealth maximisers.  Based on this assumption, a conflict of 
interests may arise between these two parties.  The agents might not act in the principals’ best 
interests if this means a personal loss of wealth.  The opportunistic behaviour of the agent 
creates the agency problem and more agency costs.  The agency problem can be reduced 
when a monitoring or bonding mechanism is applied.  Signalling theory is concerned with 
information asymmetry when one party holds more information than the other parties 
(Spence 1973; Morris 1987; Connelly et al. 2011).  The information asymmetry can be 
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reduced when the party with more information (i.e. signallers) is willing to signal more 
information to the other parties (i.e. receivers). 
These two theories can be applied together when the necessary conditions of the two theories 
are consistent with each other (Morris 1987).  The necessary conditions of agency theory are 
individual rational wealth maximisation and separation of resource ownership and control.  
When these two conditions are met, a conflict of interests between principal and agent is 
more likely to occur.  The necessary condition of signalling theory is information asymmetry.  
Information asymmetry is the reason for signalling.  Information asymmetry may arise from 
the opportunistic behaviour of the agent.  The agent may decide to conceal negative 
information from the principal in order to secure his/her own interests such as remuneration 
and position.  The information asymmetry can be reduced when effective monitoring and 
bonding devices are established.  
Both the agency and signalling theories have been applied in this thesis.  Based on the 
signalling theory, it is predicted that the full convergence with IFRS in Malaysia will have an 
impact on the financial statements and financial ratios of the companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia.  The transition from local GAAP to IFRS signals a possible change in the quality 
of financial reporting.  If there is such a change, then there must be changes in financial 
statements and financial ratios.  The agency theory and signalling theory predict that the full 
IFRS convergence will lead to less earnings management for the companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia.  Agency theory assumes that the managements of listed companies are restricted 
from engaging in earnings management when financial statements are prepared under IFRS 
than the local GAAP.  Signalling theory assumes that full convergence with IFRS reduces the 
information asymmetry between managements and the Bursa Malaysia stock market 
members.  Agency theory is also used to predict that the listed companies audited by Big 4 
have lesser earnings management compared to non-Big 4 when financial statements are 
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reported under IFRS.  These theoretical arguments are used to develop the research 
hypotheses in following chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Hypotheses Development 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters identified the research gap regarding IFRS issues and the significance 
of the research on IFRS adoption in developing economies, particularly in the ASEAN 
region.  The research aims and objectives were established in the introduction chapter.  The 
aim of this research is to evaluate how full IFRS convergence in Malaysia affects the 
financial statements and financial ratios of the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  This 
research also aims to evaluate the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings management in the 
Malaysian context.  In chapter 2, the relevant IFRS studies have been reviewed and discussed 
in order to understand the effect of IFRS on financial statements and financial ratios and 
earnings management.  The theoretical framework based upon signalling and agency theories 
was developed in chapter 3 to explain how the convergence of IFRS will affect the quality of 
financial reporting.  This chapter incorporates the findings of previous IFRS studies and the 
theoretical arguments to define the research hypotheses.  The research objectives derived 
from the research aims are: 
Research objective 1.1: To determine whether the full convergence with IFRS has had 
an impact on the financial statements and financial ratios of 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
Research objective 1.2: To determine the differences in the changes of financial 
statements and financial ratios between before and after full 
IFRS convergence for companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
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Research objective 2.1: To determine whether the full convergence with IFRS has 
decreased the earnings management of companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia. 
Research objective 2.2: To determine whether the impact of full IFRS convergence on 
earnings management is influenced by the size of audit firms 
(Big 4 versus non-Big 4).  
The Hypotheses Development chapter is divided as follows:  4.2 Hypotheses for the impact 
of IFRS on financial statements and financial ratios; 4.3 Hypothesis for the impact of IFRS 
on earnings management; 4.4 Hypothesis for the association between different size of audit 
firms and earnings management and 4.5 Chapter summary. 
 
4.2 Hypotheses for the impact of IFRS on financial statements and financial ratios 
The transition from local accounting standards to IFRS will first have an impact on the 
financial statements and financial ratios.  The first research objective is to determine whether 
the full convergence with IFRS has had an impact on the financial statements and financial 
ratios of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  Agency theory assumes that the agency 
problem arises when conflict of interests occurs between the management of the listed 
companies and the shareholders.  One of the agency problems is the manipulation of financial 
information by the managements.  The manipulation of financial information will mislead the 
shareholders regarding the financial performance of the company.  This agency problem can 
be reduced when monitoring or bonding mechanisms, such as regulating higher quality 
accounting standards – IFRS, are implemented (Stiglitz 2000; Damant 2006).  If the full 
convergence with IFRS has a bonding effect on the managements, the financial statements 
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prepared under IFRS must be different from the financial statements prepared under the local 
GAAP.  If the financial statements and financial ratios have not changed, the signalling of 
higher quality financial reporting may not be true.  Under signalling theory, it is predicted 
that the full convergence with IFRS will have an impact on the financial statements and 
financial ratios of the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
From the review of IFRS studies on financial statements and financial ratios, it can be argued 
that full IFRS convergence in Malaysia will affect the financial statements and financial 
ratios (i.e. Goodwin & Ahmed 2006; Callao, Jarne & Lainez 2007; Hung & Subramanyam 
2007; Callao et al. 2010; Stent, Bradbury & Hooks 2010; Tsalavoutas & Evans 2010; Lueg, 
Punda & Burkert 2014).  In particular, based on the majority of the findings, Malaysian listed 
companies are likely to report greater debt under IFRS, and greater profitability according to 
the findings in U.K. studies.  The comparison with the U.K. studies is relevant to this study 
because Malaysia is strongly influenced by the accounting systems in the U.K. (Muniandy & 
Ali 2012).  However, the full IFRS convergence might not have a significant impact on the 
financial statements and financial ratios.  This is because Malaysia has a long history of 
aligning the national accounting standards with IFRS. 
The hypotheses have been developed based on the arguments from the theoretical framework 
and the findings of prior IFRS studies on financial statements and financial ratios. 
Hypothesis 1.1: The full convergence with IFRS has a significant impact on the 
financial statements and financial ratios for companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. 
Based on the findings from IFRS studies, it is anticipated that full IFRS convergence will 
increase the reported debts and profitability of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  
Hypothesis 1.2 and 1.3 below are developed to test the arguments. 
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Hypothesis 1.2: The full convergence with IFRS will have a negative impact on the 
debt measurements for companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
Hypothesis 1.3: The full convergence with IFRS will have a positive impact on the 
profitability measurements for companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
Before the full IFRS convergence in 2012, MASB had initiated the alignment of the national 
GAAP with IFRS in 2005.  The partial convergence with IFRS has brought the national 
GAAP closer to IFRS.  The continuous alignment of accounting standards between 2005 and 
2012 may have gradually changed the financial statements, which may subsequently reduce 
the impact of full IFRS convergence on the financial statements and financial ratios.  
Therefore, this thesis has also focused on the period of close alignment between the local and 
international accounting standards to capture more of the possible impact produced by IFRS 
convergence.   
Hypothesis 1.4: The close alignment with IFRS has a significant impact on the 
financial statements and financial ratios of companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. 
 
4.3 Hypothesis for the impact of IFRS on earnings management 
The IFRS was developed with the purpose of improving the transparency and accountability 
of financial reporting, which will lead to better financial and capital markets (IFRS 2017).  
Based on the agency and signalling theories, full IFRS convergence is likely to increase the 
quality of financial reporting.  However, Ball (2006) argued that the implementation of IFRS 
depends on the incentives of the managers to comply with the legalised accounting standards 
and the incentives of the regulators to strictly enforce the implementation of IFRS. Ball 
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(2006, pg. 17) also stated that ‘Accounting accruals generally require at least some element of 
subjective judgement and hence can be influenced by the incentives of managers and 
auditors.’  Furthermore, Alali and Cao (2010, pg. 85) stated, ‘Countries have different 
cultures, financial and legislative/legal systems and tend to apply and interpret IFRS based on 
their national interests and biases.’  Studies such as Garcia and Madrid-Guijarro (2014), Liu 
et al. (2014) and Gray, Kang and Lin (2015) have also found that the effectiveness of IFRS 
adoption is affected by the incentive of the managements.  Furthermore, Malaysia is a 
country with poor enforcement and compliance in regard to accounting regulations (Ball, 
Robin & Wu 2003; Muniandy & Ali 2012).  Hence, this signals the possibility that IFRS may 
be ineffectual in improving the quality of financial reporting of companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. 
IFRS studies on earnings management have documented different results.  In particular, the 
U.K. studies (Jeanjean & Stolowy 2008; Callao & Jarne 2010; Ahmed, Neel & Wang 2013) 
have mainly found that IFRS adoption increased the earnings management.  Jeanjean and 
Stolowy (2008) found the IFRS adoption in the U.K. had increased the earnings management 
based on the distribution of earnings analysis.  Callao and Jarne (2010) who observed the EU 
region found an increase in earnings management based on current discretionary accruals, 
long-term discretionary accruals and total discretionary accruals.  Ahmed, Neel and Wang 
(2013) also documented an increase in earnings management based on the significant 
decrease in the volatility of net income, the volatility of net income relative to the volatility of 
cash flows, and the association between cash flow and accruals, as well as a significant 
increase in the aggressiveness of accruals particularly in strong enforcement countries such as 
the U.K. and France.  However, Iatridis (2010) reported that the U.K. listed companies have 
less earnings management based on earnings smoothing and managing earnings toward a 
target.  Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013), who studied the partial convergence in Malaysia 
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(2002-2009), found that the earnings management based on discretionary accruals had 
decreased.  Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) found that the full IFRS convergence in Brazil had 
reduced the earnings management based on discretionary accruals.  The findings of these 
studies suggest that the full convergence in Malaysia will reduce earnings management by 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
 The impact of full IFRS convergence on earnings management is questionable based on the 
IFRS studies.  Nonetheless, it is arguable that the mandatory implementation of higher 
quality accounting standards – IFRS – is more likely to improve the quality of financial 
reporting.  Therefore, hypothesis 2 is developed:  
Hypothesis 2: The full convergence with IFRS will significantly decrease the earnings 
management of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
 
4.4 Hypothesis for the association between different size of audit firms and earnings 
management  
The opportunistic behaviour of the managers can be minimised through the implementation 
of positive monitoring mechanisms (Jensen & Meckling 1976), one of which is the 
appointment of external auditor to ensure that material financial information is disclosed.  
DeAngelo (1981) argued that the size of the audit firm is positively associated with the audit 
quality.  Larger accounting firms are more likely to provide higher quality audit reports, and 
vice versa.  DeAngelo (1981) explained that larger audit firms have a greater number of 
clients and the failure to provide high quality audit report will result in greater loss to them. 
Conversely, the small audit firms have fewer clients and strongly rely upon the quasi-rents.  
The small audit firms have more to lose when they disagree with clients.  Similar to 
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DeAngelo (1981), Simunic and Stein (1987) and Francis and Wilson (1988) have supported 
the finding that audit quality is associated with audit firm size.  These two studies argued that 
the ‘Big 8’ audit firms (now reduced to Big 4) tend to provide high quality audit reports 
because they have a well-established brand name and reputation.  These audit firms have a 
greater incentive to protect their reputation therefore prevent their clients from issuing 
financial statements that are misleading.  Therefore, listed companies that are audited by Big 
4 audit firms send a signal to the public that they are committed to ensuring that the financial 
position of the companies is communicated accurately and effectively to the public (Francis 
2004).  Such communication minimises the information asymmetry between the management 
of the companies and the shareholders or investors.  Based on the theoretical framework, it is 
predicted that Big 4 audit firms are more likely to restrict the management of listed 
companies from engaging earnings management compared to non-Big 4 audit firms.   
Previous studies such as Jones (1991), Becker et al. (1998), Francis et al. (1999), Nelson 
(2002) and Johl, Jubb, and Houghton (2007) have evidenced that Big 4 audit firms provided 
higher quality audit reports on the financial statements, particularly in terms of the restriction 
on earnings management.  In particular, the findings of Nelson, Elliot and Tarpley (2002) 
suggested that the quality of accounting standards is important in assisting Big 4 audit firms 
to ensure fewer attempts at earnings management.  IFRS studies such as Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005) and Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011) found that listed companies 
audited by Big 4 firms have lower earnings management than those audited by non-Big 4, 
although this is not supported by the studies of Liu et al. (2011) and Pelucio-Grecco et al. 
(2014).  In particular, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) who reported an increase in 
earnings management for German listed companies have found that companies audited by 
Big 4 have lower earnings management than non-Big 4 clients.   Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) 
who reported a decrease in earnings management for Brazil listed companies found no 
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significant difference in the change of earnings management between Big 4 and non-Big 4.  
These results indicated that Big 4 firms are more effective in restricting the earnings 
management than non-Big 4 when managers are found to exercise excessive earnings 
management.   
Hypothesis 3 is based on the theoretical framework and the findings of studies such as Teoh 
and Wong (1993), Becker et al. (1998), Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005). 
Hypothesis 3: Companies audited by Big 4 have lower earnings management than 
those audited by non-Big 4 during the full IFRS convergence rather 
than during close alignment with IFRS.  
 
4.5 Chapter summary  
This chapter detailed the development of research hypotheses based on the findings of 
previous research studies and the theoretical framework.  The first research hypothesis stated 
that the full convergence with IFRS has a significant impact on the financial statements and 
financial ratios of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  This is consistent with the prediction 
of signalling theory that the implementation of IFRS signals decreases the information 
asymmetry between the managements and the shareholders.  This hypothesis is also 
consistent with the findings of previous studies – that there are significant differences in 
financial statements and financial ratios between those reported under IFRS and those under 
the local GAAP.   
The second research hypothesis stated that the full convergence with IFRS will significantly 
decrease the earnings management of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  This is in line 
with the prediction of agency and signalling theories.  Agency theory predicts that IFRS 
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convergence will act as a bonding mechanism that reduces the manipulation of financial 
figures by the managements of listed companies from manipulating financial figures.  The 
findings of previous studies have documented different results for the impact of IFRS 
adoption on earnings management.  This study argued that full convergence with IFRS is still 
a means of constraining opportunistic managerial behaviour (Damant 2006; Adibah Wan 
Ismail et al. 2013; Pelucio-Grecco et al. 2014).   
The third research hypothesis is that IFRS adoption has greater reduction of earnings 
management when the financial statements are audited by Big 4 audit firm compared to non-
Big 4 auditors.  The agency problem can be minimised when the financial statements 
prepared by the managements are audited by external auditors (Jensen & Mecklings 1976).  
In particular, large audit firms are more likely to provide higher quality audit than small audit 
firms because they earn less in terms of quasi-rents from each client (DeAngelo 1981).  
Previous studies (Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen 2005) 
have documented that Big 4 auditors are more effective in reducing managerial opportunistic 
behaviour than are the non-Big 4 auditors, consistent with agency theory.   
In chapter 5, the sample and methodology are designed to test these research hypotheses.  
Chapter 6 presents the results and discussions of the findings. 
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Chapter 5 Sample Selection, Data Collection and Research Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 describes the process of sample and data selection for each of the research 
objectives in this thesis.  This study focused on the impact of full IFRS convergence in the 
Malaysian context.  Therefore, companies listed on Bursa Malaysia were selected for the 
purposes of this study.  The data required for each part of this research mainly consisted of 
the financial figures and financial ratios that were extracted from companies’ annual reports.  
The annual reports are used for data collection because the restated financial figures reported 
under IFRS are provided only in the annual reports.  The period of examination in this study 
is six years, which include three years before and three years after the full IFRS convergence.   
The research methodology used to address each research objective is detailed in this chapter.  
The first part of this study analysed the differences in financial statements and financial ratios 
reported under FRS and those under MFRS.  The second part of this study measured and 
analysed the magnitude of change in discretionary accruals based on the Jones (1991) model 
and the modified versions of the Jones (1991) model using regression and descriptive 
analysis.  The third part of this study applied regression modelling to analyse the differences 
in the magnitude of change in discretionary accrual between listed companies audited by Big 
4 and non-Big 4 firms. 
The chapter comprises these sections: 5.2 Sample selection for each research objective, 5.3 
Data collection, 5.4 Research methodology, and 5.5 Chapter summary. 
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5.2 Sample selection for each research objective 
Companies listed on Bursa Malaysia were selected as sample in this thesis.  Bursa Malaysia 
has grouped the listed companies under Main Board and the Secondary Board (ACE market).  
This study focused on the Main Board companies because there is a huge difference between 
the two boards in regard to their total number of listed companies and their listing 
requirements (Muniandy & Ali 2012).  On the 30 June 2015, 814 companies were listed on 
the Bursa Malaysia Main Board.  Bursa Malaysia has grouped these listed companies 
according to different sectors.  
Listed companies in the financial sector were excluded from the sample because this sector is 
separately regulated under the Banking and Financial Institution Act of 1989 (Abdul Rahman 
& Haneem Mohamed Ali 2006) and has a working capital structure different from other 
sectors (Klein 2002).  IFRS research studies such as Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), 
Callao, Jarne, and Lainez (2007), Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008), Callao et al. (2010), Adibah 
Wan Ismail et al. (2013), Lueg, Punda and Burkert (2014), and Navarro-Garc´ıa and Madrid-
Guijarro (2014) also excluded the financial sector from their samples.  Listed companies that 
have not applied the MFRS were excluded from this study.  These companies are considered 
to be Transitioning Entities (TEs).  The MASB allowed these TEs to either apply MFRS or 
continue the application of FRS until the mandatory implementation of MFRS by 1 January 
2018.  The TEs are defined by MASB (2014) as ‘entities that are within the scope of MFRS 
141 Agriculture and/or IC Interpretation 15 Agreements for the Construction of Real Estate, 
including the parent, significant investor(s) and joint venturer(s).’  MASB has also indicated 
that the TEs are mainly comprised of real estates and agriculture industries.  To ensure that 
listed companies with non-MFRS compliance were removed, the annual reports of the listed 
companies were scrutinised.  This left a total sample of 519 listed companies as shown in 
Table 5.1. 
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Table 5. 1: Remaining sample prior to data collection 
  Descriptions Numbers 
Listed companies on Bursa Malaysia as at June 2015 814 
Less:  
Listed companies in financial sector 34 
Listed companies have not applied MFRS (or the TEs)  261 
  
Remaining Sample 519 
 
5.2.1 Final Sample for Analysing Financial Statements and Financial Ratios  
During the process of data collection, the study removed 146 listed companies that had 
insufficient information or did not meet the criteria for the research to determine the 
differences between financial statements and financial ratios reported under FRS and those 
reported under MFRS.  Table 5.2 shows the reasons for these listed companies being 
excluded and the total number of listed companies in the final sample.  
Table 5. 2: Final sample for financial statements and financial ratios  
Descriptions Numbers 
Remaining Sample from Table 5.1 519 
Less:  
Companies not listed for the whole period of examination, insufficient information 72 
Financial reporting period more or less than 12 months, negative total equity 45 
Companies with extreme outliers 27 
Sectors with insufficient number of listed companies 2 
Final sample for financial statements and financial ratios 373 
 
The final sample of listed companies was grouped according to different years of MFRS 
implementation, size of companies, and sectors.  These listed companies were divided into 
2012 MFRS-implementers and 2013 MFRS-implementers, and then further grouped into 
small, medium-sized and large companies based on their total assets reported in the first year 
of MFRS implementation.  Related IFRS studies such as Goodwin and Ahmed (2006), Callao 
et al (2010), and Stent, Bradbury and Hooks (2010) also used total assets as an indicator of 
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the size of companies.  Finally, these companies were grouped into six industry sectors: 
construction, consumer products, industrial products, technology, trading-services, and 
others.   
 
5.2.2 Final Sample for Analysing Earnings Management and Big 4 versus Non-
Big 4 
Based on the remaining sample from Table 5.1, the study excluded listed companies that 
offered insufficient information and did not meet the criteria for determining the magnitude 
of change in discretionary accruals.  The study used the remaining sample from Table 5.1 
because the data required for discretionary accruals is different from the data required for 
financial statements and financial ratios.  The reasons for removing listed companies for this 
part and the total number of listed companies in the final sample are specified in Table 5.3.   
Table 5. 3: Final sample for earnings management  
Descriptions Numbers 
Remaining Sample from Table 5.1 519 
Less:  
Companies not listed for the whole period of examination, insufficient information 72 
Financial reporting period more or less than 12 months, negative total equity 54 
Companies that have data with extreme outliers 19 
Sectors with insufficient number of listed companies 2 
Final sample for earnings management 372 
 
To determine whether the size of audit firms influences the magnitude of change in 
discretionary accruals, the study excluded two companies that had reported negative total 
equity for the final year under examination.  These two companies were not excluded from 
the earnings management section because their figures were not required for the analysis of 
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discretionary accruals.  The final sample of 370 Malaysian listed companies was used to 
determine the relationship between size of audit firms and discretionary accruals.  
 
5.3 Data collection  
The data for this study was obtained from annual reports downloaded from the Bursa 
Malaysia website.  These annual reports covered the six financial periods comprising three 
years before the full convergence to three years after the full convergence. Malaysian 
Financial Reporting Standards (MFRS) 1 First-time Adoption of Malaysian Financial 
Reporting Standards requires all first time IFRS adopters to restate the financial statements in 
the previous financial period according to the IFRS adopted.  The restated figures enabled 
this study to determine the changes in financial statements and financial ratios by comparing 
the differences between the restated figures (i.e. FRS) and the non-restated figures (i.e. 
MFRS) for the same financial period.  The study was able to use the financial figures 
prepared under the same accounting standards for two different financial periods (i.e. restated 
figures in 2011 are prepared under the same IFRS to the non-restated figures in 2012) to 
examine the earnings management.  The data had to be manually obtained from annual 
reports because the restated figures are available only in the annual reports. 
 
5.4 Research methodology 
This section detailed the research methodology used to obtain and analyse the results 
addressing each research objective. 
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5.4.1 Research methodology for financial statement and financial ratios  
The impact of full IFRS convergence on financial statements and financial ratios was 
determined based on the differences in the financial figures reported under FRS and under 
MFRS.   The 2011 financial figures were selected for the comparison because the 2011 
financial figures reported in 2011 annual reports were based on FRS and in the 2012 annual 
reports were based on MFRS.  There are entities that use financial reporting dates other than 
31 December.  These entities prepared their first MFRS-compliance financial statements in 
2013.  Hence, 2012 financial figures were collected for these entities.  This study also 
evaluated the impact of financial statements and financial ratios for the three years before and 
three years after the full IFRS convergence.  During the three years before full IFRS, MASB 
constantly aligned the FRS with the IFRS.  This means that gradually an increasing number 
of IFRS were incorporated into the national accounting standards before the full IFRS 
convergence.  The restated figures and the non-restated figures for the same financial 
reporting period were obtained from the annual reports covering 2008 to 2010 for listed 
companies with financial periods ending 31 December (or 2009-2011 for companies with 
other financial reporting dates).  After the full convergence, MASB was constantly updating 
the MFRS to IFRS to ensure consistency.  This study collected the financial figures for 2011-
2013 for entities with 31 December financial reporting date (or 2012 to 2014 for entities with 
other financial reporting dates). 
The financial statement figures selected for this study are: 
- The balance sheet items which include the current assets, current liabilities, non-
current assets, non-current liabilities, total assets, total liabilities, total equity; and 
- The income statement items which include revenue, net income (NI) after tax, and the 
comprehensive income.   
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The financial ratios selected are: 
- The liquidity ratios which include current ratio and acid test ratio; 
- The leverage ratios which include debt to asset ratio and debt to equity ratio; and 
- The profitability ratios which include return on assets (ROA) based on NI after tax, 
ROA based on comprehensive income, return on equity (ROE) based on NI after tax, 
ROE based on comprehensive income, return on sales (ROS) based on NI after tax, 
and the ROS based on comprehensive income. 
These financial statements figures and financial ratios have been used in IFRS studies such as 
Lantto and Sahlstrom (2009), Callao et al. (2010), Stent, Bradbury and Hooks (2010), and 
Black and Maggina (2016). 
Table 5. 4: Calculation for the selected financial ratios 
Financial Ratios Calculation 
Current ratio Current assets/current liabilities 
Acid Test (Trade receivable + Cash)/current liabilities 
Asset to debt ratio Total assets/total liabilities 
Debt to equity ratio Total liabilities/total equity 
ROA (NI after tax) NI after tax/total assets 
ROA (Comprehensive income) Comprehensive income/total assets 
ROE (NI after tax) NI after tax/total equity 
ROE (Comprehensive income) Comprehensive income/total equity 
ROS (NI after tax) NI after tax/revenue 
ROS (Comprehensive income) Comprehensive income/revenue 
 
These financial figures and financial ratios reported under FRS and MFRS were analysed in 
the SPSS version 22 to obtain the mean of each financial figure and the significant 
differences of the financial figures reported under the two different accounting standards.  
The normality testing was conducted to check whether the data was normally distributed 
before significant testing was conducted.  The normality testing showed that the data was not 
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normally distributed and the Wilcoxon signed rank test was used to analyse the significance 
differences.  
5.4.2 Research methodology for earnings management  
Previous IFRS studies have determined the changes in earnings management based on 
different proxies such as earnings smoothing and managing earnings towards small positive 
earnings (Barth, Landsman & Lang 2008; Chua et al. 2012; Christensen et al. 2015; Ebaid 
2016), discretionary accruals (Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen 2005; Callao and Jarne 2010; 
Houqe et al. 2012; Adibah Wan Ismail et al. 2013; Zeghal, Chtourou & Sellami 2011; 
Pelucio-Grecco et al. 2014), abnormal working capital accruals (Marra, Mazzola & Prencipe 
2011) and statistical properties of earnings to identify thresholds (Jeanjean & Stolowy 2008).  
This study has focused on the magnitude of discretionary accruals to determine the changes 
in earnings management.  Several earnings management studies in the Malaysia context have 
used discretionary accruals as a proxy of earnings management.  These studies include Aini 
et al. (2006), Abdul Rahman and Haneem Mohamed Ali (2006), Johl, Jubb, and Houghton 
(2007), Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell and Goodacre (2010), Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013), and 
Onalo, Lizam and Kaseri (2014). 
Discretionary accruals measurements include the Healy (1985) model, DeAngelo (1986) 
model, Jones (1991) model, and the modified version of the Jones (1991) model.  These 
models use different ways to measure non-discretionary accruals (NDA).  The Healy (1985) 
model and DeAngelo (1986) model are similar as both use total accruals as a basis for 
calculating the NDA.  Healy (1985) modelled the NDA based on the mean of total accruals 
scaled by lagged total asset from the estimated period.   
     
∑     
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Where 
NDA = estimated non-discretionary accruals; 
TA = total accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 
Ai, t-1 = total assets in year t-1 for firm i; 
  = year subscript for years included in the estimation period; and 
  = a year subscript indicating a year in the event period. 
The DeAngelo (1986) Model calculates the NDA based on the total accruals of the previous 
period scaled by lagged total assets, as shown in this formula:   
       
     
    
 
Unlike the Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) models, Jones (1991) took into consideration 
the changes in a firm’s economic circumstances and attempt to control this factor on NDA.  
Instead of using total accruals, Jones (1991) developed a formula for calculating non-
discretionary accruals that include revenue and property, plant and equipment as shown 
below: 
       (
 
      
)    (
      
      
)    (
     
      
) 
Where: 
  
 △REVit= revenues in year t less revenue in year t-1 for firm i: 
 △PPEit = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i 
 Ai, t-1 = total assets in year t-1 for firm i 
 i = firm index; 
 t = year index for the years included in the estimation period for firm i. 
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Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995, pg. 198) stated that ‘if nondiscretionary accruals are 
constant over time and discretionary accruals have a mean of zero in the estimation period, 
then both the Healy and DeAngelo Models will measure nondiscretionary accruals without 
error.  If, however, nondiscretionary accruals change from period to period, then both models 
will tend to measure nondiscretionary accruals with errors’.  In their research, Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney (1995) found that the Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) models were not the 
best means of measuring discretionary accruals.  The modified Jones (1991) model developed 
by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) was found to be the best model for this study.  
McNichols (2000) conducted a search of several journals published between 1993 and 1999 
and identified 55 studies that examined earnings management by using discretionary 
behaviour as a proxy.  The study also reported that the majority of these studies had used the 
Jones (1991) model, suggesting the wider acceptance of the Jones (1991) model compared to 
the Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) models.  The recent studies that have examined the 
impact of IFRS on earnings management based on discretionary accruals have used the Jones 
(1991) model and the modified versions of Jones (1991) model to calculate discretionary 
accruals.  Several modified versions of the Jones (1991) model have been developed, such as 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998), and Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005).   In this study, the discretionary accruals have been measured using the Jones 
(1991) model and the modified Jones (1991) models by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) 
and by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005). 
In the modified Jones (1991) model by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), the NDA is 
estimated as follows: 
       (
 
      
)    (
             
      
)    (
     
      
) 
Where:  
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      = net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1 scaled by total asset 
at t-1. 
Following is the modified Jones (1991) model developed by Kothari et al. (2005) to estimate 
NDA:  
       (
 
      
)    (
             
      
)    (
     
      
)    (     ) 
To derive the discretionary accruals, the total accruals are partitioned into discretionary and 
non-discretionary accruals, as shown in the following: 
Total Accruals (TAC) =  Discretionary accruals (DA) + Non-discretionary 
accruals (NDA) 
Following the Jones (1991) model assumption, the non-discretionary accruals are held 
constant.   To calculate the total accruals, the following formula is used: 
     
      
   (
 
      
)    (
      
      
)    (
     
      
)      
Therefore, the equation for the discretionary accruals based on the Jones (1991) model is as 
follows: 
           
     
      
 [ (
 
      
)   (△
     
      
)    (
     
      
)] 
 
Where: 
TACit =  total accruals in year t for firm i, calculated as: (△current assetsit -
△cashit) – (△current liabilitiesit- △short-term debtit) – (depreciation and 
amortisation expensesit); 
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        =  error term in year t for firm i, known as discretionary, unexpected or 
abnormal accruals (DAC). 
 
5.4.3 Research methodology for Big 4 versus non-Big 4 audit firms  
The last research objective is to determine whether companies audited by Big 4 firms have 
lower magnitude of discretionary accruals compared to those audited by non-Big 4 during 
before and after full IFRS convergence.  A regression model was developed to test the 
relationship between the size of audit firm (Big 4 and non-Big 4) and discretionary accruals.  
The study included several control variables: natural logarithm of total assets, debt to equity 
ratio, operating cash flow scaled by total assets, return on assets (ROA), audit opinion, 
industries effect, and the year of adoption.  The reasons for including the control variables, 
especially the size of companies, debt level of companies, operating cash flow, and ROA are 
discussed and explained below. 
- Natural logarithm of total assets.   
This control variable is used as the surrogate for the size of company.  The size of 
companies has been included as a means of controlling the well-established 
correlation between the sizes and accounting choice (Young 1998).  The size of 
companies is a proxy in one of the well-established theories, i.e. the political cost 
hypothesis.  The political cost hypothesis predicts that large firms rather than small 
firms are more likely to use accounting choices that reduce reported profits.  Based on 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978), the magnitude of political attention is highly 
dependent upon the size of companies.  The larger the firm, ceteris paribus, the 
greater the political costs.  Larger firms tend to engage in earnings management to 
avoid the occurrence or the greater pressure from political cost (Sutton 1988; Wong 
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1988; Cahan 1992).  Larger firms are more capable of engaging in earnings 
management than the small firms because they have more sophisticated financial-
reporting systems (Johnson, Khunara & Reynolds 2002).  Based on the political cost 
hypothesis, it is expected that the discretionary accruals and the natural logarithm of 
total assets will be negatively associated.   
- Leverage ratio (the debt to equity ratio). 
The second control variable is the leverage ratio that is computed by total liabilities 
over total equity.  Leverage ratio may be indirectly associated with discretionary 
accruals.  This control variable is a proxy of the debt covenants (i.e. Press & Weintrop 
1990) and financially distressed companies (i.e. Jaggi & Lee 2002).  It is assumed that 
debt covenants will encourage managers to manage the earnings upward either to 
reduce the tightening of accounting constraints in debt agreements or to avoid the 
costs of debt covenant violations (Beneish 2001).  The correlation between the debt 
covenants (leverage) and earnings management have been demonstrated by prominent 
researchers such as Watts and Zimmerman (1986), Watts and Zimmerman (1990), 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1994), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Sweeney 
(1994) and Young (1998).  Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pg. 216) predicted the 
debt/equity hypothesis: ‘ceteris paribus, the larger a firm’s debt/equity ratio the more 
likely the firm’s manager is to select accounting procedures that shift reported 
earnings from future periods to the current period’.  This hypothesis was tested by 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1994), and 
Sweeney (1994) who reported a significant and positive relationship between the 
abnormal accruals and the reported debt-covenant violations.  Jaggi and Lee (2002) 
expanded the research on the relationship between the earnings management and debt 
covenants violation.  One of the findings from Jaggi and Lee (2002) supported the 
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debt-equity hypothesis that financially distressed companies tend to use income-
increasing discretionary accruals when the likelihood of waiving the cost of debt 
covenants violation is high.  On the other hand, financially distressed firms are more 
likely to apply the income-decreasing discretionary accruals when there is a strong 
possibility that the waiver will be rejected, particularly if this rejection leads to debt 
restructuring or renegotiation.  
 
- Operating cash flow scaled by total assets and ROA 
Operating cash flow (OCF) scaled by total assets and ROA are the surrogate of the 
financial performance measurements.  Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) found that 
companies with low OCF have a sharp increase in total accruals but companies with 
high OCF have a sharp decrease in total accruals.  OCF scaled by total assets has been 
widely used as a control variable in related IFRS and discretionary accruals studies 
such as Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), Abdul Rahman and Haneem 
Mohamed Ali (2006), Marra, Mazzola and Prencipe (2011), Sun, Cahan and Emanuel 
(2011).  Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) also reported that companies with high 
earnings project greater accruals while companies with lower earnings have lower 
accruals.  In this study, ROA was used as the profitability performance measurement.  
Studies in the Malaysian context such as Abdul Rahman and Haneem Mohamed Ali 
(2006), Johl, Jubb, and Houghton (2007) and Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013) have 
used ROA as a control variable.  
 
- Audit Opinion 
The external auditors express their opinion of the quality of financial statements 
prepared by listed companies for their annual reports.  The audit opinions provide an 
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indication to the financial statement users of the reliability of financial statements.  An 
unqualified audit opinion indicates that the financial statements are prepared without 
material errors.  A qualified audit opinion or disclaimer of opinion indicates that the 
financial statements may not be free from material errors.  Companies that have been 
issued with qualified audit opinion or disclaimer of opinion may have greater use for 
discretionary accruals compared to companies with unqualified audit opinion. 
 
- Industries effect  
The industries effect was controlled in this study.  This is consistent with previous 
IFRS research studies such as Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), Sun, Cahan and 
Emanuel (2011), Houqe et al. (2012). 
 
- Years of MFRS implementation 
Malaysian listed companies may apply MFRS either in 2012 or 2013 financial 
statements based on the financial reporting date.  This variable was controlled in this 
study. 
A regression model was developed based on prior literature to analyse the relationship 
between the size of the audit firm (Big 4 and non-Big 4) and the discretionary accruals.  The 
estimated regression model is as follows: 
                                                                
                      
Where: 
DAC  =  absolute value of discretionary accruals in year t, scaled by lagged total 
assets 
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B4NB4t  =  dummy variable (company audited by Big 4 audit firms = 1, 
companies audited by non-Big 4 = 0) 
SIZEt   = natural logarithm of total assets in year t  
LEVERAGEt =  total liabilities over total assets in year t 
OCFt   =  operating cash flow in year t, scaled by lagged total assets 
ROA  =  NI after tax / total assets 
AO =  dummy variable for unqualified, unqualified with emphasis of matter, 
and qualified or disclaimer of opinion 
IND =  dummy variables for each industry (constructions, consumer products, 
industrial products, technology, trading services, and others)  
YEAR  = dummy variable (2012 MFRS-compliance = 1, 2013 MFRS-
compliance = 0) 
 
Before the regression model was analysed, the bivariate Pearson Correlation was conducted 
between the dependent variable (DAC) and the continuous control variables (LOG TA, 
TL/TE, OCF/LAGGED TA, and the ROA) to measure the strength and direction of linear 
relationships.  This was followed by the regression analysis based on the developed 
regression model. 
 
5.5 Chapter summary  
This chapter detailed the research design used in this study to achieve the research objectives 
as outlined in the introductory chapter.  This study adopted the quantitative approach by 
extracting data from the annual reports of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  All non-
financial listed companies were selected for the research purpose, consistent with previous 
studies such as Callao et al. (2010), Lueg, Punda and Burkert (2014) and Navarro-Garcia and 
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Madrid-Guijarro (2014).  This study removed listed companies that did not meet the research 
requirements as mentioned in the sample selection section of this chapter.  To collect the data 
required for this research study, annual reports that contained information for the three years 
before and three years after full IFRS convergence were obtained from the Bursa Malaysia 
website and the data was manually collected from these annual reports. 
To determine the impact on financial statements and financial ratios, the non-restated figures 
(non-IFRS) and restated figures (IFRS) were both collected for SPSS analysis to obtain the 
significance of the differences between the two figures.  The second part of the research 
involved determining the IFRS effect on earnings management, which was measured based 
on the change in discretionary accruals.  Consistent with previous research, this study applied 
the Jones (1991) model and the modified versions of the Jones (1991) model by Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005).   The last part of this 
research analysed the relationship between discretionary accruals and the size of audit firms 
(Big 4 versus non-Big 4).  A regression model was developed based on the prior IFRS or 
discretionary accruals studies to test the relationship.  The control variables such as log total 
assets, debts to equity ratios, OCF/lagged total assets, and ROA have been included in the 
model.  The following chapter 6 presents the results for each of the research objectives, 
together with a discussion of the findings.  
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Chapter 6 Results and Discussions 
 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter provides the results based on SPSS in relation to the research questions and 
objectives outlined in chapter 1 and in response to the research hypotheses developed in 
chapter 4.  These results are explained, discussed and compared with related academic studies 
in the IFRS domain.  Following are the contents of each section in this chapter:  
- Section 6.2 provides the results and the discussions of the results for the differences in 
financial statements and financial ratios reported under MFRS (after full IFRS 
convergence) and under FRS (before full IFRS convergence).  Different dimensions 
of results for each variable such as 2012 versus 2013 adopters, size of the companies, 
and the industries effect are presented to understand the potential impacts of full IFRS 
convergence on financial statements and financial ratios. 
- Section 6.3 presents the results and discusses the results for the discretionary accruals 
for the three years before and the three years after the full IFRS convergence.  The 
discretionary accruals based on the Jones (1991) model, modified version of Jones 
(1991) by Dechow, Sweeney and Sloan (1995), and the modified version of Jones 
(1991) by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) have been analysed and compared. 
- Section 6.4 contains the results and discussions of the relationship between the size of 
audit firms (Big 4 and non-Big 4) and the discretionary accruals for the three years 
before and three years after full convergence with IFRS. 
- Section 6.5 summarises the results and discussions chapter. 
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6.2 Results and discussions for the impact of full IFRS convergence on financial 
statements and financial ratios 
This section provides the results from SPSS and discusses the impact of full IFRS 
convergence on financial statements and financial ratios.  The final sample comprised 373 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  These listed companies have been grouped according to 
different sectors as shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6. 1: Final sample of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia used for the analysis 
of financial statements and financial ratios  
  Industries Number of Companies Percentage (%) 
  Constructions 9 2.41 
  Consumer Products 80 21.45 
  Industrial Products 154 41.29 
  Technology 20 5.36 
  Trading Services 94 25.20 
  Others 16 4.29 
  Total 373 100.00 
The changes in the financial statements and financial ratios of these listed companies were 
analysed.   Tables 6.2.1 to 6.2.8 present the results of: 
- The differences between the financial statements and financial ratios reported under 
FRS and those reported under MFRS; 
- The differences in the changes of financial statements and financial ratios for 2012 
and 2013 MFRS-compliance companies; 
- The differences in the changes of financial statements and financial ratios for small, 
medium-sized and large companies; 
- The differences in the changes of financial statements and financial ratios for different 
industries; 
- The differences between the financial statements and financial ratios for the three 
years before and those for the three years after full IFRS convergence. 
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Table 6.2. 1: Differences between financial statements prepared under FRS and those 
under MFRS  
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Z-Stats P-Value 
Current Assets       
FRS 400020419.7 1298792472.3 1299000.0 18681100000.0 -.566 .572 
MFRS 404716634.5 1327661199.9 1299000.0 19305600000.0   
Differences 4696214.8 54929121.7     
Non-Current Assets       
FRS 744820492.2 4364910059.1 2974000.0 69788000000.0 -1.825b .068 
MFRS 741770730.7 4353695735.4 2974000.0 69163500000.0   
Differences -3049761.5 77038768.1     
Current Liabilities       
FRS 244529324.5 798968122.4 1243000.0 9329500000.0 -.440c .660 
MFRS 247385419.5 823258510.6 1243000.0 9951400000.0   
Differences 2856095.1 48385434.2     
Non-Current Liabilities       
FRS 338244892.5 2630045230.6 .0 42741300000.0 -.193c .847 
MFRS 337865888.5 2656347270.7 .0 43360400000.0   
Differences -379004.0 45204003.0     
Total Assets       
FRS 1144840911.9 5616316033.3 19909939.0 88469100000.0 -2.328b .020 
MFRS 1146487365.2 5634835961.1 19909939.0 88469100000.0   
Differences 2477091.1 75949300.2     
Total Liabilities       
FRS 582774217.0 3334908243.1 1876000.0 52070800000.0 -.285c .775 
MFRS 585251308.0 3389723249.5 2049000.0 53311800000.0   
Differences 1646453.3 73055743.4     
Total Equity       
FRS 562066695.0 2376296513.0 9811095.0 36398300000.0 -2.293b .022 
MFRS 561236057.2 2343810237.6 9633291.0 35157300000.0   
Differences -830637.8 78471069.3     
Revenue       
FRS 797193623.2 2617029034.2 505000.0 35848400000.0 -3.727c .000 
MFRS 793785982.8 2612622410.8 505000.0 35848400000.0   
Differences -3407640.4 28166764.2     
NI after tax       
FRS 68722060.4 304439119.1 -144076337.0 4206200000.0 -3.266c .001 
MFRS 69215523.8 312044798.8 -148945472.0 4419100000.0   
Differences 493463.4 11394989.6     
Comprehensive Income       
FRS 65539166.1 279889475.1 -168739000.0 4155000000.0 -3.820c .000 
MFRS 67244485.0 299529297.2 -168739000.0 4365500000.0   
Differences 1705318.9 30865386.4     
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Table 6.2. 2:  Differences between financial ratios prepared under FRS and those under 
MFRS 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Z-Stats P-Value 
Current Ratio       
FRS 2.855936 2.7605 .0754 19.3918 -1.059b .290 
MFRS 2.868043 2.7560 .0754 19.3918   
Differences .012106 .1417374     
Acid Test       
FRS 4.214259 46.8408 .0255 905.5650 -1.157b .247 
MFRS 4.214599 46.8407 .0255 905.5650   
Differences .000341 .1006195     
Solvency       
FRS 3.883252 3.1578 1.1931 21.4095 -2.048b .041 
MFRS 3.877878 3.1423 1.1931 21.4095   
Differences -.005375 .1924017     
Indebtedness       
FRS .777077 .7269 .0490 5.1779   
MFRS .776801 .7279 .0490 5.1779 -1.897c .058 
Differences -.000276 .0522397     
ROA (NI after tax)       
FRS .121348 1.5384918 -.9336 29.6884 -2.893c .004 
MFRS .121262 1.5385319 -.9336 29.6884   
Differences -.000086 .0077123     
ROA (Comprehensive Income)       
FRS .113743 1.3854619 -.9336 26.7124 -3.484c .000 
MFRS .112457 1.3855570 -.9336 26.7124   
Differences -.001286 .0134263     
ROE (NI after tax)       
FRS .381325 6.1055536 -1.4630 117.9237 -2.654c .008 
MFRS .387400 6.2182068 -1.4630 120.1003   
Differences .006075 .1140755     
ROE (Comprehensive Income)       
FRS .351617 5.4939856 -1.4630 106.1031 -3.066c .002 
MFRS .355362 5.5954345 -1.4630 108.0615   
Differences .003745 .1042646     
ROS (NI after tax)       
FRS -.018091 1.2639744 -23.5941 1.3946 -2.862c .004 
MFRS -.019276 1.2727443 -23.7644 1.3946   
Differences -.001185 .0155269     
ROS (Comprehensive Income)       
FRS -.010675 1.0919004 -19.9683 1.4161 -3.369c .001 
MFRS -.013876 1.1001225 -20.1386 1.4161   
Differences -.003201 .0302311     
 
Table 6.2.1 and Table 6.2.2 present the results of the financial statements and financial ratios 
reported under FRS and MFRS based on the 2011 financial period (or 2012 financial period 
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for companies with reporting dates other than 31 December).  The financial statements and 
financial ratios are not normally distributed based on the test of normality. Hence, the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test was applied to test the significance of the differences in financial 
statements and financial ratios reported under FRS and those under MFRS.  Based on the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test, five financial statement figures and eight financial ratios were 
found to have significant differences when reported under FRS and under MFRS.  The five 
financial statement figures that exhibited significant differences were non-current assets, total 
assets, total equity, revenue, net income after tax, and the comprehensive income.  In 
particular, all three profitability figures showed a significance of 1%.  The eight financial 
ratios that had significant differences when reported under FRS and under MFRS were 
solvency ratio (at 5%), indebtedness (at 10%) and all of the profitability ratios.  Based on the 
mean and the test of significance, the Malaysian listed companies had on average: 
- Significant increases in the total assets, NI after tax, comprehensive income, ROE (NI 
after tax), and ROE (comprehensive income); 
- Significant decreases in non-current assets, total equity, revenue, solvency, 
indebtedness, ROA (NI after tax), ROA (comprehensive income), ROS (NI after tax), 
and ROS (comprehensive income). 
Discussion of the results for the differences in financial statements and financial ratios 
reported under MFRS and under FRS  
The results show in Table 6.2.1 and Table 6.2.2 support the Hypothesis 1.1 that full 
convergence with IFRS has a significant impact on the financial statements and financial 
ratios for the listed companies on Bursa Malaysia.  The results also indicated that the full 
IFRS convergence had more impact on the income statement than on the balance sheet of the 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  In particular, Hypothesis 1.3 is supported by the 
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increase in the reported profits (NI after tax and comprehensive income). The significant 
differences in income statements and profitability ratios found in this study are consistent 
with the results of the U.K. listed companies reported by Callao et al. (2010), Lueg, Punda 
and Burkert (2014) and Ali, Akbar and Ormrod (2016).  Callao et al. (2010) reported that 
these companies experienced significant increases in operating income, net income and return 
on equity, except return on assets based on operating income.  Lueg, Punda and Burkert 
(2014) found that these U.K. listed companies had significant increases in all profitability 
ratios, i.e. operating profit margin, return on equity and the return on invested capital.  Ali, 
Akbar and Ormrod (2016) also documented that the profit reported under IFRS is higher than 
the profit reported under the U.K. GAAP.  The similarity of the results between U.K. listed 
companies and Malaysian listed companies may be attributed to the similarity of the local 
GAAP of the two countries due to British colonisation and the Malaysian accountants 
educated in U.K.  
The results in Table 6.2.1 show no significant differences in current liabilities, non-current 
liabilities and total liabilities, thereby rejecting Hypothesis 1.2.  These results are not 
consistent with the findings of Callao et al. (2010) who reported significant increases in both 
short-term and long-term liabilities for listed companies in Spain and the U.K.  The 
significant differences found in solvency and indebtedness ratios may be the result of 
significant change in total assets and total equity.  The insignificant differences found in the 
three debt indicators may be due to the gradual alignment of the local GAAP with the IFRS 
from 2005 to 2011.   
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Table 6.2. 3: Differences in financial statements reported under FRS and MFRS for 
2012 and 2013 adopters 
Variables Year Mean Std. Deviation Z-Stats P-Value 
Current Assets 2012 4479374.7 57145104.5 .000b 1.000 
 2013 5018583.8 51645440.6 -.804c .422 
      
Non-Current Assets 2012 -2668825.6 88426159.1 -1.767c .077 
 2013 -3616086.1 56275319.9 -.507c .612 
      
Current Liabilities 2012 1695003.0 46615494.5 -.639d .523 
 2013 4582251.9 51013444.2 -.175c .861 
      
Non-Current Liabilities 2012 -3722432.8 40838779.4 -1.559d .119 
 2013 4591560.1 50745701.5 -1.769c .077 
      
Total Assets 2012 1810549.1 92642198.1 -1.861c .063 
 2013 1402497.6 23181469.4 -1.283c .199 
      
Total Liabilities 2012 -2027429.7 51962234.4 -1.462d .144 
 2013 9173812.0 101503399.1 -1.403c .161 
      
Total Equity 2012 3837978.8 56124388.8 -2.488c .013 
 2013 -7771314.3 102952812.2 -.349c .727 
      
Revenue 2012 -4257636.8 34600149.0 -2.670d .008 
 2013 -2143979.0 13941374.3 -2.599d .009 
      
NI after tax 2012 -190614.6 3110123.4 -2.337d .019 
 2013 1510459.4 17550647.5 -2.226d .026 
      
Comprehensive Income 2012 2051573.3 37265750.7 -2.758d .006 
 2013 1190554.0 17575932.7 -2.467d .014 
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Table 6.2. 4: Differences in financial ratios reported under FRS and MFRS for 2012 
and 2013 adopters 
Variables Year Mean Std. Deviation Z-Stats P-Value 
Current Ratio 2012 .0189 .1712 -1.215b .224 
 2013 .0021 .0794 -.121b .904 
      
Acid Test 2012 -.0003 .1289 -.628b .530 
 2013 .0013 .0231 -1.293b .196 
      
Solvency 2012 .0093 .1207 -3.479b .001 
 2013 -.0272 .2644 -.912c .362 
      
Indebtedness 2012 -.0016 .0407 -2.912c .004 
 2013 .0017 .0659 -.530b .596 
      
ROA (NI after tax) 2012 .0002 .0087 -1.742c .082 
 2013 -.0005 .0059 -2.322c .020 
      
ROA (Comprehensive Income) 2012 -.0002 .0095 -1.908c .056 
 2013 -.0029 .0176 -2.942c .003 
      
ROE (NI after tax) 2012 .0008 .0217 -2.109c .035 
 2013 .0139 .1780 -1.641c .101 
      
ROE (Comprehensive Income) 2012 .0003 .0218 -2.039c .041 
 2013 .0089 .1624 -2.194c .028 
      
ROS (NI after tax) 2012 -.0008 .0124 -2.042c .041 
 2013 -.0017 .0193 -2.019c .043 
      
ROS (Comprehensive Income) 2012 -.0014 .0141 -2.383c .017 
 2013 -.0058 .0444 -2.352c .019 
 
Tables 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 show the differences in financial statements and financial ratios 
reported under FRS and under MFRS between the 2012 and 2013 adopters.  The results 
presented in these two tables show that 2012 adopters have more significant differences in the 
financial statements and financial ratios reported under FRS and MFRS compared to 2013 
adopters, particularly in regard to the balance sheet items and debt ratios.  The balance sheet 
items that show significant differences for the 2012 adopters are non-current assets, total 
assets, and total equity.  The non-current liabilities are the only financial figures found to be 
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significantly different for 2013 adopters.  Significant differences have been found in solvency 
and indebtedness ratios for 2012 adopters, but not for the 2013 adopters.  All the income 
statements items, i.e. revenue, net income after tax, and the comprehensive income have 
shown significant differences for both 2012 and 2013 adopters.  Similar to the results for 
income statements, all the profitability ratios reported under MFRS are significantly different 
from those reported under FRS for both 2012 and 2013 adopters, except for ROE (NI after 
tax) for 2013 adopters. 
Based on these results, it can be determined that on average, the 2012 adopters have: 
- Significant increases in total assets, total equity, comprehensive income, solvency, 
ROA (NI after tax), ROE (NI after tax), and ROE (comprehensive income), and  
- Significant decreases in non-current assets, revenue, NI after tax, indebtedness, ROA 
(comprehensive income), ROS (NI after tax), and ROS (comprehensive income). 
On average, the 2013 adopters have: 
- Significant increases in non-current liabilities, NI after tax, comprehensive income, 
ROE (comprehensive income), and 
- Significant decreases in revenue, ROA (NI after tax), ROA (comprehensive income), 
ROS (NI after tax), and ROS (comprehensive income).    
When comparing the results for the 2012 and 2013 adopters, it can be argued that the full 
IFRS convergence had a greater effect on the financial statements and financial ratios of the 
2012 adopters than on the 2013 adopters.  It is observable that the 2012 adopters reported 
more positive financial information than did the 2013 adopters.  This finding suggests that the 
listed companies choose not to delay the implementation of MFRS because the financial 
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statements prepared under MFRS suggest a better financial position of the companies, 
consistent with the assumption of agency theory explained in Chapter 3.   
Table 6.2. 5: Differences in financial statements reported under FRS and MFRS for 
small, medium-sized and large listed companies  
Variables Sizes of Company  Mean Std. Deviation Z-Stats P-Value 
Current Assets Small 26429.9 472542.3 -1.120b .263 
 Medium 4769207.4 49002212.3 -.504c .614 
 Large 14121615.0 105352763.3 -.980c .327 
      
Non-Current Assets Small 9144.3 3678933.9 -1.574c .115 
 Medium -4726027.1 60382664.5 -1.446c .148 
 Large -4417234.5 158924600.5 -.213c .831 
      
Current Liabilities Small -24931.0 216272.5 -1.859b .063 
 Medium 2521296.9 31405591.3 -.020c .984 
 Large 9792214.5 106149257.8 -.153c .878 
      
Non-Current Liabilities Small 26109.9 400001.1 -1.060c .289 
 Medium -2237611.6 31810384.7 -.313c .755 
 Large 4270522.1 97001418.7 -.821b .411 
      
Total Assets Small 35574.2 3648574.0 -1.612c .107 
 Medium 43180.3 35568950.4 -1.843c .065 
 Large 9704380.5 169311067.6 -.698c .485 
      
Total Liabilities Small 1178.9 340610.3 -.187c .852 
 Medium 283685.3 7211569.4 -.245c .806 
 Large 14062736.6 186703019.4 -.560b .575 
      
Total Equity Small 34395.4 3585696.5 -1.857c .063 
 Medium -240505.0 29645694.5 -2.219c .027 
 Large -4358356.1 186782500.6 -.317c .751 
      
Revenue Small -1225211.8 12890881.5 -1.826b .068 
 Medium -1993051.7 14832540.2 -2.166b .030 
 Large -12088617.6 61182240.9 -2.366b .018 
      
NI after tax Small -58075.6 336059.9 -3.027b .002 
 Medium 100069.5 2242686.9 -1.776b .076 
 Large 2793271.4 27751151.8 -1.371b .170 
      
Comprehensive Income Small -175791.4 1489820.8 -2.678b .007 
 Medium -246174.1 3556564.6 -2.521b .012 
 Large 11348953.3 75193100.1 -1.657b .097 
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Table 6.2. 6: Differences in financial ratios reported under FRS and MFRS for small, 
medium and large companies  
Variables Sizes of Company  Mean Std. Deviation Z-Stats P-Value 
Current Ratio Small .003676 .0298936 -1.020b .308 
 Medium .012544 .1714613 -.751b .452 
 Large .028218 .1803442 -.089c .929 
      
Acid Test Small .000984 .0280460 -1.334b .182 
 Medium -.006271 .1247188 -.504b .614 
 Large .018527 .1150059 -.051b .959 
      
Solvency Small -.022280 .2760507 -.666b .505 
 Medium -.001151 .1380780 -2.280b .023 
 Large .017059 .0951243 -.091c .927 
      
Indebtedness Small .001029 .0439273 -.647c .518 
 Medium -.000993 .0625863 -2.515c .012 
 Large -.000856 .0305384 -.243b .808 
      
ROA (NI after tax) Small -.000675 .0052402 -2.273c .023 
 Medium .000446 .0099794 -1.381c .167 
 Large -.000441 .0025921 -1.430c .153 
      
ROA (Comprehensive Income) Small -.002296 .0166239 -2.705c .007 
 Medium -.000948 .0130830 -2.243c .025 
 Large -.000196 .0030965 -.958c .338 
      
ROE (NI after tax) Small .016423 .1926337 -1.265c .206 
 Medium .001384 .0238040 -1.800c .072 
 Large -.001442 .0079680 -1.486c .137 
      
ROE (Comprehensive Income) Small .012187 .1751118 -1.685c .092 
 Medium -.000581 .0268864 -2.367c .018 
 Large -.000917 .0083428 -.860c .390 
      
ROS (NI after tax) Small -.001560 .0151047 -2.286c .022 
 Medium -.001248 .0181989 -1.842c .065 
 Large -.000227 .0024096 -.503c .615 
      
ROS (Comprehensive Income) Small -.004821 .0420369 -2.776c .006 
 Medium -.003277 .0249033 -2.575c .010 
 Large .000370 .0050518 -.049b .961 
 
The differences between the financial statements and financial ratios reported under FRS and 
those under MFRS for small, medium-sized and large companies are presented in Tables 
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6.2.5 and 6.2.6.  It is observable that large companies are less affected by the full IFRS 
convergence compared to small and medium-sized companies.  In particular, none of the 
balance sheet items has shown significant differences for the large listed companies while 
significant differences are found in the current liabilities and total equity for the small 
companies, and the total assets and total equity for medium-sized companies.  There are 
significant differences in all income statement items for both small and medium-sized 
companies.  Significant differences are also found in two of the income statement items, i.e. 
revenue and comprehensive income for the large listed companies.  These results suggest that 
full IFRS convergence has had a significant impact on the income statements for listed 
companies of all sizes. 
Table 6.2.6 shows that there is no significant difference between the financial ratios reported 
under the MFRS and those under FRS for large listed companies, but significant differences 
are found in a few of the financial ratios for small and medium-sized listed companies. 
On average, the small companies listed on Bursa Malaysia have experienced: 
- Significant increases in total equity, and the ROE (Comprehensive Income); and 
- Significant decreases in current liabilities, revenue, NI after tax, comprehensive 
income, ROA (NI after tax), ROA (comprehensive income), ROS (NI after tax), and 
ROS (comprehensive income). 
The medium listed companies have on average: 
- Significantly increase in total assets, NI after tax, and the ROE (NI after tax); and 
- Significantly decrease in total equity, revenue, comprehensive income, solvency, 
indebtedness, ROA (comprehensive income), ROE (comprehensive income), ROS 
(NI after tax), and the ROS (comprehensive income). 
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The large listed companies have on average: 
- Significant increases in comprehensive income; and 
- Significant decreases in revenue. 
These results support the findings of Goodwin and Ahmed (2006), Callao et al. (2010) and 
Stent, Bradbury and Hooks (2010) who have documented that the impact of IFRS adoption 
on financial statements and financial ratios differ between small, medium and large 
companies.  This study and Callao et al. (2010) have reported that IFRS adoption has greatest 
impact on medium companies in Malaysia and U.K., while Goodwin and Ahmed (2006) and 
Stent, Bradbury and Hooks (2010) found greatest impact on large companies in Australia and 
New Zealand.  These findings support the argument of the similarity between Malaysian and 
U.K. local GAAP. 
Table 6.2. 7: Differences in financial statements reported under FRS and MFRS for 
different sectors  
Variables Industries  Mean Std. Deviation Z-Stats P-Value 
Current Assets Construction 4287606.9 29870225.7 -.535b .593 
 Consumer Products 650940.6 5693717.4 -.845b .398 
 Industrial Products 1273867.1 13533970.0 -.966c .334 
 Technology -127100.0 568408.5 -1.000c .317 
 Trading-Services 15614066.5 107239619.3 -1.070b .285 
 Others -20711.3 82845.0 -1.000c .317 
      
Non-Current Assets Construction -4282776.3 29871001.4 -.447c .655 
 Consumer Products -6461436.8 46016539.6 -.308c .758 
 Industrial Products 484543.5 27040569.8 -1.656b .098 
 Technology 248407.5 822707.4 -1.069b .285 
 Trading-Services -7102205.6 143559053.1 -1.070b .285 
 Others 369898.8 1393680.5 -1.342b .180 
      
Current Liabilities Construction -305974.2 934336.4 -.447c .655 
 Consumer Products 587585.7 5963164.6 -.845b .398 
 Industrial Products 226146.656 3151370.2 -1.085c .278 
 Technology .000 .0000 .000d 1.000 
 Trading-Services 10705614.5 96079763.9 -.392b .695 
 Others -1255248.8 4220241.9 -1.342c .180 
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Table 6.2.7 (Continue) 
Non-Current Liabilities Construction 310804.8 932414.3 -1.000b .317 
 Consumer Products -672998.6 6482449.7 .000d 1.000 
 Industrial Products -60687.5 6536681.8 -.131c .896 
 Technology -59602.5 411122.7 -.674c .500 
 Trading-Services 203563.0 89266313.9 .000d 1.000 
 Others -6182678.1 23958781.4 -.730c .465 
      
Total Assets Construction 4830.6 14491.7 -1.000b .317 
 Consumer Products -5810496.3 46445338.1 -.243c .808 
 Industrial Products 1758410.6 23685187.1 -1.587b .112 
 Technology 121307.5 468240.7 -1.069b .285 
 Trading-Services 8511860.9 136001146.4 -2.146b .032 
 Others 349187.5 1396750.0 -1.000b .317 
      
Total Liabilities Construction 4830.6 14491.7 -1.000b .317 
 Consumer Products -85412.8 8825429.2 -.213b .831 
 Industrial Products 165459.2 7260763.7 -.255c .798 
 Technology -59602.5 411122.7 -.674c .500 
 Trading-Services 10909177.5 150739692.6 -.497b .619 
 Others -7437926.8 23954496.9 -1.461c .144 
      
Total Equity Construction .000 .0000 .000d 1.000 
 Consumer Products -5725083.5 39372545.5 -1.512c .131 
 Industrial Products -5725083.5 18654156.3 -2.431b .015 
 Technology 180909.9 464516.8 -1.826b .068 
 Trading-Services -2397316.6 150342362.4 -1.330b .184 
 Others 7787114.3 23983213.8 -1.461b .144 
      
Revenue Construction .000 .0000 .000d 1.000 
 Consumer Products -6572477.0 51239050.4 -1.690c .091 
 Industrial Products -543402.8 4715223.3 -1.960c .050 
 Technology -776600.0 3473060.8 -1.000c .317 
 Trading-Services -6872719.9 29415386.1 -2.547c .011 
 Others .000 .0000 .000d 1.000 
      
NI after tax Construction 817545.2 3146432.5 -.447b .655 
 Consumer Products -652302.3 3731086.7 -3.114c .002 
 Industrial Products 179638.4 2910721.1 -2.098c .036 
 Technology -188811.1 869294.3 -.535c .593 
 Trading-Services 2242479.2 22082904.9 -.686c .493 
 Others -362062.5 1448250.0 -1.000c .317 
      
Comprehensive Income Construction .000 .0000 .000d 1.000 
 Consumer Products -783702.1 4881912.2 -2.427c .015 
 Industrial Products -316922.3 3192447.7 -2.980c .003 
 Technology -92311.1 1002932.6 -.535c .593 
 Trading-Services 8034312.6 60982231.9 -.673c .501 
 Others -362062.5 1448250.0 -1.000c .317 
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Table 6.2. 8: Differences in financial ratios reported under FRS and MFRS for 
different sectors  
 Variables Industries  Mean Std. Deviation Z-Stats P-Value 
Current Ratio Construction -.0098 .3196 -.535c .593 
 Consumer Products .0015 .0390 -.255c .799 
 Industrial Products .0129 .1430 -1.288b .198 
 Technology -.0006 .0029 -1.000c .317 
 Trading-Services .0164 .1704 -.568b .570 
 Others .0605 .2079 -1.069b .285 
      
Acid Test Construction .0041 .0125 -.447b .655 
 Consumer Products .0006 .0056 -.652b .515 
 Industrial Products -.0070 .1115 -1.764b .078 
 Technology -.0086 .0380 -1.342c .180 
 Trading-Services .0045 .1134 -.040c .968 
 Others .0545 .1964 -1.342b .180 
      
Solvency Construction -.0001 .0001 -1.000c .317 
 Consumer Products -.0355 .3101 -1.371c .170 
 Industrial Products .0078 .1327 -2.457b .014 
 Technology -.0079 .0469 -.405b .686 
 Trading-Services -.0128 .1754 -1.313b .189 
 Others .0623 .1632 -1.461b .144 
      
Indebtedness Construction .0001 .0003 -1.000b .317 
 Consumer Products .0123 .0626 -2.057b .040 
 Industrial Products -.0055 .0572 -2.554c .011 
 Technology .000007 .0020 -.135b .893 
 Trading-Services -.0018 .0431 -1.568c .117 
 Others -.0041 .0302 -.730c .465 
      
ROA (NI after tax) Construction .0031 .0101 .000d 1.000 
 Consumer Products .0012 .0141 -1.537c .124 
 Industrial Products -.0007 .0052 -2.062c .039 
 Technology -.0010 .0034 -1.095c .273 
 Trading-Services -.0002 .0031 -.689c .491 
 Others -.0004 .0014 -1.000c .317 
      
ROA (Comprehensive Income) Construction -.000001 .0000029 -1.000c .317 
 Consumer Products .000022 .0189 -1.435c .151 
 Industrial Products -.0028 .0155 -3.023c .003 
 Technology -.0010 .0035 -1.095c .273 
 Trading-Services -.0010 .0038 -.751c .453 
 Others -.0004 .0014 -1.000c .317 
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Table 6.2.8 (Continue) 
ROE (NI after tax) Construction .0034 .0133 -.447b .655 
 Consumer Products .0032 .0358 -1.332c .183 
 Industrial Products -.0012 .0078 -2.268c .023 
 Technology -.0014 .0047 -1.461c .144 
 Trading-Services .0003 .0062 -.767c .443 
 Others .1354 .5443 .000d 1.000 
      
ROE (Comprehensive Income) Construction .0000 .0000 .000d 1.000 
 Consumer Products .0015 .0415 -1.117c .264 
 Industrial Products -.0043 .0213 -3.042c .002 
 Technology -.0013 .0048 -1.095c .273 
 Trading-Services .0001 .0073 -.616c .538 
 Others .1218 .4898 .000d 1.000 
      
ROS (NI after tax) Construction .0044 .0170 -.447b .655 
 Consumer Products -.000015 .0014 -1.164c .244 
 Industrial Products -.0024 .0221 -2.515c .012 
 Technology -.0007 .0029 -.730c .465 
 Trading-Services -.0008 .0112 -.854c .393 
 Others -.0008 .0034 -1.000c .317 
      
ROS (Comprehensive Income) Construction .0000 .0000 .000d 1.000 
 Consumer Products -.0011 .0202 -1.399c .162 
 Industrial Products -.0065 .0439 -3.393c .001 
 Technology -.0006 .0030 -.365c .715 
 Trading-Services -.0008 .0103 -.487c .627 
 Others -.0008 .0034 -1.000c .317 
 
Based on the results in Tables 6.2.7 and 6.2.8, significant differences in financial statements 
and financial ratios are found in four sectors which are consumer products, industrial 
products, technology and trading-services.  In particular, the industrial products sector is the 
one most affected by the full IFRS convergence with significant differences found in several 
financial statement items and financial ratios.  The mean and p-value indicate that industrial 
products have: 
- Significant increases in non-current assets, net income after tax, and solvency; and 
- Significant decreases in total equity, revenue, comprehensive income, acid test, 
indebtedness, ROA (NI after tax), ROA (comprehensive income), ROE (NI after tax), 
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ROE (comprehensive income), ROS (NI after tax), and ROS (comprehensive 
income). 
The results for the industries effect in this study support the finding of Callao et al. (2010) 
that the changes in financial statements and financial ratios differ between sectors.  The 
results have also shown similarity to the Spanish listed companies based on Callao et al. 
(2010) study, but not the U.K. listed companies.  The Spanish listed companies in the 
industrial sector are more affected than the commercial and service sector, but the U.K. listed 
companies in the commercial and service sectors have had greater impact from the IFRS 
adoption than the industrial sector.   
Table 6.2. 9: Differences in financial statements for three years before and three years 
after full IFRS convergence 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Z-Stats P-Value 
Current Assets       
Before 1400301.3 23245104.7 -19869333.3 439666666.7 -.309b .758 
After -2637136.9 45111172.4 -774033333.3 212084094.7 -2.850c .004 
       
Non-Current Assets       
Before 4919947.795 85460548.2 -47033333.3 1644466666.7 -3.075b .002 
After 3077794.3 63073269.9 -252627000.0 1096933333.3 -2.606b .009 
       
Current Liabilities       
Before 158856.085 3727085.3 -51290666.7 24190481.3 -2.344b .019 
After 625490.388 21661095.8 -219316333.3 185466666.7 -1.290c .197 
       
Non-Current Liabilities       
Before 24007696.0 378533875.9 -26361000.0 7233280000.0 -3.923b .000 
After -915068.2 24565824.2 -308833333.3 227805333.3 -1.199b .230 
       
Total Assets       
Before 6320249.1 108317755.6 -38881000.0 2084133333.3 -3.672b .000 
After 440657.4 35622621.0 -338754333.3 322900000.0 -.499b .618 
       
Total Liabilities       
Before 24166552.2 378578398.6 -38359333.3 7233280000.0 -4.371b .000 
After -289577.8 17578140.0 -211256333.3 141766666.7 -.217c .829 
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Table 6.2.9 (Continue) 
Total Equity       
Before -9294198.5 220368883.1 -4082226000.0 1107833333.3 -.544b .586 
After 730235.2 33177378.8 -347243333.3 446266666.7 -.784b .433 
       
Revenue       
Before -2953499.4 30821350.9 -462067333.3 73427333.3 -2.970c .003 
After -2290237.2 22099926.5 -151416666.7 300850000.0 -4.339c .000 
       
NI after tax       
Before 277004.0 8658716.2 -67515666.7 152300000.0 -.446c .655 
After 24636.5 24736937.5 -347243333.3 321666666.7 -3.260c .001 
       
Comprehensive Income       
Before 1426991.7 18242287.3 -58672333.3 289766666.7 -.930c .352 
After 501975.9 26559427.6 -347243333.3 320866666.7 -3.583c .000 
 
Table 6.2. 10: Differences in financial ratios for three years before and three years after 
full IFRS convergence 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Z-Stats P-Value 
Current Ratio       
Before -.008476 .0769679 -.8525 .3752 -2.319b .020 
After .003566 .0682293 -.5063 .6186 -.052b .958 
       
Acid Test       
Before -.002083 .1205151 -1.4098 1.2991 -.368b .713 
After -.003809 .0530107 -.4570 .2622 -.597b .551 
       
Solvency       
Before -.029064 .2699839 -4.2257 .1964 -3.287b .001 
After -.000273 .0733957 -.8525 .4741 -1.582c .114 
       
Indebtedness       
Before .011234 .1104081 -.0610 1.6856 -2.830c .005 
After .000531 .0251072 -.1858 .1738 -1.259b .208 
       
ROA (NI after tax)       
Before -.000009 .0013805 -.0088 .0179 -2.031b .042 
After .000076 .0046106 -.0197 .0669 -3.253b .001 
       
ROA (Comprehensive Income)       
Before .000418 .0054800 -.0138 .0576 -1.805b .071 
After -.000035 .0069256 -.0508 .0672 -3.676b .000 
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Table 6.2.10 (Continue) 
ROE (NI after tax)       
Before .000102 .0038930 -.0254 .0572 -1.306b .191 
After .002063 .0388618 -.0632 .7257 -3.017b .003 
       
ROE (Comprehensive Income)       
Before .001026 .0120455 -.0252 .1748 -1.444b .149 
After .001823 .0365218 -.0644 .6562 -3.396b .001 
       
ROS (NI after tax)       
Before .000553 .0097480 -.0750 .1267 -.311c .756 
After .004820 .0824564 -.2768 1.5142 -1.433b .152 
       
ROS (Comprehensive Income)       
Before .001050 .0120916 -.0750 .1267 -.248c .804 
After .004369 .0869711 -.2768 1.5963 -1.853b .064 
 
Tables 6.2.9 and 6.2.10 present the changes in financial statements and financial ratios during 
the last three years of close alignment with IFRS and the first three years of full IFRS 
convergence.  The results indicate that there are significant differences between the financial 
statements and financial ratios for the two periods.  During the last three years of close 
alignment with IFRS, significant differences are found in five balance sheet items, one 
income statement item, and five financial ratios.  During the first three years of full IFRS 
convergence, significant differences are found in one balance sheet item, all income 
statement items, and most of the profitability ratios.  
Based on the mean differences and the significance test, it can be determined that during the 
final three years of close alignment with IFRS, the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia 
experienced: 
- Significant increase in the non-current assets, current liabilities, non-current liabilities, 
total assets, total liabilities, indebtedness and ROA (comprehensive income); and 
- Significant decrease in revenue, current ratio, solvency, and ROA (NI after tax). 
 
 
151 
 
During the first three years of full IFRS convergence, the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia 
on average experienced: 
- Significant increase in the non-current assets, NI after tax, comprehensive income, 
ROA (NI after tax), ROE (NI after tax), ROE (comprehensive income), and ROS 
(comprehensive income); and 
- Significant decrease in current assets, revenue, ROA (comprehensive income). 
The results of the changes in financial statements and financial ratios during the final three 
years of close alignment with IFRS support Hypothesis 1.4 which anticipated that the close 
alignment with IFRS has a significant impact on the financial statements and financial ratios 
of the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  When comparing the results for the two periods, 
it is evident that the balance sheet items and debt ratios were more influenced during the final 
three years of close alignment with IFRS than during the first three years of full IFRS 
convergence.  The income statements and profitability ratios were more affected during the 
full IFRS convergence period than the close alignment period.   
The significant increase in all debt indicators and the significant decrease in liquidity ratios 
support Hypothesis 1.2 that full IFRS convergence will have a negative impact on the debt 
measurements for the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  These results also supported the 
findings of Goodwin and Ahmed (2006), Callao et al (2010), Stent, Bradbury and Hook 
(2010) that the adoption of IFRS does increase the debt level of the companies.  The 
increment in debt level after IFRS adoption implies the effectiveness of IFRS in ensuring that 
more negative financial information is disclosed.   
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6.3 Results and discussions for the impact of full IFRS convergence on discretionary 
accruals 
In this section, the results for the changes in discretionary accruals during the three years 
before and three years after full convergence are presented and discussed.  The final sample 
used to analyse discretionary accruals is 372 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  The final 
sample in this section is different to 6.2 because different data (i.e. financial figures) is 
required in these two sections, which ultimately affect the companies removed from the 
sample.  Table 6.3.1 below shows the sectors under which the listed companies have been 
grouped.   
 
Table 6.3 1: Final sample of listed companies on Bursa Malaysia used to analyse the 
discretionary accruals 
  Industries Number of Companies Percentage (%) 
  Constructions 8 2.2 
  Consumer Products 80 21.5 
  Industrial Products 156 41.9 
  Technology 19 5.1 
  Trading Services 91 24.5 
  Others 18 4.8 
  Total 372 100.00 
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Table 6.3 2: Descriptive statistics for variables used to analyse discretionary accruals 
 Before Full IFRS After Full IFRS 
Variables Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Total Accruals       
Mean -.032087 -.020708 -.028042 -.016890 -.024356 -.033314 
Median -.036655 -.014239 -.023756 -.029321 -.025856 -.028036 
Std. Deviation .1055240 .0991310 .0959480 .1198292 .0843455 .1120559 
Minimum -.3814 -.5285 -.6879 -.4982 -.4006 -.8210 
Maximum .6856 .3300 .5011 .8018 .3031 .4961 
       
Revenue/Lagged TA       
Mean -.040920 .086157 .066835 .044687 .021716 .040020 
Median -.023442 .057599 .034481 .025138 .017068 .023526 
Std. Deviation .2283461 .2240341 .1785325 .1671207 .1697436 .1652867 
Minimum -1.2675 -1.0313 -.4973 -.6442 -1.0452 -.7940 
Maximum 1.1220 1.3167 1.3872 .9251 .6301 .7498 
       
(Rev-Rec)/Lagged TA       
Mean -.043822 .070787 .056297 .030668 .014658 .027143 
Median -.022565 .049891 .034328 .017765 .012119 .013834 
Std. Deviation .2146600 .2054074 .1564029 .1462747 .1570829 .1548606 
Minimum -1.3387 -1.0252 -.4953 -.6089 -1.0005 -.6893 
Maximum 1.0459 1.0892 1.3212 .7492 .4813 .8206 
       
GPPE/Lagged TA       
Mean .613757 .652586 .648996 .654126 .666245 .673529 
Median .589245 .630866 .632550 .621358 .630109 .637335 
Std. Deviation .3692261 .4344138 .3917637 .4006412 .4170820 .4400712 
Minimum .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Maximum 2.2393 3.6251 2.4875 2.4693 2.6059 2.9470 
       
ROA       
Mean .051445 .046448 .047178 .043237 .047603 .031098 
Median .046384 .044480 .043866 .040816 .040787 .037490 
Std. Deviation .0727662 .0931494 .0852342 .1018437 .0891978 .1332605 
Minimum -.1817 -.3391 -.3930 -.5244 -.4076 -1.1168 
Maximum .5178 .4659 .4908 .8375 .6006 .7025 
       
ROA (Lagged TA)       
Mean .057323 .054721 .052733 .048833 .052500 .043048 
Median .048739 .047320 .047539 .044476 .043902 .039973 
Std. Deviation .0768807 .0974418 .0846706 .0892229 .0884813 .1112236 
Minimum -.1579 -.2574 -.2701 -.2865 -.3129 -.5179 
Maximum .5021 .6029 .4586 .5089 .5695 .6750 
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Table 6.3 3: Results of regression analysis based on Jones (1991) model 
 Before Full IFRS After Full IFRS 
  Independent Variables 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 5th Year 6th Year 
       
(Constant) 0.006 -0.002 -0.007 0.012 0.012 -0.012 
Δ Rev/lagged TA 0.049** 0.083* 0.084* 0.227* -0.005 -0.004 
GPPE/lagged TA -0.059* -0.039* -0.042* -0.060* -0.055* -0.032** 
       
Model Fit       
R Square 0.050 0.059 0.055 0.157 0.073 0.016 
Adjusted R Square 0.045 0.054 0.050 0.152 0.068 0.010 
F Statistics 9.804 11.523 10.738 34.265 14.533 2.940 
P-value .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .054 
 * denotes for significant at 1% 
 ** denotes for significant at 5% 
 *** denotes for significant at 10% 
Table 6.3.3 presents the results of the regression analysis based on Jones (1991) model that 
determine the relationship between total accruals and the non-discretionary accruals 
variables.  The F Statistics and P-value based on this model indicate that the coefficients of 
independent variables are jointly significant at 1% to the usual confidence interval for the 
first five years of observation and jointly significant at 10% for the final observation year.  
The value of R² and adjusted R² are considered small (no greater than 16%), suggesting that 
the greater percentage of the variation in total accruals can be explained by the discretionary 
accruals.  It is observable that the variation of total accruals explained by the non-
discretionary accruals variables increased in the 1
st
 year of full convergence but decreased in 
the following years. 
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Table 6.3 4: Results of discretionary accruals, non-discretionary accruals, and total 
accruals based on Jones (1991) model  
 Before Full IFRS After Full IFRS 
  Variables 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 5th Year 6th Year 
Discretionary Accruals       
Mean 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0006 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 
Median -0.0024 0.0035 0.0087 -0.0052 0.0006 0.0059 
Std. Deviation 0.1028 0.0962 0.0933 0.1100 0.0812 0.1112 
Minimum -0.3724 -0.5175 -0.6679 -0.4816 -0.3667 -0.8000 
Maximum 0.6739 0.3280 0.5069 0.6813 0.3218 0.5496 
       
Non-Discretionary Accruals       
Mean -0.0322 -0.0203 -0.0286 -0.0171 -0.0248 -0.0337 
Median -0.0311 -0.0197 -0.0284 -0.0205 -0.0231 -0.0327 
Std. Deviation 0.0236 0.0240 0.0226 0.0475 0.0229 0.0141 
Minimum -0.1179 -0.1464 -0.1247 -0.1766 -0.1316 -0.1066 
Maximum 0.0266 0.0938 0.0925 0.1910 0.0153 -0.0109 
       
Total Accruals       
Mean -0.0321 -0.0207 -0.0280 -0.0169 -0.0244 -0.0333 
Median -0.0367 -0.0142 -0.0238 -0.0293 -0.0259 -0.0280 
Std. Deviation 0.1055 0.0991 0.0959 0.1198 0.0843 0.1121 
Minimum -0.3814 -0.5285 -0.6879 -0.4982 -0.4006 -0.8210 
Maximum 0.6856 0.3300 0.5011 0.8018 0.3031 0.4961 
 
The results of the discretionary accruals based on the Jones (1991) model are presented in 
Table 6.3.4.  The results in this table show that the mean discretionary accruals dropped from 
0.0001 in the first year to -0.0004 in the second year, and then increased to 0.0006 in the third 
year.  This finding indicates that the use of mean discretionary accruals increased during the 
final three years before full IFRS convergence (ignore negative value, the 0.0004 >0.0001 
and 0.0006>0.0004).  From the third to fourth year, the mean discretionary accruals 
decreased from 0.0006 to 0.0002.  The mean discretionary accruals increased again in the 
fifth year and remained the same in the final year. 
Different from the mean value, the median discretionary accruals increased from -0.0024 in 
the first year before full convergence to 0.0035 in the second year and again increased to 
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0.0087 in the third year of observation.  These results indicate that the managements of 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia had applied greater discretionary accruals during the 
three year before full IFRS convergence.  The median discretionary accruals decreased to -
0.0052 in the fourth year and increased to 0.0006 in the fifth year.  The smaller numbers 
reported for the medium discretionary accruals (0.0087>0.0052>0.0006) indicate that the 
practice of discretionary accruals decreased in the first and second years of full IFRS 
convergence.  In the final year of observation, the reported median discretionary accrual is 
0.0059, which indicates that managements have applied greater discretionary accruals. 
Table 6.3 5: Results of regression analysis based on modified Jones (1991) model by 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995)  
 Before Full IFRS After Full IFRS 
  Independent Variables 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 5th Year 6th Year 
       
(Constant) 0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.024** 0.013 -0.011 
Δ (Rev-Rec)/lagged TA 0.031 0.031 0.019 0.114* -0.054** -0.041 
GPPE/lagged TA -0.057* -0.037* -0.042* -0.068* -0.055* -0.032** 
       
Model Fit       
R Square 0.043 0.028 0.031 0.078 0.083 0.019 
Adjusted R Square 0.038 0.023 0.026 0.073 0.078 0.014 
F Statistics 8.357 5.286 5.967 15.531 16.740 3.542 
P-value .000 .005 .003 .000 .000 .030 
Table 6.3.5 presents the results of the regression analysis based on the modified Jones (1991) 
model by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995).  The F Statistics and P-value indicate that the 
coefficients of independent variables are jointly significant at 1% to the usual confidence 
interval for the first five years of observation and jointly significant at 5% for the final 
observation year.  The value of R² and adjusted R² are considered small (> 10%) indicating 
that more than 90% of the variation in the total accruals can be explained by the discretionary 
accruals. 
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Table 6.3 6: Results for the discretionary accruals, non-discretionary accruals, and 
total accruals based on modified Jones (1991) model by Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney (1995)  
 Before Full IFRS After Full IFRS 
 Variables 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 5th Year 6th Year 
Discretionary Accruals       
Mean 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 
Median -0.0022 0.0027 0.0049 -0.0048 0.0001 0.0059 
Std. Deviation 0.1032 0.0977 0.0944 0.1151 0.0808 0.1110 
Minimum -0.3677 -0.5206 -0.6620 -0.4962 -0.3686 -0.8042 
Maximum 0.6828 0.3461 0.5701 0.7547 0.3218 0.5522 
       
Non-Discretionary Accruals       
Mean -0.0323 -0.0210 -0.0282 -0.0170 -0.0244 -0.0337 
Median -0.0310 -0.0197 -0.0273 -0.0165 -0.0237 -0.0336 
Std. Deviation 0.0218 0.0167 0.0169 0.03324 0.0244 0.0154 
Minimum -0.1196 -0.1342 -0.1095 -0.1411 -0.1343 -0.1069 
Maximum 0.0129 0.0216 0.0061 0.0654 0.0587 0.0159 
       
Total Accruals       
Mean -0.0321 -0.0207 -0.0280 -0.0169 -0.0244 -0.0333 
Median -0.0367 -0.0142 -0.0238 -0.0293 -0.0259 -0.0280 
Std. Deviation 0.1055 0.0991 0.0959 0.1198 0.0843 0.1121 
Minimum -0.3814 -0.5285 -0.6879 -0.4982 -0.4006 -0.8210 
Maximum 0.6856 0.3300 0.5011 0.8018 0.3031 0.4961 
Table 6.3.6 presents the results of discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones (1991) 
model by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995).  The mean discretionary accruals decreased 
from the first to the fifth year of observation, but increased in the final year.  The changes in 
the mean discretionary accruals measured under this model are different from those derived 
using the Jones (1991) model as shown in Table 6.3.4.  The results also show that the median 
discretionary accruals increased during the three years before the full convergence.  The 
median discretionary accruals declined in the first two years of full convergence and 
substantially increased in the third year.  The changes in median discretionary accruals under 
this model and the Jones (1991) model are similar, which indicates that the use of median 
discretionary accruals is more consistent and more appropriate than mean discretionary 
accruals. 
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Table 6.3 7: Results of regression analysis based on performance-matched Jones 
ROAт by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005)  
 Before Full IFRS After Full IFRS 
  Independent Variables 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 5th Year 6th Year 
       
(Constant) -0.002 -0.005 -0.010 0.013 0.013 -0.014 
Δ Rev/lagged TA 0.039 0.078* 0.079* 0.229* -0.003 -0.027 
GPPE/lagged TA -0.058* -0.038* -0.040* -0.060* -0.055* -0.031** 
ROA 0.129*** 0.044 0.047 -0.018 -0.010 0.098** 
       
Model Fit       
R Square 0.058 0.060 0.057 0.157 0.073 0.028 
Adjusted R Square 0.050 0.053 0.049 0.150 0.066 0.020 
F Statistics 7.548 7.877 7.358 22.819 9.676 3.539 
P-value .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .015 
Table 6.3.7 presents the results of regression analysis based on another modified Jones (1991) 
model by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005).  Four models are proposed in the Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley (2005) study: the performance-matched Jones ROAт-1, performance-
matched Jones ROAт, performance-matched modified-Jones ROAт-1, and the performance-
matched modified-Jones ROAт.  The results indicate that the performance-matched Jones 
ROAт model produces the best model fit.  The F statistics and p-value of this model indicate 
that the coefficients of independent variables are jointly significant at 1% to the usual 
confidence interval for the first five years of observation and jointly significant at 5% in the 
final observation year.  The value of R² and adjusted R² are considered small (no greater than 
20%), suggesting that the higher percentage of the variation in total accruals can be explained 
by the discretionary accruals.  It is observable that the variation in total accruals explained by 
the non-discretionary accruals variables greatly increased in the 1
st
 year of full convergence 
but decreased in the following years similar to the regression statistics based on the Jones 
(1991) model. 
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Table 6.3 8: Results for the discretionary accruals, non-discretionary accruals, and 
total accruals based on performance-matched Jones ROAт by Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley (2005)  
 Before Full IFRS After Full IFRS 
   1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 5th Year 6th Year 
Discretionary Accruals       
Mean 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 
Median -0.0016 0.0036 0.0091 -0.0051 0.0001 0.0052 
Std. Deviation 0.1024 0.0961 0.0932 0.1100 0.0812 0.1105 
Minimum -0.3654 -0.5226 -0.6683 -0.4824 -0.3679 -0.7776 
Maximum 0.6730 0.3294 0.5126 0.6801 0.3209 0.5512 
       
Non-Discretionary Accruals       
Mean -0.0326 -0.0210 -0.0285 -0.0168 -0.0242 -0.0329 
Median -0.0320 -0.0210 -0.0288 -0.0204 -0.0228 -0.0319 
Std. Deviation 0.0254 0.0243 0.0228 0.0475 0.0229 0.0187 
Minimum -0.1209 -0.1486 -0.1227 -0.1755 -0.1309 -0.1423 
Maximum 0.0329 0.0995 0.0959 0.1922 0.0134 0.0317 
       
Total Accruals       
Mean -0.0321 -0.0207 -0.0280 -0.0169 -0.0244 -0.0333 
Median -0.0367 -0.0142 -0.0238 -0.0293 -0.0259 -0.0280 
Std. Deviation 0.1055 0.0991 0.0959 0.1198 0.0843 0.1121 
Minimum -0.3814 -0.5285 -0.6879 -0.4982 -0.4006 -0.8210 
Maximum 0.6856 0.3300 0.5011 0.8018 0.3031 0.4961 
The results in Table 6.3.8 show that the mean discretionary accruals decreased from 0.0005 
in the first year to 0.0003 in the second year, and increased to 0.0004 in the third year.  In the 
fourth year, the mean discretionary accruals decreased to -0.0001.  The reported mean 
discretionary accruals in the fifth and sixth year are -0.0002 and -0.0004.  The increase in 
negative figures indicates that the use of mean discretionary accruals has increased.  The 
changes in mean discretionary accruals measured using this model over the six years are 
different from the changes of mean discretionary accruals based on the Jones (1991) model in 
Table 6.3.4 and the modified Jones model by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) as shown 
in Table 6.3.4 and Table 6.3.6. 
The results also show that the median discretionary accruals increased over the three years 
before the full convergence.  In the first two years of full convergence, the median 
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discretionary accruals decreased, but substantially increased in the following year.  When 
comparing these results with the results from Table 6.3.4 and Table 6.3.6, it is evident that 
the changes in median discretionary accruals across the six years are similar.  This finding 
suggests that the median discretionary accruals are more reliable than mean discretionary 
accruals. 
Discussion of the results between three regression Models 
The two modified versions of the Jones (1991) model were analysed in conjunction with the 
original Jones (1991) model to provide a robustness check and to ensure that more reliable 
results were used.  The F statistics of the three regression models have shown that the 
coefficients of independent variables are jointly significant at 1% to the usual confidence 
interval for the first five years of observation and jointly significant at 5% or 10% (Jones 
(1991) model) for the final observation year.  This finding indicates that the three models can 
be used to explain the relationship between dependent variables and independent variables. 
When comparing the results of mean and median discretionary accruals presented in Tables 
6.3.4, 6.3.6 and 6.3.8, it appears that the changes in mean discretionary accruals are different 
for each of the three models, whereas the median discretionary accruals for the three models 
are consistent.  Therefore, the median discretionary accruals were selected to determine 
whether full IFRS convergence has restricted the management of listed companies from 
manipulating the earnings.  The results have shown that the median discretionary accruals 
increased over the three years before full IFRS convergence.  This finding suggests that the 
managements of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia applied discretionary accruals to a 
greater extent during the three years before full IFRS convergence.  The results also show 
that median discretionary accruals decreased in the first two years of full convergence, but 
increased substantially in the third year. Based on these results, it is arguable that Hypothesis 
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2 which anticipated that the full convergence with IFRS will significantly decrease the 
earnings management of the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia, is supported in terms of the 
first two years of full convergence, but is rejected in the third year.  These results imply the 
usefulness of full IFRS convergence in constraining the managements from engaging in 
earnings management in the short term. The substantial increase in discretionary accruals in 
the third year of full convergence suggests that IFRS may not be effective in ensuring higher 
quality financial reporting in the longer term.    
Comparison of Studies and Discussion of Findings 
The results in this study are compared mainly with the results obtained by Adibah Wan 
Ismail et al. (2013) and Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014).  These two studies are suitable for 
comparison because discretionary accruals have been used as a proxy of earnings 
management, and countries with an IFRS convergence process were used.  Adibah Wan 
Ismail et al. (2013) who examined the period before and after close alignment with IFRS 
(2002 to 2009) found that the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia had engaged in less 
discretionary accruals after MASB had begun aligning the national GAAP with IFRS.  This 
study has extended the research of Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013) to examine the period 
before and after full IFRS convergence (i.e. 2009-2014 for 2012 implementers or 2010-2015 
for 2013 implementers).   
When comparing the results of the close alignment period in Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013) 
and those of this thesis, it can be determined that the close alignment with IFRS in early years 
(2006 to 2009) has led to a decrease in discretionary accruals, but the close alignment with 
IFRS in the later years (2009 to 2011) led to increases in discretionary accruals.  This finding 
suggests that the managements are less inclined to manipulate earnings in the early years of 
IFRS implementation, but are more motivated to do so in the later years.  This argument is 
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supported by the changes in discretionary accruals evident during the three years after full 
convergence.  One problem that may distort the results in Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013) is 
the inconsistency of data collected from the database.  The figures of previous year provided 
in database may not follow the same accounting standards to the figures of the current year, 
which are required to calculate the changes in financial figures such as revenue and accounts 
receivable.  This study overcomes this possible issue by collecting the financial figures from 
the annual reports to ensure the previous year and current year financial figures follow the 
same accounting standards. 
Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) documented that the Brazilian listed companies reported reduced 
discretionary accruals when the country achieved full convergence with IFRS.  The 
difference in results reported by this study and those of Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) can be 
explained by the different contexts (Brazil versus Malaysia) of the two researches.  Empirical 
studies (Jeanjean & Stolowy 2008; Chua, Cheong & Gould 2012; Liu et al. 2014; Bryce, Ali 
& Mather 2015; Ebaid 2016) reported that the adoption of IFRS did not necessarily improve 
the quality of financial reporting.  In particular, the results of Liu et al. (2014) indicated that 
IFRS-based companies exercised greater earnings management through research and 
development investment than did the U.S. GAAP companies, which suggests U.S. GAAP is 
superior to IFRS.  Liu et al. (2014) explained that the imprecise rules of the principle-based 
standards of the IFRS may encourage structured earnings management. 
The increase in discretionary accruals during the last three years of close alignment with 
IFRS and the third year of full IFRS convergence may be explained by the weak enforcement 
of accounting regulations in Malaysia (Muniandy & Ali 2012), which encourage 
opportunistic earnings management behaviour by the managements of listed companies.  
Navarro-Garcia and Madrid-Guijarro (2014) reported that the adoption of IFRS in Germany 
effectively reduced the level of reported negative discretionary accruals by the listed 
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companies when the study controlled the incentive variables. Gray, Kang and Lin (2015) 
evidenced that the adoption of IFRS does not necessarily constrain the practice of earnings 
management; rather, the underlying cultural values (individualism versus uncertainty 
avoidance) of the nation determine the effectiveness of IFRS in restricting opportunistic 
managerial behaviour.  These studies support the argument that the incentive of the 
managements of the listed companies influences the effectiveness of IFRS implementation. 
 
6.4 Results and discussions on the relationship between discretionary accruals and 
the size of audit firms  
In this section, the results and discussion on the relationship between discretionary accruals 
and the size of audit firms i.e. Big 4 and non-Big 4 are presented.  The study first defined the 
final sample of the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia, analysed the percentage of 
companies audited by Big 4 as opposed to those audited by non-Big 4 firms, and presented 
the descriptive statistics for each control variable.  Pearson correlation and mulitple linear 
regression were applied to evaluate the correlation between each pair of variables, between 
dependent variable and each control variable, and to assess the relationship between 
discretionary accruals and companies audited by Big 4 versus non-Big 4 firms. 
Table 6.4 1: Final sample of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia 
  Industries Number of Companies Percentage (%) 
  Constructions 8 2.16 
  Consumer Products 80 21.62 
  Industrial Products 155 41.89 
  Technology 19 5.14 
  Trading Services 90 24.32 
  Others 18 4.87 
  Total 370 100.00 
Table 6.4.1 presents the final sample of 370 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia used to 
address the third research objective.  Two companies are removed from this sample as 
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compared to Table 6.3.1 because they presented inconsistent data (i.e. negative figures).  The 
final sample of listed companies is grouped according to sectors: construction (8), consumer 
products (80), industrial products (155), technology (19), trading-services (90) and others 
(18). 
Table 6.4 2: Numbers and percentage of companies audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 
audit firms 
  Before Full IFRS After Full IFRS 
Size of Audit Firms Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Big 4 203 54.9 205 55.4 202 54.6 196 53.0 191 51.6 183 49.5 
non-Big 4 167 45.1 165 44.6 168 45.4 174 47.0 179 48.4 187 50.5 
 Total 370 100.0 370 100.0 370 100.0 370 100.0 370 100.0 370 100.0 
Table 6.4.2 shows the numbers and percentages of listed companies audited by Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 audit firms for the three years before and three years after full IFRS convergence.  
The results show that more than half of the listed companies were audited by Big 4, except 
for the final (sixth) year.  There is a decline in the numbers and percentages of companies 
audited by Big 4 firms after full IFRS convergence, in particular for the final year.  The 
percentage of listed companies audited by Big 4 firms dropped from 53% in the first year of 
full IFRS convergence to 51.6% in the second year, and then down to 49.5 % in the third 
year.  Tables 6.4.3 to 6.4.5 below provide the descriptive statistics of discretionary accruals 
and various control variables, i.e. lagged TA, TL/TE, OCF/lagged TA, ROA and audit 
reports. 
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Table 6.4 3: Descriptive statistics for discretionary accruals  
 Before Full IFRS After Full IFRS 
Variables Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Discretionary Accruals       
Mean .0004 -.0004 .0004 .0005 -.0002 .0030 
Median -.0024 .0035 .0087 -.0052 .0006 .0064 
Std. Deviation .1030 .0964 .0931 .1102 .0801 .1030 
Minimum -.3724 -.5175 -.6679 -.4816 -.3667 -.7331 
Maximum .6739 .3280 .5069 .6813 .3218 .5496 
Table 6.4 4: Descriptive statistics for the four control variables (i.e. lagged TA, TL/TE, 
OCF/lagged TA and ROA) 
 Before Full IFRS After Full IFRS 
Variables Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
LOG TA       
Mean 8.4596 8.4765 8.4984 8.5145 8.5323 8.5593 
Median 8.3553 8.3805 8.4104 8.4397 8.4612 8.4955 
Std. Deviation .5468 .5444 .5540 .5588 .5609 .5702 
Minimum 7.3436 7.3909 7.4068 7.3831 7.4784 7.5102 
Maximum 10.8697 10.8728 10.9468 10.9958 11.0440 11.0687 
       
TL/TE       
Mean .8218 .7859 .7836 .8104 .7454 .7586 
Median .5981 .6006 .5747 .5701 .5313 .5281 
Std. Deviation .8192 .7306 .7281 1.0247 .7238 .8485 
Minimum .0458 .0365 .0277 .0265 .0143 .0091 
Maximum 6.2460 4.4918 5.1779 14.3601 4.6765 7.3116 
       
OCF/LAGGED TA       
Mean .0793 .0685 .0716 .0691 .0706 .0705 
Median .0813 .0596 .0641 .0641 .0590 .0612 
Std. Deviation .2815 .1056 .0986 .1011 .0976 .1171 
Minimum -5.0118 -.2591 -.4930 -.4079 -.2703 -.6834 
Maximum .6214 .6074 .5266 .4679 .5655 .7193 
       
ROA       
Mean .0520 .0474 .0475 .0439 .0492 .0343 
Median .0466 .0446 .0442 .0413 .0413 .0378 
Std. Deviation .0725 .0925 .0853 .1014 .0860 .1265 
Minimum -.1817 -.3391 -.3930 -.5244 -.2166 -1.1168 
Maximum .5178 .4659 .4908 .8375 .6006 .7025 
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Table 6.4 5: Numbers and percentage of listed companies that have unqualified, 
unqualified with emphasis and qualified or disclaimer of opinions 
 Before Full IFRS After Full IFRS 
Variables Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
 Unqualified 361 97.57 357 96.49 355 95.95 356 96.22 358 96.76 358 96.76 
Unqualified with emphasis 8 2.16 8 2.16 12 3.24 12 3.24 10 2.70 10 2.70 
Qualified or Disclaimer 1 0.27 5 1.35 3 0.81 2 0.54 2 0.54 2 0.54 
  Total 370 100.00 370 100.00 370 100.00 370 100.00 370 100.00 370 100.00 
Tables 6.4.6.1 to 6.4.6.6 present the correlation between the dependent variable – 
discretionary accrual – and the continuous control variables of log TA, TL/TE, OCF/lagged 
TA, ROA. 
Table 6.4.6. 1: Pearson correlation matrix for dependent variable and the four 
continuous control variables (Log TA, TL/TE, OCF/lagged TA 
and ROA) in first year of observation 
 1ST DA 1ST LOG TA 1ST TL/TE 1ST OCF/LAGGED TA 
1ST LOG TA Pearson Correlation .016    
Sig. (2-tailed) .761    
N 370    
1ST TL/TE Pearson Correlation .118* .268**   
Sig. (2-tailed) .023 .000   
N 370 370   
1ST OCF/LAGGED TA Pearson Correlation -.145** .102* -.004  
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .049 .932  
N 370 370 370  
1ST ROA Pearson Correlation .082 .143** -.238** .187** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .114 .006 .000 .000 
N 370 370 370 370 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
In the first year of observation, the Pearson correlation coefficient for each pair of variables 
that is significant based on a two-tailed test is as follows: 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for DA and TL/TE is 0.118 (p< 0.05); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for DA and OCF/lagged TA is -0.145 (p<0.01); 
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- Pearson correlation coefficient for Log TA and TL/TE is 0.268 (p<0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for Log TA and OCF/lagged TA is 0.102 (p<0.05); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for Log TA and ROA is 0.143 (p<0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for TL/TE and OCF/langged TA is -0.238 (p<0.01); and 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for OCF/lagged TA and ROA is 0.187 (p< 0.01). 
Table 6.4.6. 2: Pearson correlation matrix for dependent variable and the four 
continuous control variables (Log TA, TL/TE, OCF/lagged TA 
and ROA) in second year of observation 
 2ND DA 2ND LOG TA 2ND TL/TE 2ND OCF/LAGGED TA 
2ND LOG TA Pearson Correlation .027    
Sig. (2-tailed) .610    
N 370    
2ND TL/TE Pearson Correlation -.015 .240**   
Sig. (2-tailed) .775 .000   
N 370 370   
2ND OCF/LAGGED TA Pearson Correlation -.424** .112* -.078  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .031 .136  
N 370 370 370  
2ND ROA Pearson Correlation .039 .160** -.174** .462** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .456 .002 .001 .000 
N 370 370 370 370 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
In the second year prior to full IFRS convergence, the Pearson correlation coefficient for each 
pair of variables that is significant based on a two-tailed test is as follows: 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for DA and OCF/ lagged TA is -0.424 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for Log TA and TL/TE is 0.240 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for log TA and OCF/lagged TA is 0.112 (p< 0.05); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for log TA and ROA is 0.160 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for TL/TE and ROA is -0.174 (p< 0.01); and 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for OCF/lagged TA and ROA is 0.462 (p< 0.01). 
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Table 6.4.6. 3: Pearson correlation matrix for dependent variable and the four 
continuous control variables (Log TA, TL/TE, OCF/lagged TA 
and ROA) in third year of observation 
 3RD DA 3RD LOG TA 3RD TL/TE 3RD OCF/LAGGED TA 
3RD LOG TA Pearson Correlation -.016    
Sig. (2-tailed) .764    
N 370    
3RD TL/TE Pearson Correlation -.119* .288**   
Sig. (2-tailed) .023 .000   
N 370 370   
3RD OCF/LAGGED TA Pearson Correlation -.405** .112* -.035  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .031 .507  
N 370 370 370  
3RD ROA Pearson Correlation .039 .145** -.147** .509** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .454 .005 .005 .000 
N 370 370 370 370 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
In the third year of observation, the Pearson correlation coefficient for each pair of variables 
that is significant based on a two-tailed test is as follows: 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for DA and TL/TE is -0.119 (p< 0.05); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for DA and OCF/lagged TA is -0.405 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for log TA and TL/TE is 0.288 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for log TA and OCF/lagged TA is 0.112 (p< 0.05); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for log TA and ROA is 0.145 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for TL/TE and ROA is -0.147 (p< 0.01); and 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for OCF/lagged TA and ROA is 0.450 (p< 0.01). 
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Table 6.4.6. 4: Pearson correlation matrix for dependent variable and the four 
continuous control variables (Log TA, TL/TE, OCF/lagged TA 
and ROA) in the fourth year of observation 
 4TH DA 4TH LOG TA 4TH TL/TE 4TH OCF/LAGGED TA 
4TH LOG TA Pearson Correlation .001    
Sig. (2-tailed) .987    
N 370    
4TH TL/TE Pearson Correlation -.077 .267**   
Sig. (2-tailed) .138 .000   
N 370 370   
4TH OCF/LAGGED TA Pearson Correlation -.303** .101 .061  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .052 .239  
N 370 370 370  
4TH ROA Pearson Correlation -.015 .140** -.076 .450** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .772 .007 .143 .000 
N 370 370 370 370 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
In the fourth year of observation (first year of full IFRS convergence), the Pearson correlation 
coefficient for each pair of variables that is significant based on a two-tailed test is as follows: 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for DA and OCF/lagged TA is -0.303 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for log TA and TL/TE is 0.267 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for log TA and ROA is 0.140 (p< 0.01); and 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for OCF/lagged TA and ROA is 0.450 (p< 0.01). 
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Table 6.4.6. 5: Pearson correlation matrix for dependent variable and the four 
continuous control variables (Log TA, TL/TE, OCF/lagged TA 
and ROA) in the fifth year of observation 
 5TH DA 5TH LOG TA 5TH TL/TE 5TH OCF/LAGGED TA 
5TH LOG TA Pearson Correlation -.039    
Sig. (2-tailed) .457    
N 370    
5TH TL/TE Pearson Correlation .010 .309**   
Sig. (2-tailed) .849 .000   
N 370 370   
5TH OCF/LAGGED TA Pearson Correlation -.306** .108* -.093  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .038 .073  
N 370 370 370  
5TH ROA Pearson Correlation .036 .153** -.115* .623** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .496 .003 .027 .000 
N 370 370 370 370 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
In the fifth year of the observation, the Pearson correlation coefficient for each pair of 
variables that is significant based on a two-tailed test is as follows: 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for DA and OCF/lagged TA is -0.306 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for log TA and TL/TE is 0.309 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for log TA and OCF/lagged TA 0.108 (p< 0.05); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for log TA and ROA is 0.153 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for TL/TE and ROA is -0.115 (p< 0.05); and  
- Pearson correlation coefficient for OCF/lagged TA and ROA is 0.623 (p< 0.01). 
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Table 6.4.6. 6: Pearson correlation matrix for dependent variable and the four 
continuous control variables (Log TA, TL/TE, OCF/lagged TA 
and ROA) in the sixth year of observation 
 6TH DA 6TH LOG TA 6TH TL/TE 6TH OCF/LAGGED TA 
6TH LOG TA  Pearson Correlation -.001    
Sig. (2-tailed) .979    
N 370    
6TH TL/TE Pearson Correlation -.213** .305**   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   
N 370 370   
6TH OCF/LAGGED TA Pearson Correlation -.350** .180** .023  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .659  
N 370 370 370  
6TH ROA Pearson Correlation .004 .192** -.213** .519** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .938 .000 .000 .000 
N 370 370 370 370 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
In the third year of full IFRS convergence, the Pearson correlation coefficient for each pair of 
variables that is significant based on a two-tailed test is as follows: 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for DA and TL/TE is -0.213 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for DA and OCF/lagged TA is -0.350 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for log TA and TL/TE is 0.305 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for log TA and OCF/lagged TA is 0.180 (p< 0.01); 
- Pearson correlation coefficient for log TA and ROA is 0.192 (p< 0.01);  
- Pearson correlation coefficient for TL/TE and ROA is -0.213 (p< 0.01); and  
- Pearson correlation coefficient for OCF/lagged TA and ROA is 0.519 (p< 0.01). 
Based on the results, it can be determined that the discretionary accruals (dependent variable) 
and the OCF/lagged TA (control variable) have a significant negative relationship in all six 
years of observation.  This study anticipated that the discretionary accruals would decrease 
when the OCF/lagged TA increased.   
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Table 6.4.7. 1: Results of regression analysis of discretionary accruals and the four 
continuous control variables (Log TA, TL/TE, OCF/lagged TA and ROA) 
for the three years prior to full IFRS convergence 
 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
 B Coefficients t  B Coefficients t  B Coefficients t  
(Constant) .030 .352 -.050 -.715 -.014 -.208 
LOG TA -.006 -.612 .009 1.017 .006 .684 
TL/TE .021* 2.967 -.003 -.420 -.013** -2.121 
OCF/LAGGED TA -.062* -3.284 -.516* -11.057 -.538* -10.835 
ROA .224* 2.898 .301* 5.508 .338* 5.756 
       
R Square .057  .253  .255  
Adjusted R Square .046  .244  .246  
F 5.466  30.828  31.155  
Sig. .000  .000  .000  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level. 
 
Table 6.4.7. 2: Results of regression analysis of discretionary accruals and the four 
continuous control variables (Log TA, TL/TE, OCF/lagged TA and ROA) 
for the three years after full IFRS convergence 
  4th Year 5th Year 6th Year 
 B Coefficients t  B Coefficients t  B Coefficients t  
(Constant) -.028 -.327 .066 1.089 -.120 -1.559 
LOG TA .006 .619 -.006 -.866 .019** 2.086 
TL/TE -.006 -1.015 .002 .338 -.024* -3.801 
OCF/LAGGED TA -.399* -6.593 -.440* -8.824 -.403* -8.266 
ROA .153** 2.515 .352* 6.156 .146* 3.093 
       
R Square .113  .179  .203  
Adjusted R Square .103  .170  .194  
F 11.596  19.934  23.241  
Sig. .000  .000  .000  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level. 
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Tables 6.4.7.1 and 6.4.7.2 present the results of the regression analysis that determines the 
relationship between the discretionary accruals (dependent variable) and the log TA, TL/TE, 
OCF/lagged TA, and ROA (the control variables) for the three years before and the three 
years after the full IFRS convergence respectively.  The F-tests for the three years prior to 
full IFRS convergence are 5.466, 30.828 and 31.155 respectively and the p-value shows less 
than 0.01 for all three observations.  The F-tests for the three years after the full IFRS 
convergence are 11.596, 19.934 and 23.241 respectively, which are all significant (p< 0.01).  
These results indicate that, overall, the independent variables are jointly significant, which 
means that independent variables jointly explain the variation in the dependent variable. 
In particular, there are statistically significant relationships between the OCF/lagged TA and 
discretionary accruals as well as the ROA and discretionary accruals.  The b coefficients of 
OCF/lagged TA for the three years prior to full IFRS convergence are -0.062, -0.516, and -
0.538 respectively, which are significant (p< 0.01).  The b coefficients of OCF/lagged TA for 
the three years after the full IFRS convergence are reported as -0.399, -0.440 and -0.403 
respectively, which are significant (p< 0.01).  These results indicate that there is a statistically 
significant negative relationship between discretionary accruals and OCF/lagged TA for the 
six years of observation, suggesting that companies with higher operating cash flow are more 
likely to have lesser discretionary accruals.  The b coefficients of ROA for the three years 
before full IFRS convergence are 0.224, 0.301 and 0.338 respectively, which are significant 
(p< 0.01).  For the three years after full IFRS convergence, the b coefficients of ROA are 
0.153, 0.352 and 0.146 respectively, which are significant (p< 0.01).  These results of ROA 
indicate that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between discretionary 
accruals and ROA, suggesting that companies with greater ROA are more likely to have 
higher discretionary accruals.   
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Table 6.4.8. 1: Results of regression analysis for the relationship between discretionary 
accruals and Big 4 versus non-Big 4 in the three years prior to full IFRS 
convergence 
 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
 B Coefficients t  B Coefficients t  B Coefficients t  
(Constant) .037 .425 -.048 -.658 .003 .044 
  AFSIZE .004 .328 .001 .110 .008 .844 
LOG TA -.007 -.684 .008 .923 .003 .353 
TL/TE .021* 2.981 -.003 -.409 -.013** -2.071 
OCF/LAGGED TA -.063* -3.288 -.516* -11.000 -.541* -10.863 
ROA .223* 2.871 .301* 5.499 .336* 5.713 
       
R Square .057  .253  .256  
Adjusted R Square .044  .242  .246  
F 4.384  24.598  25.047  
Sig. .001  .000  .000  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level. 
Table 6.4.8. 2: Results of regression analysis for the relationship between discretionary 
accruals and Big 4 versus non-Big 4 in the three years after full IFRS 
convergence 
 4th Year 5th Year 6th Year 
 B Coefficients t  B Coefficients t  B Coefficients t  
(Constant) -.011 -.122 .062 .976 -.174** -2.160 
  AFSIZE .008 .681 -.002 -.194 -.023** -2.223 
LOG TA .004 .353 -.006 -.739 .027* 2.738 
TL/TE -.006 -1.001 .002 .325 -.025* -3.926 
OCF/LAGGED TA -.399* -6.591 -.439* -8.769 -.393* -8.076 
ROA .150** 2.459 .353* 6.150 .152* 3.235 
       
R Square .114  .179  .214  
Adjusted R Square .102  .168  .203  
F 9.356  15.913  19.782  
Sig. .000  .000  .000  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level. 
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Tables 6.4.8.1 and 6.4.8.2 show the results of the regression analysis that determine the 
relationship between discretionary accruals (dependent variable) and companies audited by 
Big 4 versus non-Big 4 (independent variable) for the three years before and the three years 
after full IFRS convergence.  This regression model includes four control variables, i.e. the 
log TA, TL/TE, OCF/lagged TA and ROA.  The F-tests for the six years are 4.384, 24.598, 
25.047, 9.356, 15.913 and 19.782, which are all significant (p< 0.01).  These results indicate 
that the independent variables jointly explain the variation in the dependent variable. 
The b coefficients of companies audited by Big 4 for the three years prior to full convergence 
are 0.004, 0.001, and 0.008, but these results are not significant (p> 0.1).  The b coefficients 
of companies audited by Big 4 for the three years after full IFRS convergence are 0.008, -
0.002 and -0.023, which are not significant except final year (p<0.05).  Based on the level of 
significance in the coefficient results, it can be determined that companies audited by Big 4 or 
non-Big 4 firms show no significant changes in discretionary accruals, except in the third 
year of full IFRS convergence.  In the final year of observation, companies audited by Big 4 
firms have statistically significant lower discretionary accruals of 0.023 than companies 
audited by non-Big 4. 
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Table 6.4.9. 1: Results of regression analyses for the relationship between 
discretionary accruals and Big 4 versus non-Big 4 in the three 
years (Including more control variables) prior to full IFRS 
convergence 
 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 
 B Coefficients t  B Coefficients t  B Coefficients t  
(Constant) -.204 -1.450 -.147 -1.674*** -.192 -2.195** 
AFSIZE .003 .309 .001 .098 .008 .895 
LOG TA .002 .136 .012 1.288 .008 .865 
TL/TE .021* 3.074 -.002 -.256 -.008 -1.277 
OCF/LAGGED TA -.057* -2.997 -.517* -10.748 -.581* -11.777 
ROA .182** 2.350 .293* 5.249 .361* 6.213 
UNQUALIFIED .191*** 1.871 .035 .887 .085*** 1.798 
UNQEMPHASIS .173 1.620 .007 .134 .039 .749 
Construction -.010 -.235 .062* 1.657 .029 .830 
Consumer Products -.010 -.392 .039* 1.735 .086* 4.104 
Industrial Products .021 .840 .032 1.494 .078* 3.902 
Technology -.017 -.516 .025 .879 .092* 3.464 
Trading Services -.013 -.508 .012 .553 .080* 3.883 
Year of Adoption -.041 -3.799 .008 .826 -.007 -.818 
       
R Square .126  .271  .314  
Adjusted R Square .094  .244  .289  
F 3.961  10.159  12.518  
Sig. .000  .000  .000  
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
177 
 
Table 6.4.9. 2: Results of regression analyses for the relationship between 
discretionary accruals and Big 4 versus non-Big 4 in the three 
years (Including more control variables) after full IFRS 
convergence 
 4th Year 5th Year 6th Year 
 B Coefficients t  B Coefficients t  B Coefficients t  
(Constant) -.168 -1.336 .019 .221 -.247** -2.154 
AFSIZE .008 .643 -.003 -.324 -.023** -2.176 
LOG TA .003 .259 -.004 -.497 .029* 2.805 
TL/TE -.005 -.802 .003 .561 -.024* -3.689 
OCF/LAGGED TA -.395* -6.328 -.445* -8.823 -.403* -7.925 
ROA .115*** 1.848 .347* 5.943 .155* 3.173 
UNQUALIFIED .161** 2.122 .001 .027 .070 1.051 
UNQEMPHASIS .107 1.322 -.039 -.668 .043 .594 
Construction .024 .526 .001 .019 -.005 -.137 
Consumer Products .014 .508 .032 1.637 -.012 -.471 
Industrial Products -.002 -.068 .027 1.465 -.007 -.314 
Technology -.008 -.220 .005 .195 .002 .064 
Trading Services .008 .275 .022 1.150 -.013 -.516 
Year of Adoption .005 .452 .007 .890 -.009 -.865 
       
R Square .137  .199  .221  
Adjusted R Square .106  .170  .192  
F 4.353  6.797  7.763  
Sig. .000  .000  .000  
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level. 
 
Tables 6.4.9.1 and 6.4.9.2 present the results of the regression analysis that include more 
control variables, i.e. the audit reports, sectors and year of adoption to determine the 
relationship between discretionary accruals (dependent variable) and companies audited by 
Big 4 versus non-Big 4 (independent variable) for the three years before and the three years 
after full IFRS convergence.  The F-tests of this regression model based on observations for 
the six years are 3.961, 10.159, 12.518, 4.353, 6.797 and 7.763, which are all significant (p< 
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0.01).  Based on the F-test and significant level, the overall independent and control variables 
jointly explain the variation in the dependent variable. 
The b coefficients of companies audited by Big 4 for the three years prior to full convergence 
are 0.003, 0.001 and 0.008, but the coefficients are not significant (p> 0.1).  The b 
coefficients of companies audited by Big 4 for the three years after full IFRS convergence are 
0.008, -0.003 and -0.023, which are not significant except in the final year (p<0.05).  Based 
on the level of significance in the coefficient results, it can be determined that there are no 
significant difference in discretionary accruals between companies audited by Big 4 and non-
Big 4, except in the final year of observation.  In the third year of full IFRS convergence, 
companies audited by Big 4 firms have statistically significant lower discretionary accruals of 
0.023 than companies audited by non-Big 4. 
Discussions on the results between Audit Firms Size and Discretionary Accruals 
The results of the relationship between discretionary accruals and Big 4 versus non-Big 4 in 
Table 6.4.8.1 and 6.4.8.2 are similar to those in Tables 6.4.9.1 and 6.4.9.2.  These results 
indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in the magnitude of change in 
discretionary accruals between companies audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4, except for the last 
year of observation where the results of both regression models show that the companies 
audited by Big 4 firms have statistically significant lower of 0.023 respectively in 
discretionary accruals compare to companies audited by non-Big 4.  Based on these results, it 
is arguable that Hypothesis 3 which anticipated that companies audited by Big 4 report lower 
earnings management than do the non-Big 4 clients, is supported.  
This study investigated the reasons that Big 4 audit firms have a significant impact on 
decreasing discretionary accruals in the final year but not in the other years based on the 
percentage of Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms and the changes in median discretionary 
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accruals.  In the final year of observation, the listed companies audited by Big 4 decreased to 
less than half of the sample (49.5%), which may explain why companies audited by Big 4 
have significant lower discretionary accruals in the final year.  These remaining listed 
companies may be taking their compliance with IFRS more seriously.  The median 
discretionary accruals shown in Table 6.4.3 increased in the third year of full IFRS 
convergence when compared to the first and second years of full IFRS convergence.  The 
increase in median discretionary accruals in the final year and the lower discretionary 
accruals found in companies audited by Big 4 suggest that the Big 4 audit firms do play a role 
in restricting the excessive use of discretionary accruals compared to non-Big 4. 
Comparison of Studies and Discussion of Findings 
The results in this section are compared to those of studies such as Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005), Liu et al. (2011), Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011), and Pelucio-
Grecco et al. (2014).  The results from Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) and Pelucio-
Grecco et al. (2014) have shown results similar to those of this study, but are inconsistent 
with those of Liu et al. (2011) and Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011). 
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) found that the adoption of IFRS in Germany increased 
the earnings management.  When comparing the companies audited by Big 4 and those 
audited by non-Big 4 firms, the study reported that the former have lower discretionary 
accruals than those audited by non-Big 4.  These results are similar to the results for the third 
year of full convergence.  These findings suggest that Big 4 auditors do restrict the 
managements from engaging in substantial earnings management.  Pelucio-Grecco et al. 
(2014) who found a decline in discretionary accruals after full IFRS convergence in Brazil 
reported that Big 4 auditors have no greater restricting effect than do the non-Big 4.  These 
results are similar to the results for the first two years of full convergence in this study, 
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suggesting that full IFRS convergence is the main reason for the decline in earnings 
management.   
Previous studies on the ASEAN region (i.e. Khurana & Raman 2004; Chia, Lapsley & Lee 
2007; Hermann, Pornupatham & Vichitsarawong 2008) have also evidenced that Big 4 
auditors are more effective in restricting earnings management than are the non-Big 4 firms 
when managements attempt to manipulate substantial earnings.  In particular, Hermann, 
Pornupatham and Vichitsarawong (2008) who documented that Thai companies reported 
more conservative earnings during post Asian financial crisis, also found that the 
involvement of Big 4 firms did not lead to more conservative earnings than non-Big 4.  The 
results from this study have confirmed the findings of previous ASEAN studies. 
 
6.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has provided details of the results and has revisited the research objectives.  The 
first section presents the results of the impact of full IFRS convergence on financial 
statements and financial ratios.  Overall, full IFRS convergence does affect the financial 
statements and financial ratios, particularly the profitability indicators.  This is in line with 
the findings of U.K. sample companies from Callao et al. (2010), Lueg, Punda and Burkert 
(2014) and Ali, Akbar and Ormrod (2016), suggesting that there are similarities between the 
Malaysian and U.K. national GAAP.  The results have also shown that the changes in 
financial statements and financial ratios are different for 2012 and 2013 adopters, small, 
medium-sized and large companies, and different industries. The study also analysed the 
changes in financial statements and financial ratios for the three years before and the three 
years after full convergence.  The comparisons of the results indicate that the balance sheet 
items and debt ratios were more affected during the final three years of close alignment with 
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IFRS than during the first three years of full IFRS convergence.  More significant differences 
are found in profitability indicators during the three years after full IFRS convergence than 
the three years before.  This finding implies that the effect of implementing IFRS is dispersed 
across the period of close alignment and full convergence with IFRS. 
The second section of this chapter presented the results pertaining to the magnitude change in 
discretionary accruals based on three models (i.e. Jones (1991) model, modified Jones (1991) 
model by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), and the modified Jones (1991) model by 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005)) for the final three years of close alignment and three 
years after full IFRS convergence.  The results show that the median discretionary accruals 
increased during the three years before full convergence.  The median discretionary accruals 
declined in the first two years of full convergence, but increased substantially in the third year 
of full convergence.  Based on this result, it can be argued that the full convergence with 
IFRS has limited the practice of discretionary accruals by the management of the listed 
companies but only in the early years of full IFRS convergence.  An decrease in discretionary 
accruals was also reported in the early years of IFRS close alignment i.e. 2005-2009 (Adibah 
Wan Ismail et al. 2013) but this study has reported increases in discretionary accruals in the 
later years, i.e. 2009-2011.  The increase in median discretionary accruals during the final 
three years of close alignment with IFRS and in the third year of full convergence suggests 
that managements are more confident or motivated to engage in earnings management after a 
few years of IFRS implementation.  This argument is in line with the findings of studies such 
as Navarro-Garcia and Madrid-Guijarro (2014) and Gray, Kang and Lin (2015).  The increase 
of opportunistic managerial behaviour may be due to the weak enforcement of IFRS 
implementation in Malaysia (Muniandy & Ali 2012). 
The last section provides the results and discussions of the relationship between discretionary 
accruals and the size of audit firms (Big 4 and non-Big 4) during the three years before and 
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the three years after full IFRS convergence.  The results have shown that the significant 
difference in discretionary accruals between companies audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 is 
only found in the third year of full convergence.  These results imply that Big 4 auditors are 
more effective in restricting earnings management after the full convergence with IFRS.  This 
is because the discretionary accruals increased during the three years before full convergence, 
but there is no significant difference in discretionary accruals between companies audited by 
Big 4 and non-Big 4.  When discretionary accruals have increased in the third year of full 
convergence, the companies audited by Big 4 have significant lower discretionary accruals 
than companies audited by non-Big 4.  The results for the first two years of full convergence 
suggest that full IFRS convergence is the main reason for the decrease in discretionary 
accruals.  These findings are consistent with those of previous studies such as Khurana and 
Raman (2004), Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), Chia, Lapsley and Lee (2007), 
Hermann, Pornupatham and Vichitsarawong (2008) and Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014).  These 
studies documented that the Big 4 have been able to restrict earnings management when 
company managements have manipulated substantial earnings. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
The adoption of IFRS by nations world-wide has substantially increased over the years, 
particularly in the ASEAN region with most of the countries (except Laos and Vietnam) 
adopted IFRS.  Malaysia, one of the countries in this region, began the process of 
convergence with IFRS in 2005 and achieved full IFRS convergence in 2012. The MASB 
began the process of participating in the harmonisation movement even before 2005.  Of the 
IFRS convergence ASEAN countries, among which are Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, 
Malaysia was the first to achieve full convergence with IFRS.  This country’s unique process 
of transition to full IFRS provided the motivation to investigate the impact of full 
convergence with IFRS on the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  Specifically, this study 
focused on two aspects of IFRS issues: the changes in financial statements and financial 
ratios, and the impact of IFRS on the quality of financial reporting.   
IFRS is perceived as a set of higher quality accounting standards that promotes transparency 
and accountability in financial reporting, which leads to the improvement of financial and 
capital markets (Ball 2006; Damant 2006; Alali & Cao 2010).  The adoption of IFRS will 
increase investors’ confidence in the quality of financial reporting.  In particular, Gordon, 
Loeb and Zhu (2012) documented that IFRS countries with developing economies received 
more foreign investments than did the developed economies.  Malaysia has a developing 
economy and high FDI, which makes this country an appropriate subject for this research.   
The effectiveness of IFRS adoption in improving the quality of financial reporting may be 
affected by the extent to which preparers are willing to comply with the accounting standards 
and the motivation of the enforcers to ensure compliance with regulated accounting standards 
(Ball 2006; Alali & Cao 2010).  Malaysia is a country with a low level of enforcement and 
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poor compliance with accounting regulations (Ball, Robin & Wu 2003; Muniandy & Ali 
2012).  These characteristics may reduce the effectiveness of full IFRS convergence in 
improving the quality of financial reporting. 
This study applied agency theory and signalling theory to explain how the full convergence 
with IFRS influences the financial reporting of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  Agency 
theory predicts that the full convergence with IFRS acts as a bonding mechanism on the 
managements of listed companies to restrict the manipulation of financial figures.  This 
restriction reduces information asymmetry (i.e. the information disclosed in financial 
statements) between the managements of the listed companies and the users of financial 
statements.  Signalling theory predicts the full convergence with IFRS signals that the 
financial statements prepared by Malaysian listed companies are with higher quality.  
Therefore, these two theories suggest that full IFRS convergence can improve the quality of 
financial reporting. 
This thesis first determined the impact of full IFRS convergence on financial statements and 
financial ratios of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  Based on a sample of 373 companies 
listed on Bursa Malaysia (excluded those in the finance sector), the study has found 
significant differences between financial figures and financial ratios reported under IFRS and 
under local GAAP.  In particular, the study found that listed companies reported greater debts 
during the period of close alignment with IFRS (i.e. 2009-2011) and reported greater profits 
during the full convergence period (i.e. 2012-2014).  The study also found that the reported 
revenue decreased during both the three years before and the three years after full IFRS 
convergence.  These significant changes in financial statements and financial ratios suggest 
that there is a change in the quality of financial reporting, which leads to the second research 
objective.  
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To determine the impact on the quality of financial reporting, this study observed changes in 
earnings management using discretionary accruals that are measured with the Jones (1991) 
model and the modified version of this model.  Based on the final sample of 372 listed 
companies, this study found that the earnings management activities decreased in the first two 
years of full IFRS convergence, but substantially increased in the third year.  This finding 
suggests that full IFRS convergence is effective in the short term, but not in the longer term.  
The comparison of the changes in earnings management between the early years of close 
alignment with IFRS (i.e. 2006-2009) reported in Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013) and the 
later years (i.e. 2009-2011) reported in this study also confirmed that IFRS implementation is 
effective in the short term, but not in the long run. 
The third research objective was to determine whether the Big 4 auditors are more effective 
in restricting the earnings management than are the non-Big 4 auditors during the full 
convergence period.  The results as presented in chapter 6 indicate that there was no 
significant difference in audit quality between Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms during the three 
years before full convergence, despite the increase in earnings management.  The results also 
indicated that Big 4 auditors are more effective in restricting earnings management than non-
Big 4 after the full convergence only when the earnings management increased substantially 
in the third year.  These results suggest that Big 4 auditors in Malaysia are more likely to 
provide greater audit quality when greater quality accounting standards are implemented. 
The findings of this thesis have indicated whether full IFRS convergence in Malaysia has 
achieved its purpose in improving the quality of financial reporting.  This information is 
important to the accounting standards-setting bodies, in particular the IASB and MASB.  The 
results indicated that full IFRS convergence is effective in restricting earnings management, 
suggesting that IFRS does improve the quality of financial reporting.  However, the IFRS 
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implementation is effective only in reducing earnings management in the short term.  This 
finding signals to the Malaysian accounting regulators the importance of strengthening the 
enforcement of IFRS implementation so that managements have less incentive to manipulate 
earnings management.  Nonetheless, the Big 4 auditors are more effective in restricting 
earnings management during the full convergence period than during the close alignment 
period.  This finding is beneficial for investors as it gives them more confidence in the 
financial statements prepared by companies that are audited by Big 4 audit firms. The 
findings of this thesis can also provide some guidance to neighbouring countries that are still 
undergoing the convergence process. In particular, these countries will be aware that IFRS 
full convergence improves the quality of financial reporting but this benefit may not sustain 
in longer-term.  These countries may seek effective method to strengthen the companies in 
complying with accounting standards.  
 
7.1 Limitations of the study  
The results of this study are subject to three limitations.  First, this study selected companies 
listed on Bursa Malaysia that have implemented IFRS (non-TE companies) and that do not 
belong to the finance sector.  This sector was excluded from research because it is regulated 
separately under the Banking and Financial Institution Act of 1989 (Abdul Rahman & 
Haneem Mohamed Ali 2006) and has a different working capital structure than those of other 
sectors (Klein 2002).  Listed companies that are defined as TE are allowed by the MASB to 
defer their IFRS implementation until 2018.  
Second, this study focused on one of the earnings management measurements, that is, the 
discretionary accruals that are frequently used in Malaysian research studies.  There are 
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several other earnings management measurements such as earnings smoothing, managing 
earnings towards small positive earnings, and abnormal working capital accruals. 
Third, this study examined the three years before and the three years after full IFRS 
convergence.  The MASB began the alignment of national accounting standards with IFRS in 
2005; however, the period of interest chosen for this research study was from 2009. The 
possible impact on financial statements and financial ratios during 2005-2009 is not captured.  
Nonetheless, Adibah Wan Ismail et al. (2013) have provided some insight on the quality of 
financial reporting during the earlier periods of close alignment with IFRS and found 
improvement on the quality of financial reporting. 
 
7.2 Suggestions for future research 
This thesis has determined whether the full convergence of IFRS has improved the quality of 
financial reporting.  In particular, this study focused on the discretionary accruals which are 
one of the earnings management proxies.  Future research could consider examining the 
changes in earnings management using other indicators, such as earnings smoothing and 
managing earnings towards small positive earnings (Barth, Langsman & Lang 2008).  The 
investigation of more earnings management proxies will provide a stronger indication of 
whether the quality of the reported earnings has improved.  Future research could also 
consider financial sectors and TE entities to determine whether the impact of IFRS adoption 
in these two sectors is similar to those examined in this study.   
As this study has been conducted only on Malaysia from the ASEAN region, further research 
based on all countries from the region that have adopted the IFRS may provide better 
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comparable data for financial regulators in the region or for the regulators in similar 
economies. 
The findings of this thesis indicate that the implementation of IFRS is effective only in 
reducing earnings management in the short term.  Future research could consider the factors 
that may increase earnings management.  For instance, researchers could investigate whether 
the managements of listed companies have complied with the IFRS and whether the increase 
in earnings management is due to the lack of the enforcement of IFRS.  
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